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We do not see our hand in what happens, so we call certain 
events melancholy accidents when they are the inevitabilities 
of our projects (I, 75), and we call other events necessities 
because we will not change our minds.
Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Walden
I now regret very much that I did not yet have the courage 
(or immodesty?) at that time to permit myself a language of 
my very own for such personal views and acts of daring, la-
bouring instead to express strange and new evaluations in 
Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulations, things which 
fundamentally ran counter to both the spirit and taste of Kant 
and Schopenhauer. What, after all, did Schopenhauer think 
about tragedy?
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy
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Introduction
regrettable politics
This book is born of an effort to take regret seriously as a political emotion. 
It is also an attempt to understand the oft- professed absence of regret — 
 the decisive moment in which one declares that one regrets nothing — not 
as a sign of virtue, as it is typically heard in boast, but as an expression of 
conviction. By “conviction,” I mean a commitment to first principles, or 
the betrayal of human complexity and the diversity of life in the ongoing 
adherence to what we have only ever believed in one way. If I profess my 
conviction, if I give it a name, I usually do so when the corresponding 
signs of my belief — what I believe and what I want you to believe even 
more than I do, so that I am never left to doubt myself — have gone miss-
ing in the world. If what I believe is best has always been before me in the 
right way, why would I protest? The tautological character of conviction 
is such that its seeming and ceaseless relevance depends on the constant 
absence or presence of whatever this or that holder of conviction seems 
to prize most. In order to maintain my sense of conviction, I must re-
main unsatisfied and also always without remorse, so that my perpetual 
dissatisfaction can stand as proof that I have only ever been right about 
what I believe to be wrong. The political left and the political right are 
equally susceptible to conviction in just this sense, which can only name 
a perpetual absence that must be corrected by various means of insistence 
on what does not change, whether rhetorically, in the form of dogmatic 
speech, or else as real violence.
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Is this not the lesson of Adolf Eichmann, the haunting advocate of 
the clear conscience, the most infamous opponent of regret? Recall Eich-
mann’s famous declaration about regret, published in English translation 
in Life in 1960. The phrase, of course, has become a commonplace of pop-
ular culture: “But to sum it all up, I must say that I regret nothing. Adolf 
Hitler may have been wrong all down the line, but one thing is beyond 
dispute: the man was able to work his way up from lance corporal in the 
German army to Führer of a people of almost 80 million. I never met him 
personally, but his success alone proves to me that I should subordinate 
myself to this man.”1 Most striking in Eichmann’s claim to have no re-
grets is the attendant admission that Hitler “might have been wrong all 
down the line,” an admission he made, it should be emphasized, to a fel-
low ss officer turned Dutch journalist in Argentina in 1955.2 That is, Eich-
mann was speaking to someone with whom he could trust to be already 
in agreement — not a reporter from Life but someone he was bound to by 
a shared sense of conviction. Likely, Eichmann experienced the feeling as 
an expression of duty. This is what allowed Eichmann, and presumably 
the Dutch journalist in exile, to recognize a right that did not diminish 
every other wrong so much as render those wrongs ethically irrelevant on 
the basis of what Richard Rorty has described, in critical terms, as a “pref-
erence ranking.” For Rorty, preference rankings are what follow, in certain 
strains of moral philosophy, from an inability to accept that “the boundar-
ies of the self are fuzzy and flexible,” which leads moral philosophers — 
and also Eichmann, in no sense a philosopher — to draw lines around 
selves where there may be none and to develop systems “which divid[e] 
people up according to whom one would prefer to be fed first, for ex-
ample.”3 What mattered most to Eichmann was the becoming- Führer of 
Hitler, the invocation of eighty million as a picture of consensus, and 
consensus as the becoming- arbiter of the Good.
Curiously, Eichmann’s response in the interview unfolds in the rhetor-
ical structure of a preference ranking in process. It is one that depends, as 
any preference ranking must do — and however tacitly it happens — on a 
consideration of potential regrets. If Eichmann begins the ending of his 
confession by saying, “But to sum it all up” (the clause that always goes 
missing in its everyday citation), it is because he earlier admits in the 
interview that he did, in fact, regret something:
introduction · 3
There was only one thing I regretted. If I had not been in a state of 
shock at this time, I would have done more for my wife and children. 
Unfortunately, I did not make provision for them ahead of time, un-
like the gentlemen from the Intelligence Section of Schellenberg’s, the 
so- called kid- glove boys in the S.S. I, too, could have had my family 
securely wrapped in a very comfortable cocoon of foreign exchange 
and gold. In fact, I could have easily sent them on to the farthest, the 
most neutral of foreign countries. Long before the end, any of the Jews 
I dealt with would have set up foreign exchange for me in any country 
I had named, if I had promised any special privileges for them.
As it was, I was able to give my wife only a briefcase full of grapes 
and a sack of flour before going up into the mountains from Altaussee. 
I had also given them poison capsules, one for my wife and one for 
each child, to be swallowed if they fell into the hands of the Russians.4
There is, of course, an even more chilling discussion of regret, even if the 
word isn’t used — chilling precisely as a testament to Arendt’s well- known 
and controversial claim of Eichmann’s stupidity in place of an idea that 
he was, by essence, evil. Save for the fact that what Eichmann appears to 
do in the interview is to invoke potential mistakes and begin to classify 
them. Even earlier in the interview, for instance, Eichmann reports that 
“Himmler went on to say that he had made some mistakes. ‘I’ll tell you 
one thing, Eichmann,’ he said, ‘if I have to do it over again, I will set up the 
concentration camps the way the British do. I made a big mistake there.’ I 
didn’t know exactly what he meant by that, but he said it in such a pleasant, 
soft way that I understood him to mean the concentration camps should 
have been more elegant, more artful, more polite.”5 Setting aside, for the 
moment, the odd assumption that Eichmann makes about the notion of 
a better — “more elegant, more artful, more polite” — concentration camp, 
what we see here is a steady movement from mistake (Himmler) to re-
gret (about his wife and children) to the final determination that, in sum, 
he has no regrets at all (how could eighty million people be wrong?). 
In other words, Eichmann separates reason and emotion in the very act 
of establishing a preference ranking, so that what might have produced 
pangs of regret — his wife and kids with a bag of grapes and a pocket full 
of poison — is, for him, no real cause for regret at all, since the best thing 
that could have happened, according to his logic, happened. Eichmann’s 
response is not so unusual in terms of the way that regret is regularly 
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regarded: as long as the best is realized, so long as virtue is achieved or 
observed, regret can be understood not as a response to a mistake but in-
stead as a mistake in itself. It is the kind of mistake — perhaps the only of 
its kind — in which the consequences of that mistake disappear in the in-
stant of its identification. For example, what Eichmann seems to assume, 
or simply wants his reader to believe, is that every choice comes down to 
an evaluation of the relative value of potential goods, which makes regret 
both possible and unnecessary at once, insofar as choice is never under-
stood as something that we make without an enclosed, auto- democratic 
scale.
There is, of course, nothing terribly unusual about such an insistence 
on the separation of reason and emotion, especially as that separation is 
very often made in response to the manifestation of regret. The distinc-
tion is as common to Western philosophy as it is to Eichmann’s special 
brand of stupidity. As we’ll see in chapter 1, for instance, Aristotle con-
sidered regret to be useless to both the determination and the experience 
of virtue. Alternatively, one could argue against such a notion, as Janet 
Landman, author of a pioneering study of regret, has, and say instead that 
“regret is a form of inductive reason in that it proceeds from the given to 
the not given, comparing what is (a particular ‘given’) with what might 
have been.”6 It is the feeling of regret that cannot be separated from the 
act of distinction and comparison. Our thought is motivated, in such an 
account, by a feeling about something that has transpired and that we 
now revisit, rationally. It could also be said that regret, if we take the 
claim for inductive reason seriously, is a feeling that brings us back to 
reason. This is not so far from the way that the problem has been taken 
up in moral philosophy around the idea of rational regret, which in most 
cases involves the establishment of what should count as a greater or 
lesser good, so that we can say, without fear of self- deception or absurdity, 
that we have good reason to regret having chosen x rather than y.7 Or as 
Thomas Hurka puts it, “The regret is rational as an instance of propor-
tional love [in which we divvy up and rank our feelings in relation to the 
relative merits of each possible good, whether state or object, that will be 
included in decision], but like all such love it becomes less rational for 
more remote possibilities.”8 So, for Hurka, it would be rational to regret 
experiencing bad weather when on holiday, insofar as we will have missed 
out on an anticipated pleasure, but not more than one would regret miss-
ing out on the pleasure “you would have enjoyed had a stranger given 
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you a million dollars on the beach or had aliens abducted you and taken 
you to an intergalactic pleasure palace.”9 In other words, regret can be 
understood as rational if we retain a sense of the inherent value of things, 
on the one hand, and impose modest limits on our imaginations, on the 
other. But it is hard for me to imagine what good such modesty might 
bring, beyond the assurance it may provide us about what we have chosen 
to do or accept or else decline. If I am forced to imagine an intergalactic 
pleasure palace in order to understand why I chose to visit Seattle when I 
could have gone to Palm Springs, then it would be hard to imagine a use 
for regret in the world of political experience, or even, in the realm of the 
social, as it involves an experience with others whom we do not, exactly, 
comprehend.
By contrast, at the core of this book is an argument that regret is un-
conditionally transformative, and thus of no real import for reason. Re-
gret is unconditionally transformative in that when I feel a pang of regret 
when revisiting an image or memory of something I have done and imag-
ine how I might have done it differently, but without any definite image of 
what I might do next time, knowing what I now think I know, I do not proj-
ect something because I feel I am in possession of nothing. And, besides, 
if there is a next time, it will not be the same time that has already passed 
me by. Regret is not restorative, just as we imagine paintings to be subject 
to restoration, inasmuch as we consider paintings to be things that can be 
cleaned or repaired in time or in the event of an accident (the risk of time): 
shown as they really were, shown now as they truly are. For instance, if 
I turn down my friend’s invitation for drinks on Thursday night, after 
having done the same thing to her repeatedly before and for the same 
reason, she may decide to stop trying; she may cease to be my friend. A 
few months pass by and I realize that I have not heard from my friend. 
When I write and when I call, I receive no reply. I begin to feel regret. I 
begin to wonder about myself. I dwell on the event of our last moment of 
contact, which is also my most recent appeal to my supposed busyness. 
Now that I feel the loss of my friend, my work seems less pressing than 
it did before; or, at least, I can see that it was not so pressing in this one 
instance — not enough, as it turns out, to jeopardize a friendship I have 
valued, since for her, this one instance was yet one more instance of the 
same. In revisiting the scene of my decision, I imagine an alternative — 
I imagine what I believe would have been a better thing to do. I may even 
recall previous instances in which I responded in roughly the same way. 
6 · introduction
But I do not expect, as a consequence of what my regret now helps me 
to see, that I will have the same opportunity with the same person if I do 
now what I should have done before. I do not engage in these reflections 
on the condition that I will win this particular friend back, that my orig-
inal image of our friendship will be restored just as it was, even if such 
a thing happens to happen. In all likelihood, this friend will have moved 
on, will have seen no reason to try again. In this case, which I take to be 
the more typical occasion of regret, I cannot enact a transformation in 
the same state. Rather, I become aware of my habit, of my inclination to 
deflect social obligations on the grounds of my busyness, recognizing 
that very few of us feel overwhelmed with available time. In attempting 
to mark my particular burden — she couldn’t understand how busy I really 
am, what it is like to do what I do — I say of myself what distinguishes me 
from no other. I may not become a friend again to the one who has gone, 
but I recognize that in order to be a friend, I will have to address my habit 
of announcing my busyness. Even if my friend decides to try again, the 
friendship will look different than it did before. Likewise, I will take on 
a different image of myself for myself, even if I cannot say who it is that 
my next friend will be. If I can predict a friend, I will have no friend. In 
order to have a friend, I will have to be capable of regret.
If we imagine regret as something subject to proportion, indicated by 
it — to a divvying up of relative value across a range of possible actions 
and possible goods — I can easily see how regret, in my case, might be a 
reasonable thing to feel. But all that would come of such a response is the 
assurance that my decision was in fact a bad decision. I really was a bad 
friend, which means that I have been incapable of imagining someone 
else’s experience from a perspective other than my own. However, if I 
can divide my feelings across a range of objects, states, or relations, then 
I will be noticeably involved in a preference ranking, which depends, ul-
timately, on the presence of a system or at least an ethos — on whatever 
it is that allows me to declare my conviction — that will ultimately negate 
the significance of the distinctions that I nevertheless make for the sake 
of comparison and decision. I tend to agree with Richard Rorty that the 
notion of morality exists — if it is to be in any way useful — as a way of 
explaining decisions that we make that seem to us unnatural, or at least 
potentially counterintuitive, as when I “feel an obligation to deprive both 
my children and myself of a portion of the available food because there 
are starving people outside of the door.”10 Morality, in this sense, comes 
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to define a duty I feel to others without having a picture of their particu-
larity or a sense of their relation to me on the basis of something more 
obviously value- dependent than the fact of our shared need to eat. By con-
trast, “the term ‘moral obligation’ becomes increasingly less appropriate 
to the degree to which we identify with those whom we help: the degree to 
which we mention them when telling ourselves stories about who we are, 
the degree to which their story is our story.”11 In other words, if I identify 
as Christian and I help someone on the basis of their being Christian as 
well, then there is nothing moral in what I do. If I help an atheist on the 
basis of our shared atheism, then there is nothing moral in what I do. In 
order to determine the relative value of things in this way, I would first 
need to define the limit of a moral economy, the categorical imperative 
that follows from a question that really never is one: that is, what makes 
a Christian a Christian? What makes an atheist an atheist? Preference 
rankings. Having restricted the terms of a moral economy, I can estab-
lish related bureaus (categories within the category) to imagine levels of 
intensity or completion based on a difference that cannot be sustained as 
a difference precisely because difference is what the category needs and 
also needs to reject. By contrast, we might say that any morality worthy of 
the name does not prize conviction but instead its asymmetrical cousin, 
which is where or, better, how it is that one runs the risk of regret as the 
beyond of reason. It is beyond reason because it is without a picture or 
ready- made system of evaluation.
This is precisely what Eichmann failed to recognize. In his confession to 
a fellow Nazi, by listing a series of regrets, he comes to the rational conclu-
sion that he has no regrets at all, since what he chose was reasonable, in the 
general economy of Nazism, to choose. As Arendt has shown, Eichmann 
defended his actions as the lawful observation of what was then the law 
(i.e., his claim to being a mere bureaucrat) and despite the fact that the per-
sistence of this lawfulness would become the proof of the unlawful in time, 
since Eichmann will have felt no need to deny that he did what he was 
accused of doing, only how it was being understood in Israel, in a different 
place and a different time. Arendt said, “Eichmann, much less intelligent 
and without any education to speak of, at least dimly realized that it was 
not an order but a law which had turned them all into criminals. The 
distinction between an order and the Führer’s word was that the latter’s 
validity was not limited in time and space, which is the outstanding char-
acter of the former.”12 This difference — which Arendt marks as one that 
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exists between a response to an order and a response to the law — is also, I 
would argue, where we can locate a distinction between regret and its ab-
sence, between thinking and knowing. That is to say, any response to an 
order is subject to regret, to a feeling that occasions thinking, just where 
there had not been a sufficient amount of thinking before. Regret is, at 
the same time, adventitious to thoughtfulness, to a way of becoming re-
sponsive to things that may not be of concern to me — at least not yet, nor 
in memory — but that I take to matter in some way that I do not, or need 
not, fully understand as if it were my own experience. When thinking, I 
am thinking about something in particular, regardless of how clearly or 
distinctly said thing is to me at any point. When thoughtful, I am gen-
erally attentive: I look for nothing in particular but remain responsive to 
what appears. Eichmann appealed, instead, to knowledge, to established 
ways of being and doing, to a system of preferences that had become law, 
had become iterative. Eichmann hoped, as we know, that his will would 
come to be defined, paradoxically and in time, by a lack of agency that 
stems from the observance of the law. This is what made him, in Arendt’s 
eyes, stupid. He deferred to knowledge, seemed, even, to believe in it.
We might say, then, that Eichmann felt no regret because he could not 
think, could only refer to the categories that were in operation when he 
acted. This is certainly Arendt’s point. It also explains the odd response to 
Himmler: rather than take on the gravity of what had been done, take on 
the opportunity of regret for himself, Eichmann supposes that Himmler’s 
mistake could only mean that the concentration camps could simply be 
made nicer, “more polite.” As Arendt famously argued, one’s capacity 
for evil is not an inherent trait, not even a capacity really, but an unwill-
ingness (rather than an inability) to think. “The sad truth,” she wrote, 
“is that most evil is done by people who never made up their mind to be 
either bad or good.”13 This does not mean, however, that they act without 
conviction. Rather, conviction is what follows from an inability to think, 
an inability to subject to constant evaluation in different terms what we 
profess to believe, and to carry on instead with the divvying up, by de-
grees, of the always already related. This is why, for Arendt, thinking has 
to be understood as a particular form of political activity, in at least two, 
if not many more, important ways. First, she says that “the need to think 
can be satisfied only through thinking, and the thoughts which I had 
yesterday will satisfy this need today only to the extent that I can think 
them anew.”14 In this regard, what defines conviction is the very refusal 
introduction · 9
to reimagine and redescribe the terms for doing now what we have done 
before. I take this point to be especially crucial to understanding why it 
is that we might want to carry on with a particular order of the social that 
we, as a political constituency, have worked so hard to enact, in place of 
an overestimation of failure as the key to emancipatory politics — an odd 
commonplace, in my view, of leftist politics. Second, thinking is political 
insofar as it produces a different way of acting, even if doing is what 
the activity of thinking cannot help but interrupt: “When everybody is 
swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, 
those who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join is 
conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action.”15 This, it seems to 
me, describes the two main experiences of political life — the decision to 
carry on, which must be expressed as a redescription of the same, and the 
decision to dissent, at which point my thinking sets me apart from others. 
In being set apart by how I think, what I think becomes an alternative in 
which others can join me. As an alternative, and as a political expression, 
what I think gains its force on the basis not of what we have seen, but of 
what we do not yet know. The experience of regret is important to both 
options. If I stand out, and not because of the force of my thought but 
by way of its absence, I have the opportunity to return to what I regret 
having rejected. And in this sense, it makes no difference whether my 
rejection was a result of my passivity or of a decision I consciously made. 
The condition- less condition of my return is that I find a different way of 
thinking about what it is that I wish to continue doing, continue being 
part of; or else I return to and do better with it next time. In boasting that 
I have no regrets, I admit only that I am incapable of thinking.
For this reason, I am inclined to limit my theory of regret here largely 
to political considerations, with the hope that we can agree that regret is 
the experience we have of feeling compelled by a world and also, at times, 
mistaking that world, recognizing, in time — however quickly, however 
slowly — that worlds are made and sustained and in that way they remain 
unknowable in relation to first principles. One surely could, as many in 
fact have, write about more ordinary experiences of regret, regrets of a 
more personal, and sometimes trivial, kind. One such instance would be 
when we order a plate at dinner that we know we don’t want as much as 
something else and it turns out badly, or when we decide to buy some-
thing that we don’t really need and cannot afford — to state the more shal-
low instances of ordinary regret. Such experiences, I imagine, do have 
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something to teach us, but such decisions (and the regrets that follow) 
occur within very particular, and rarely transferable, economies of taste, 
in the first instance, or wealth, in the second, or sometimes both at once. 
They may matter, these regrets, but never to anyone other than the one 
who experiences them, or is implicated in the same relative and restricted 
economy (no matter how large it is). Alternatively, it is just as common, 
and thus much more important as a consideration, to experience regret 
in response to the death of a loved one, in which case our regrets follow 
from our reflection on what we did or failed to do before the end of the 
loved one’s life. The regret that we feel in the event of the death of a loved 
one, which is often propaedeutic to mourning, is not as easy to disasso-
ciate from the political feeling of regret that I will be dealing with here, 
insofar as our feeling of regret includes the acknowledgment that the 
one who has passed is gone forever. So, in this sense, regret may, most 
simply — and also, potentially, most profoundly — be what reminds us of 
our finitude, and the finitude of every other, to the extent that a shift in 
how we perceive and act in the world changes in some way or another. 
Regret reawakens our thoughtfulness and potentially our moral sense, if 
by moral we understand our capacity to extend our care and consideration 
to beings about whom, and for whom, we have no picture at hand.
In linking regret to mourning, however uncontroversial such a sugges-
tion seems to be at first blush, I am concerned to distinguish regret from 
melancholia, especially since I want to understand regret as a politically 
useful emotion. For one, regret is, in my account, not only an important 
political emotion: it is the affective registration of thought itself. As Freud 
famously argued, melancholia “is related to an object- loss which is with-
drawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which 
there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious.”16 This is what regret 
shares with mourning, even if the two states must also be told apart: if I 
am in mourning, or experiencing regret, I know what has passed, what 
it meant to me (or at least, in the case of regret, what I thought it meant 
to me, and how I might understand what passed now), and also that it 
will no longer be as it was. And while Freud prescribed no time limit 
for mourning — it would take whatever time it took, and could not be 
controlled — it was understood to be a state that we pass through, precisely 
because we know why, more or less, we feel the way that we do, even if 
we are not in possession of an ability to bring those emotions to an end. 
In the case of melancholia, Freud argued that the patient “knows whom 
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he has lost but not what he has lost in him.”17 In a state of melancholia, at 
least in Freud’s terms, and precisely as a pathological condition, I expect 
what has passed to return again and again, just as it was; and what returns 
as the same does so as both sign and source of the deep disregard I have 
for myself. Or as Eugenie Brinkema puts it, “Melancholia, in a sense, just 
uses the self up.”18
In The Forms of the Affects, Brinkema has identified, with respect to 
Freud’s distinction between mourning and melancholia, an important 
problem with attempts to understand melancholia itself as “the grounding 
disposition of the political.”19 Noting a tendency within trauma studies and 
the political valorization of loss as such, Brinkema describes a tendency 
in political theory to conflate mourning, which can be generative — 
simply because the work that mourning does is to deliver us, emotionally, 
from an absence, and a memory that gives an image to absence, to a state 
of being in the world in a different way — with melancholia, which blocks 
transformation. As she notes, trauma theorists have ignored, in the work 
of conflating the two states that Freud was careful to keep separate, the 
unceasing and expressly unproductive negativity of melancholia: “For 
melancholia in Freud’s version of 1917 is anti- mediating: its stickiness 
to the past is precisely a recursive loop of painful attachment that cannot 
renounce, that never synthesizes, that is temporarily pathological for its 
expanded affective duration without end or change. It does not transform, 
and it is not transformative. Thus, a ‘politics of mourning’ that involves 
mediation requires a dialecticizing of that which is unmediatable in the 
original treatment of mourning.”20 It seems to me that our tendency to say 
we have no regrets, upon surveying aspects of our own behavior in view 
of a moral self- appraisal, is importantly related to an anxiety (whether 
perceived or not) that follows from the recognition that we have erred, in 
this way or some other, which will deliver us to the depths of melancholia. 
We also assume that mourning, which overlaps with regret as a reflection 
on loss, is merely a passage to the permanent condition of melancholia, 
the cursed mutuality of hatred and eradication of the self. And as Freud 
was careful to point out, mourning is not just a response we have to the 
loss of a valued person or relationship, but it follows, as well, from “the 
loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s 
country, liberty, an ideal, and so on.”21 Hence the political dimension of 
mourning but not of melancholia. So, if what I fear is the passage from 
mourning to melancholia in admitting to myself, if not also to others, that 
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I have been or done wrong, I am inclined to say that I have no regrets. If 
I have no regrets, I can forestall the permanent ruin that I perceive to fol-
low from an admission of regret, which is something I know anyway but 
refuse to countenance, finally, for myself. I may even convince myself so 
thoroughly that I do not experience the early pangs of mourning, which 
I conflate with regret and also fear as a passage to melancholia. Even the 
most casual reader of Dostoevsky, however, will attest to the impracticality 
of that strategy. Eichmann, like Dostoevsky’s underground man, obvi-
ously could not stop talking, which I take to be a condition of the denial 
of regret itself. One has to go on making the same case to oneself and to 
others, which suggests that in denying regret — in declaring that we have 
none — we do not avoid the non- generative repetition of the same that 
follows from melancholia, in Freud’s account. Rather, we proudly arrive 
there by the very means of its denial. What we repeat and experience for-
ever, in the professed absence of regret — as summary expression — are 
the very terms of our refusal, which take on a phenomenal aspect that will 
not change so long as we keep talking.
I will come at this problem in a different way in chapter 2, by think-
ing about the problem of advice — whether received from a trusted mentor 
or a bureaucrat, trusted or untrustworthy, upon whom we nevertheless 
depend — as the continuation of a way of seeing and being in the world 
that the mentor and/or bureaucrat extends to the one who seeks counsel 
precisely as a way of anticipating regret. I won’t come back directly to the 
question of melancholia, since what interests me is the productive potential 
of regret, but what I say there about the experience of possibilization — 
when we experience the world and our way in the world as the result of a 
deference to known ways of being and doing — describes a non- pathological 
mimicry, and thus experience, of the pathological dimension of melancho-
lia. Or at least, I am concerned to indicate what possibilization shares with 
melancholia as a form of repetition that prevents us from seeing differ-
ence in what repeats — which is akin, but not identical, to Freud’s observa-
tion that the melancholic “knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost 
in him.”
My preference, conceptually speaking, for possibilization in place of 
melancholia is in this very way motivated by the same political problem 
that Brinkema detects in the valorization of melancholia in trauma stud-
ies. Recourse to the possible — by which, in a more deconstructive tra-
dition, which I discuss in detail in chapter 2, one indicates something 
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that has happened at least once and thus can be duplicated as experi-
ence — is a major, if often unacknowledged, trope of political theory. It 
is what happens when we bluntly project a previous political ambition, a 
previous version of the political as a desired ground for new and better 
social relations, onto situations that genuinely demand political interven-
tion but bear little relation to the specificity of the events that gave rise to 
the political discourse to which we remain devoted and see as the right 
solution for nearly every struggle everywhere. “Historical consciousness” 
becomes in this way a euphemism for possibilization and conviction. It 
announces itself in the drawing up of parallels between one moment and 
another that, on the one hand, denies the problem that led to a failure in 
its original implementation (or characterization as record of historical 
events, such as when we say, too simply, that May ’68 failed because there 
was no systematic plan in place for a new and more emancipatory model 
of social relations). On the other hand, it is also what happens when we 
fail to notice how the specificity of our own crisis is motivated by concerns 
and relations very different from the ones that animated the source of our 
sense of political identification and transhistorical affiliation. An example 
of this would be when we assume that the crisis of the university today is 
a symptom of both why the strikes of May ’68 occurred and how the same 
conditions returned in enlarged form as a result of that “failure.” Put 
differently, possibilization is an effect that follows from the submission 
of our politics to preference rankings, or else from when we derive our 
politics from them, which means that not only do we operate with a sense 
of the Good, but we do so as if it were essential in our case and inessential 
in every other case. Put differently still, as Jacques Rancière has, “what 
is proper to politics is thus lost at the outset if politics is thought of as a 
specific way of living.”22
Such, it seems to me, are the problems that have beset radical politics 
for some time. In asking, as Lenin so famously did in his eponymous 
pamphlet from 1902, “what is to be done?” we all too often look to what 
was done at least once before, in which case there will be nothing histor-
ical in what I find and also in what I do. For instance, in The Enigma of 
Capital, to cite a prominent instance, David Harvey offers a variation that 
may not be a variation at all: “ ‘What is to be Done?’ cannot be answered, 
to be sure, without some sense of who might do it and where.”23 If we 
have a sense of who might do it and where, then what we know will have 
been decided strictly in terms of what has already been done at least once, 
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which becomes a model for recognition — and obviously without resound-
ing success — since the once of doing could not have taken, even if we still 
think that it should have. Harvey’s question is caught in a logic of regret 
misconstrued as melancholy, or the possible, insofar as moving forward 
can only ever be considered in a recurrent and never advancing relation 
to what has already passed.
Perhaps the most influential instance of historical consciousness as 
invocation and institution of the possible can be found in the writing of 
Marx and Engels. In their “Address to the Communist League” in 1850, 
Marx and Engels argue that the German workers must come to an under-
standing “as to what their class interests are, by taking up their position as 
an independent party as soon as possible and by not allowing themselves 
to be seduced for a single moment by the hypocritical phrases of the 
democratic bourgeois into refraining from the independent organization 
of the party of the proletariat. Their battle cry must be: The Revolution 
in Permanence.”24 In imploring the proletariat to avoid the “hypocritical 
phrases” of the democratic bourgeois, Marx and Engels offer a hypocrit-
ical phrase of their own: the revolution in permanence. If the revolution 
is permanent, then it will become the norm. If it has become the norm, it 
is no longer a break but an essential way of being. “Revolution” comes, in 
this way, to redefine the experience of contingency as necessity, in which 
case the temporal and contextual specificity of every instance of struggle 
is subsumed by the belief in permanent revolution, since if it is to be 
permanent, each revolution will be the same revolution. If melancholia 
has a place here, it could only be as that which enables the shift from 
contingency to the appearance of necessity in what remains, nevertheless, 
contingent. Regret has no place in such a scenario. If we feel regret at 
having been seduced by the “hypocritical phrases” of the democratic bour-
geois, the conviction promised and rewarded by the phrase “permanent 
revolution” means that we will never make a mistake again. However, as I 
understand it, regret has something better to teach us about our political 
struggles, since its chief virtue, as I will describe in chapter 1, is that it 
is an emotion that reawakens thought and trains us, in this way, against 
an expectation that what appears will always appear in the same way; 
this means, among other things, that the very notion of permanence will 
always stand in opposition to politics and political struggle. In place of 
permanence, including the permanence of failure (which is also implied 
in the very notion of revolution), we are better served to think about con-
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tinuity. Continuity cannot be sustained by something like conviction. It 
requires instead an attentiveness to difference, both in the phenomenal 
realm of ordinary life and in the imagination of our political values in a 
genuinely contingent way, so as to resist the impulse to render a contin-
gent articulation of the social as something necessary.
institutional ethics, aspectual relations
It is probably clear by now that the theorization of regret presented here 
will have little to offer, by way of support, to the impulse in political 
discourse toward universal claims about political action, such as we 
find in Marx’s call to permanent revolution.25 I am expressly concerned 
about the way in which the conflation of contingent acts with necessary 
ones — as in the call for permanent revolution — come to mimic, by vir-
tue of an unchecked and unreflective sense of conviction, transcendental 
operations. That said, I am in no way opposed to broader conceptions of 
the political, and I consider the view of hegemony articulated by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and re-
fined further by Laclau in On Populist Reason, a source of inspiration. I 
do not take issue, for example, with Laclau’s notion of the equivalential 
relation, by which we are said to de- emphasize our differences for the 
sake of instituting, as an instance of the political (which Laclau takes 
to be a representational order), a new and contingent ground of social 
relations on the basis of something that we all want and that we believe 
to be missing in the social as we currently experience it.26 And we do so 
despite the differences that nevertheless remain between us — in view, 
but de- emphasized for some time. The chief merit of the equivalential 
relation, as the basis of Laclau’s conception of hegemony, is that it gives 
us a way of understanding how large- scale shifts in the social — whether 
as revolution or by democratic election — can take place without a con-
ception and experience of identification, in which political affiliation is a 
zero- sum game: I have to believe all of it or none of it. What the logic of the 
equivalential relation solves, among other things, is the problem rightly 
identified by Jean- Luc Nancy as an “operative community,” that is to say, 
an experience of community, or unification, that can only be achieved in 
and as death, since membership requires that I have every single thing 
in common with everyone else.27
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The theory of regret on offer here does not oppose such macro- concep-
tions of political change as we find in Laclau precisely because the univer-
sal aspect of hegemony, conceived as an equivalential relation, is offered 
expressly as a contingent articulation of the social and refuses in this way 
anything like an adherence to first principles. One of the consequences 
of this, as we know, is that hegemony is not guaranteed to any one strain 
of political belief; rather, it describes how any popular political formation 
might come into existence. For example, while Laclau’s conception of 
hegemony and populism has had a major influence on movements such 
as Podemos, it could just easily explain — at the other end of the political 
spectrum — the increasing success (at the time of this writing) of Marine 
Le Pen and the Front National in France.28 This is not a weakness in the 
theory of hegemony; instead, it is a sign of its sensitivity to the com-
plexity of real politics, which are only ever ill understood in moralistic 
terms like “permanent revolution.” The contingent structures of political 
success regularly defy their content — or the specificity of each and ev-
ery demand — as something essential to the structure itself. The demand 
matters, and it depends on the equivalential relation for its existence. 
However, no single demand can define, permanently or essentially, the 
logic of the equivalential relation as such.
In one sense, regret may very well play a role in the life of a hegemonic 
formation, insofar as it provides us with an opportunity to reevaluate our 
commitment, such that I might decide to emphasize something that I 
had de- emphasized before. Regret may be one emotion among others that 
helps us to understand when a particular social order has reached the end 
of its time. It may be that I come to regret privileging one thing at the ex-
pense of something else, which now feels more pressing. But I am struck, 
in this context, by a different role that regret might play in political theory 
and real politics, which will have a different bearing on macro- political 
thought. Curiously, Kierkegaard’s brief reflection on regret in Either/Or 
indicates both what regret gives to thinking and how thought itself can ac-
quire a political dimension, just not in every instance. Kierkegaard writes,
Marry, and you will regret it. Do not marry, and you will also regret it. 
Marry or do not marry, you will regret it either way. Laugh at the stu-
pidities of the world, and you will regret it; weep over them, and you 
will also regret it. Laugh at the stupidities of the world or weep over 
them, you will regret it either way. Whether you laugh at the stupidities 
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of the world or you weep over them, you will regret it. Trust a girl, and 
you will regret it. Do not trust her, and you will also regret it. Trust a 
girl or do not trust her, you will regret it either way. Whether you trust 
a girl or do not trust her, you will regret it either way. Hang yourself, 
and you will regret it. Do not hang yourself, and you will also regret 
it. Hang yourself or do not hang yourself, you will regret it either way. 
Whether you hang yourself or do not hang yourself, you will regret it 
either way. This, gentleman, is the quintessence of all the wisdom of 
life. It is not merely in isolated moments that I, as Spinoza says, view 
everything aeterno modo [in the mode of eternity], but I am continually 
aeterno modo. Many believe they, too, are this when after doing one 
thing or another they unite or mediate these opposites. But this is a 
misunderstanding, for the true eternity does not lie behind either/or 
but before it. Their eternity will therefore also be a painful temporal 
sequence, since they will have a double regret on which to live. My 
wisdom is easy to grasp, for I have only one maxim, and even that is 
not a point of departure for me.29
For Kierkegaard, regret becomes a way of understanding how thought 
itself — and thus philosophy — cannot have a proper point of departure, or 
an essential ground, which is how philosophy as the identification of first 
principles so often proceeds. That is to say, if we are concerned (as Kant 
was, for instance) to understand the conditions under which the world 
appears as the prerequisite to a moral use of the will, such as we see in 
Critique of Pure Reason, a particular instance of thought — or the name 
we give to any beginning as the beginning — becomes the ground upon 
which everything else can and must be known. For Kierkegaard, then, 
regret marks the self- consciousness of a beginning that can be anywhere, 
and thus rightly belongs to nowhere in particular. To act at all, to make a 
beginning that cannot ever really be one — or at least a beginning that is 
also not an origin — is to become conscious of having made a choice that 
will not result in the mediation of what is not chosen. For as Kierkegaard 
insists, eternity does not lie after a choice or decision that we make, as 
heroic or teleological resolution, but before it.
Along such lines, Kierkegaard goes on to say, “Experience shows that 
it is not at all difficult for philosophy to begin. Far from it. It begins, in 
fact, with nothing. But it is always difficult for philosophers to stop. This 
difficulty, too, I have avoided, for if anyone thinks that I, in stopping now, 
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actually stop, he demonstrates that he does not have speculative compre-
hension. The point is that I do not stop now, I stopped when I began.”30 If 
Kierkegaard stopped when he began, which is what regret signals, he did 
so with the awareness that in beginning somewhere he produced a some­
thing that followed from this or that point of departure. Every beginning 
is a point of stopping that cannot help but continue exactly as it began. 
In this respect, every beginning would be something like an exergue, 
which Derrida describes in Archive Fever as that which “serves to stock in 
anticipation and to prearchive a lexicon, which, from there on, ought to 
lay down the law and give the order.”31 The exergue, Derrida argued, has in 
this way an “institutive and conservative function.”32 Whatever is placed 
in the beginning as the beginning will come to proscribe and arrogate to 
itself whatever follows, no matter how much or for how long.
And yet, in Kierkegaard’s enigmatic passage, regret figures importantly 
not as a corrective emotion that moves us from wrong to right, in which 
case the choice we make would mediate its opposite, so much so that regret 
would no longer be possible or necessary. Rather, regret marks the very 
decision and distinctiveness of thought itself, its limits and also the poten-
tial of an alternative that is only ever an alternative and never the ground 
of being or knowledge as such. While Kierkegaard’s litany of regrets gives 
the impression of nihilism, what the unrelenting negativity does instead 
is to refuse a dialectical conception of knowledge. If every decision war-
rants regret, and without exception, then each and every thought is fol-
lowed by the affective registration of an alternative, of yet another place 
to begin. Thinking is situational, can and must begin anywhere, and will 
always be introduced to its limits, which means that no one thought will 
enclose or be enclosed by eternity, nor by mere appearance. Likewise, it 
should be said that “from anywhere” is not the same as “from nothing.” 
What is striking about Kierkegaard’s set of choices (if you choose x, you 
regret it; if you don’t choose x, you will regret it) is that it also defines 
a set of limits that come to describe the possible terms of a choice that 
can now be made. And perhaps most importantly, the indication of the 
terms and limits that describe choice does not come with any indication 
of what a best choice might be. In this way, Kierkegaard’s list of lists is a 
useful way of understanding choice within an institutional framework, 
especially since every institution is itself uniquely composed of a series 
of constitutive rules and concepts that are internal to that particular insti-
tution. Or as the legal theorist Corrado Roversi has put it, “In all of these 
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contexts [i.e., institutions], we must learn the relevant concepts in order to 
act meaningfully, and these concepts are internal in a peculiar way, in that 
for the most part they play a role only in the specific institutional setting 
they have been created for.”33 In Roversi’s terms, any effort to determine 
the meaning or value of how one functions within any given institution 
cannot be decided — at least not necessarily — by larger social forms of 
valuation external to that institution, or what he calls “meta- institutional 
concepts.” That is to say, what counts as a good or a bad move within an 
institution cannot be decided with reference to forms of evaluation that 
are external to the logic of that institution. 
Why does this matter? For one, if we understand institutions as things 
that are constituted uniquely by rules and concepts they do not share 
with other institutions, there is no correlative logic beyond the function 
of the rules and concepts internal to the institution that would guarantee 
any particular result or content generated by governing structures, forms, 
and possible procedures of that institution. Consider, for instance, the re-
search university. Let’s say that one of my roles in the university is to con-
tinue to publish. In order to meet the standard of “research excellence,” 
a concept and a language specific to my institution (even if it is shared 
by others in similar terms), I am expected to publish the equivalent of 
two peer- reviewed articles per year. The institution is predicated, then, 
on an assumption that each member’s ability to meet this minimum 
will allow the institution to carry on meeting, in turn, a standard recog-
nized by others, even though my institution determines those standards 
by itself and for itself. Since academic institutions comprise a variety of 
disciplines — some of which are necessarily unrelated, conceptually and 
thematically, to others — the specificity of what each of us who participate 
in the institution publishes can never be important to the functioning 
of the institution itself. It matters little to the institution if I publish a 
book on regret or a book on a French filmmaker, so long as an academic 
press that my institution recognizes as significant publishes my book. 
This is not to say that the content of the work any of us does, in this or 
that academic institution, does not matter. It is just that it does not matter 
to the functioning of the university as such. Rather, the specificity of the 
content of my work is what matters outside of my own institution. It is 
certainly the case, though, that how that content is received externally 
can increase or decrease the ease with which I function inside that insti-
tution, but even then only if that “success” is owed to a capability already 
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built into the internal logic of the institution in which I work. Indeed, 
this is one way of explaining how politically radical work — say, a book 
that calls for the forceful overthrow of every institution — regularly allows 
such writers to thrive within the very institutions that they nevertheless 
argue against. The popularity of such a work could very well foment a 
widespread revolutionary consciousness outside of the writer’s institution 
while nevertheless fortifying one’s place in that institution (and thus the 
institution itself ) — that is to say, in an institution structurally similar, but 
never identical, to all of the ones described in that now widely circulated, 
influential work. And it would make no sense to describe such sequences 
as contradictory since there is no particular content demanded by the 
institution itself, only that the work be recognized by what the institution 
recognizes in turn, which is a form with no necessary content — but al-
ways some content.
In expressly political terms, then, this is why representative democ-
racies are as frustrating as they are (or can be) vital, since the feeling of 
the former depends not on a dismantling of the rules and concepts that 
constitute a given form, but on a hegemonic relation to that form. If we re-
turn to Laclau’s equivalential relation, then, we can see how the dynamism 
of any hegemonic order depends on the particular content that becomes 
appealing within a given institution. The affective charge of disappoint-
ment in one political order or another effects a change in content but not 
necessarily in the rules and concepts that constitute that institution. Of 
course, it should be said that Laclau’s conception of hegemony functions 
just as well within institutional frameworks as it does in revolutionary con-
texts, in which one conceives of politics as a beginning from nowhere as 
opposed to the beginning from anywhere that would describe a choice one 
makes within a given institutional practice.34 Regret certainly figures in 
both approaches. I can, for instance, come to regret my participation in an 
institution at every level, in which case what I do next will be a beginning 
from nowhere. What I do or what I build, in that scenario, will have no 
resemblance to the institution or institutions that I have forsaken in regret. 
I will say later what I take the limits of this approach to be. Instead, I am 
here mostly concerned to understand regret — whether in ethical or moral 
terms — as an affect better served by reformist politics, however unfashion-
able that may sound. Regret is, above all else, an intuition that comes too 
late — but nevertheless arrives — that we have not sufficiently understood 
the wider capacities of what we have already dismissed whole.
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Thus, to return to the example of a representative democracy, any regret 
I feel on the basis of a decision I made within that institutional framework 
will not lead me to imagine an entirely different mode of political orga-
nization, just a different organizer. If I come to regret a decision I made 
to support one particular candidate, party, or social policy — and do not 
regard the effects of that bad decision as a result of a representative demo-
cratic system as an institutional form — I can emphasize more what I had 
de- emphasized earlier in an effort to make a change. As an affective regis-
tration of consciousness, regret — as a political emotion — contributes sig-
nificantly to the dawning of a new aspect, in Wittgenstein’s terms, or to a 
discursive shift, in the terms of Laclau and Mouffe. The aspectual and the 
discursive are important and importantly related concepts for this book. 
What the concept of discourse shares with the aspectual, in particular, is 
a refusal of normative epistemologies and an attendant recognition that 
an object only ever acquires meaning in relation to the social or percep-
tual context in which it operates. The meaning or valuation of an object 
remains independent of that operation, such that any object can — and 
likely will — acquire a different meaning in time than the one it has for us 
in the present, even if nothing in the object itself undergoes a transforma-
tion. For instance, in an early defense of their theory of hegemony, Laclau 
and Mouffe give the following example to explain how the aspectual and 
discursive function: “If I kick a spherical object in the street or if I kick a 
ball in the football match, the physical fact is the same, but its meaning 
is different. The object is a football only to the extent that it establishes a 
system of relations with other objects, and these relations are not given 
by the mere referential materiality of the objects but are, rather, socially 
constructed.”35 The distinction between a spherical object in the street 
and a “football” results not, as Laclau and Mouffe make clear, from any 
inherent feature of the object but by way of a hegemonic, equivalential 
relation that indicates a particular way of doing and comprehending what 
is done. This is also one reason that films come to take, at points in this 
book, a privileged status as examples, even if this is not a work of film 
theory, properly speaking, since the work of film is itself always aspectual. 
That is to say, how we understand a single image — one that does not 
change — will depend entirely on the shots that surround it. In Laclau and 
Mouffe’s account of hegemony, however, we have more than just a rela-
tion between images. It is a contingent totality made up of linguistic signs 
(scoreboards, verbal commands, play calls) and non- linguistic signs (kick-
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ing, goal- keeping, running), which frames our perception of the spherical 
object as a football and that depends in turn on our own de- emphasis of 
the “non- football” aspects that would, in a different context, allow us to 
apprehend the very same object as the equivalent of a freestanding stone 
lying in the road. In that case, I may carry on kicking the thing, but that 
kick will more likely signify my boredom than it will my participation in 
an actual game. But it is important to emphasize here that this particular 
sign of my boredom or else my role as player in a football game is subject 
to even more flexibility than Laclau and Mouffe themselves needed to 
indicate the contingency of “meaning” in any hegemonic formation and, 
ultimately, the contingency of the subject itself.
For example, in their explanation of the independence of the object 
from what nevertheless frames that object in a particular way, Laclau 
and Mouffe insist on the determining characteristic of discourse or the 
aspectual.
A diamond in the market or at the bottom of a mine is the same phys-
ical object; but, again, it is only a commodity within a determinate 
system of social relations. For that same reason it is the discourse 
which constitutes the subject position of the social agent, and not, 
therefore, the social agent which is the origin of discourse — the same 
system of rules that makes that spherical object into a football, makes 
me a player. The existence of objects is independent of their discur-
sive articulation to such a point, that we could make of that mere 
existence — that is, existence extraneous to any meaning — the point of 
departure of social analysis.36
Laclau and Mouffe rightly depend on a conception of the subject for the 
working of any hegemonic order and are careful, as we have seen, to indi-
cate that those determinations are themselves contingent and in no sense 
necessary. However, of note here is the way in which these social relations — 
which are, nevertheless, determined aspectually or discursively in the 
constitution of the subject — take on the appearance of necessity. That is, 
one is either a player or an idler, despite the fact that one can be either at 
any time. In de- emphasizing this or that feature of my beliefs and desires, 
which also have a bearing on how the world appears and works for me, 
if not others, I occupy a particular role. I have agency in ways that are de-
fined in relation to the system that has determined that role, even though 
it has done so contingently, and despite the fact that my embrace of this or 
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that social order is predicated on de- emphasizing whatever distinguishes 
me from others within the same set of terms that I have agreed to in being 
bound to others in a hegemonic relation. Within the context of political 
change, then, from an institutional perspective, we would have to say that 
the process of being determined as a football player (as opposed to a street 
idler) carries with it a presumption that one accepts whole the particular 
ways of playing within that very institution, and the difference is what 
is left behind precisely so this institution can become legible and, most 
importantly, work. In other words, we assume that the rules of the institu-
tion that have been constituted contingently — and owing to the determin-
ing character of the social relation that has taken aspectual hold — define 
in transparent terms how one plays the game or what exactly one’s role in 
the game is. And yet what makes institutions so difficult to evaluate at the 
moment in which one contemplates the question of reform or revolution 
has everything to do with the difficulty of telling the character of an insti-
tution apart from the people who inhabit it in particular ways.
For example, must I give up on representational democracy simply 
because the rules that constitute it can justify an effect (for example, the 
refusal, as we saw at the end of 2016, to entertain a presidential nominee 
for the Supreme Court) that I strongly oppose? How can I be sure that 
the bylaws of an institution guarantee a particular action or outcome? 
Put this way, regret could, of course, eventually allow us to see that there 
is something wrong in the constituted nature of the institution itself and 
could provoke, on the basis of our disappointment with what we decided 
in error, more revolutionary forms of action and subsequent institution 
building. But regret may also be a form of aspect dawning, in which case 
my decision or action — which I now regard as a mistake — can shift. I 
might change my mind about how I will act within the institution. And 
if I have the ability to take on a different role or way of being within an 
institution, then I should also be able to see that the institution is more 
capacious than I had imagined at first. Thus I may be compelled to pause 
before opting out altogether, knowing, as I now do, that the institution is 
constituted by its own unique rules that are internal, and that the roles to 
be played (defender, center back, sweeper) are determined by that logic, 
and yet my identity is in no sense determined in an absolute way by those 
rules or roles. A part of the political utility of regret, then, has to do with 
the way in which it affords us the opportunity, in time and as a result of 
our own capacity to remain thoughtful, to determine what the limits of 
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any institution might be before we move to destroy it, especially since so 
many ideas about revolution are always already possible.
The scope of this book is admittedly much smaller than, say, a reck-
oning with hegemony, a theory of capital, neoliberalism, or, for that mat-
ter, communism — though none of those things is entirely off the table 
either. I am concerned instead to consider the way that regret allows us 
to understand our relation to the institutions we occupy and, most impor-
tantly, that we want to go on occupying, albeit with a better sense of what 
the institution at hand does and also how we might clarify our demands 
with respect to what the limits of an institution allow for in ways that are 
agreeable, if also never fully satisfying. It is my sense that when we speak 
in one way or another about burning down institutions, we typically mean 
the one that we do not occupy or recognize, for ourselves, as valuing. It 
seems to me that this has something to do with the fact that we expect our 
institutions as well as our reasons for belonging to them to be perfectly 
correlated and thus never a cause for regret.
bureaucracies
Given the institutional orientation of my theory of regret, the book is also 
a meditation on bureaucracy. For one, our confrontation with bureau-
cracy — if there can be said to be a typical character of the experience — is 
something that always occurs in medias res and very often leaves us with 
an unsteady feeling of regret. That is, when we come to the recognition 
of a problem that we believe to have an institutional history, or at least a 
series of related causes, we find ourselves before a bureaucrat, whether 
in the personage of a phone representative with whom I begin to dispute 
an erroneous charge on my phone bill, perhaps an immigration agent 
who can help explain why I have been categorized in one way and not 
another (to my detriment), or else a dean who comes to a faculty meeting 
ostensibly to seek the faculty’s counsel on an administrative decision that 
has already been made — to cite a few ordinary examples. No matter the 
case, it seems to me that one of the most ordinary experiences of a bu-
reaucracy involves what we take to be the presentation of disinformation 
in response to an irritable demand, our own, for clarification and reason. 
In our exchange with the bureaucrat, we hope that we will quickly be 
made privy in a clear way to the causal chain that has thus far eluded us 
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or the bureaucrat. We hope that we can restore what has gone missing 
just as we once knew it to be and that what gets restored — as this missing 
causal chain — will be indistinguishable from how we previously imag-
ined it to be. Likewise, when most of us are greeted with what we think is 
disinformation at the moment we demand clarification, we often charge 
the bureaucrat with stupidity, on the assumption that he or she is either 
blindly following the rules of the bureaucracy or else is in ignorance of 
them. Whether we say so to ourselves or voice it to the bureaucrat, we get 
nowhere; we are sent instead to yet one more window, one more phone 
operator, or we are left with our own rage, which can only follow from 
what we take to be our conviction: we know, above all else, that we are 
right, just not why. That is to say, we believe that every institution is know-
able in relation to what we take institutions, in general, to be. When we 
confront a bureaucracy, what we expect is a complete system of knowl-
edge, either to be revealed to us or to be hidden completely if the answer 
never comes. Despite our tendency to regard bureaucracies as networks 
of dissimulation, we believe that the work of dissimulation itself — the 
shifting of appearance — covers over what can and must be known whole. 
We believe that the aspect change initiated by a bureaucracy covers over 
something stable and true, a real foundation. One odd, and also com-
mon, effect of this is that we regularly assume that the relation between 
bureaucrat and bureaucracy is a transparent one, that the bureaucrat is 
in full knowledge of how the institution works and what, precisely, their 
role in the larger working of the bureaucracy is, even if the bureaucrat’s 
job is to prevent others from knowing how to navigate the institution 
successfully in the terms one expects in advance. This doesn’t strike me 
as an unusual description of how bureaucrats and bureaucracies work, 
but it does not — as either idea or attendant attitude — stand as a proof of 
bureaucratic relations everywhere. There are people who can be described 
as bureaucrats whose job it is to prevent us from righting a wrong or 
merely clearing up a clerical error causing us some amount of grief; there 
are also people one can describe as bureaucrats who see it as their job to 
allow for a clearer passage through this or that institution, or even work 
to make the institution itself function better, more like the one we want to 
believe in and be supported by. It would be of no use, for instance, simply 
to complain about a particular bad administrator as proof of the problem 
of administration in general. Such complaints — however warranted they 
feel and sometimes, in fact, are — typically have the effect of ratifying the 
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very thing we most despise, since all that we are shown in such instances 
is what we have only ever believed in the first place.
What I am interested in here is what regret makes possible in these 
moments of institutional instability, which can be as productive as they 
are detrimental. As Ben Kafka has shown, bureaucracy is a textual phe-
nomenon, a matter of signification, before all else. In his remarkable 
study of bureaucracy, The Demon of Writing: Powers and Failures of Paper­
work, Kafka examines the “psychic life of paperwork.”37 Where others 
have only ever been concerned to regard bureaucracy as an expression of 
the repressive force of administration, Kafka has privileged instead — and 
without denying the repressive potential of any bureaucracy — the insta-
bility of writing as the stuff of bureaucracy, a textual undecidability on the 
order of Derridean différance, one that can loosen the grip of administra-
tive power just as much as it can tighten it. Rather strikingly, Kafka notes, 
for instance, that the term “bureaucracy” emerged in 1764, in an issue of 
Melchior von Grimm’s Correspondance littéraire, as a pun. Kafka writes,
Grimm recounted [in that issue] how Gournay had once remarked to 
him that “ ‘we have in France an illness that takes a terrible toll; this 
illness is called bureaumania.’ ” He even described this mania as a 
“fourth or fifth form of government, by the name of bureaucracy.” 
This new word “bureaucracy” simultaneously invoked and violated a 
well- worn semiotic code. To the classic three regimes, democracy, aris-
tocracy, and monarchy — that is, rule by the many, the few, and the one — 
Gournay had now added rule by a piece of furniture. The piece of 
furniture was expandable, metonymically, to include the men who sat 
behind it, the offices in which they found themselves, and ultimately 
the entire state apparatus. More than an ordinary neologism, “bureau-
cracy” was a pun, a “rattling of the semiotic chain,” as Lacan says.38
As a pun, “bureaucracy” describes both order — the geometric regularity 
and categorical distinctiveness of each drawer that is nevertheless related 
to the whole of the desk — and the defiance of that order in the undecid-
ability of the writing that gets classified there, and becomes subject, as 
Kafka importantly observes, to “the material and semiotic exigencies of 
différance.”39 As a pun, “bureaucracy” perfectly describes the difference 
between knowledge as a stable foundation beyond dispute and thinking 
as an ongoing process of relating what we see to material sources that 
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can never secure what any instance of signification features as a point of 
contact, as a proposed relation. A bureaucracy might very well be like an 
interlocking series of drawers beneath the desktop of a functionary, but 
only that. If it is like a chest of drawers, it is also never a chest of drawers; 
thus, how we imagine any relation of power and also our agency within 
that network of relations can be determined not by first principles, but 
by a capacity to think, by our faculty for analogy, knowing as we do that 
none of these relations can be held as permanent, essential, or merely 
beyond dispute. In this sense, which is what Ben Kafka demonstrates, the 
instability of signification can enable the binding power of the bureaucrat, 
but it can also unburden, by way of a different reading of the same mark, 
the one who has, up until now, been tracked and thus controlled in some 
way by a bureaucracy. Most importantly, what it suggests is that politics 
only ever takes place as a problem of signification that cannot be solved 
as a problem of signification, lest thinking disappear as a function of the 
solution offered.
Disputing Pierre Rosanvallon’s reading of instances of French humor 
about bureaucratic struggle since the French Revolution, which Rosan-
vallon takes to be common expressions of the hopelessness that one has 
felt — and regularly still feels — in the face of this or that bureaucratic or-
der, Kafka points out something more important about such tales: “The 
stories about ‘bureaucracy’ are not the signs of a failure of intellection; 
they are one of the forms that intellection takes.”40 This, in many ways, 
is where my own reflection on bureaucracy begins, and precisely as a re-
lated theory of regret. One of the main provocations of A Theory of Regret 
is simply to ask what happens when we cease to regard the bureaucrat 
as always already stupid and instead regard her/him as someone capable 
of thinking. Kafka’s book provides a very strong justification for such 
a question. It is not that I want to argue that bureaucracy is always an 
experience of thoughtfulness. That would be absurd. I take it for granted 
that many bureaucracies produce the dissimulations or obfuscations that 
they do simply to carry on the work of accumulation and alienation that 
we often assume of them. This is certainly in line with how David Grae-
ber has pursued the contemporary form of bureaucracy when he writes,
In contemporary American populism — and increasingly, in the rest of 
the world as well — there can only be one alternative to “bureaucracy,” 
and that is “the market.” Sometimes this is held to mean we should 
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simply get the bureaucrats out of the way and let nature take its course, 
which means letting people attend the business of their lives untram-
meled by endless rules and regulations imposed on them from above, 
and so allowing the magic of the marketplace to provide its own solu-
tions. “Democracy” thus came to mean the market; “bureaucracy,” 
in turn, government interference with the market; and this is pretty 
much what the word continues to mean today.41
To be clear, Graeber is not honoring the distinction but reporting on what 
he takes to be a commonplace assumption about bureaucracy. His own 
view seems to favor the idea that markets and governmental bureaucra-
cies are now more fused than ever: “This process — the gradual fusion of 
public and private power into a single entity, rife with rules and regula-
tions whose ultimate purpose is to extract wealth in the form of profits — 
does not yet have a name.”42 Yet, whether one takes the commonplace 
assumption (should such a thing actually exist) that bureaucracies are 
governmental agencies that stand in the way of nature, perversely un-
derstood here as the free play of the marketplace, or one assumes that 
bureaucracies are the very way in which the marketplace becomes pro-
tected by government for the sake of oligopolies and radical economic 
inequality, one thing remains true in both accounts: namely, “bureau-
cracy” is simply the name for the “truth” of government and governmen-
tal institutions, which concerns its preoccupation with the maintenance 
and production of radical inequality. Indeed, the critique of bureaucracy 
is quite often a critique of governmental institutions as such. And yet, as 
Meghan Sutherland points out in “The Aporetic Apparatus,” many inter-
national forms of contemporary protest are less inclined to call for an end 
to all forms of governmentality and governmental institutions than they 
are concerned with their better functioning. “Although it has become a 
commonplace of critical and cultural theory to treat the instruments of 
governance and institutional order as antithetical to and suppressive of 
any meaningful political activity — in other words, institutions and orders 
are what political dissent is understood to destabilize, not the other way 
around — it is precisely such instruments and orders that concern the 
most fervent political demands of populations around the world at the 
moment.”43 As an example, she cites — among many others — the “You 
Stink Movement” in Beirut, which involved above all a demand for proper 
trash removal services, and the Black Lives Matter movement and its call 
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for police to “uphold their duty as police, that government institutions 
ensure the rights they promise citizens.”44
One way of taking seriously the idea that it is not the absence of gov-
ernment that we need follows from the recognition that there is no bu-
reaucracy in itself. If you fail to find a definition of bureaucracy in these 
pages, it is because such a definition could only ever work to produce a 
way of seeing, a mode of identification, which is precisely what we need to 
guard against and is precisely what we always accuse the bureaucrat and 
a bureaucracy of doing. If we think of a bureaucracy as something that 
moves continuously, then any given instance will never be well described 
by a list of stable, related conditions. If we take seriously the idea that 
the bureaucrat is capable of thinking, then we will have a way of keeping 
up with the bureaucrat where we might otherwise remain subject to an 
appearance that is only ever meant to cover over what the bureaucrat — if 
he or she is in service of a loathsome project — believes us to be too stupid 
to comprehend. If we are assumed to be too stupid to comprehend what 
the bureaucrat shows, then we will also be understood to be incapable of 
a meaningful intervention. In fact, it will be shown in chapter 3 that most 
emancipatory theories of thinking on offer in the continental tradition 
understand thinking itself as a form of withdrawal. What can we make 
of the fact, I will ask, that our most cherished theories of thinking as a 
withdrawal from appearance, from those of Martin Heidegger to Cather-
ine Malabou, resemble our most ordinary descriptions of bureaucracy?
Regret, as we will see, also involves a withdrawal from appearance and 
one that gets caught up, at times, with what we so often wrongly describe 
as hypocrisy. And while I began this introduction by citing one infamous 
bureaucrat’s claim for the absence of all regret, I did not do so in order to 
stage this inquiry as one that only concerns world historical figures and 
fascist politics. Every single one of us, I would wager, references regret 
whenever we want to secure an instance of dissimulation. For instance, if 
I do not want to go to a dinner party, simply because I would just rather 
stay home and watch basketball, I may send the host my regrets.45 In this 
case, in sending my regrets, not only do I state, in the terms of a euphe-
mism, that I cannot attend, but I imply in the same gesture that I am 
doing something that is, in fact, important, or at least previously agreed 
upon in a way that is now understandably binding, when in fact all I want 
to do is stay on the couch. I also presume, in the cover that my regret of-
fers me as polite response, that my host would not understand just how 
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significant basketball is to me — that it is something that must be con-
cealed about me if I am to be taken seriously and invited to such things 
again. Probably, if I send such regrets, I will also feel genuine regret about 
my minor act of dissimulation, about giving an appearance at a distance 
that can easily be read against my wishes (since we all recognize the trope 
as social custom), and also because it should be possible to tell my ac-
quaintance that basketball, sometimes, is very important to me. And on 
a slightly larger political scale, I would say that until we have some better 
sense not only of what is important to us and to each other but also why, 
and of how all of the things we care about may bear no obvious relation to 
each other or to anything else, we will continue to substitute the voicing 
of first principles (the supposedly unassailable truths of the left and of 
the right) in place of genuine conversation, or at least, consideration for 
anyone other than the ones with whom we know we identify completely.
This is a political problem that can be understood, for many of us, in 
the experience of writing and of being read. One of the burdens of writ-
ing, as I experience it, involves a reflection in advance of what I might 
regret, having said x or y: I’ve said this but does it make sense beyond the fact 
that it makes sense to me? How could this matter if I’m saying this and no one 
else has already? Of course, the only way to solve that problem is to be sure 
that what one wants to say is said in a way that makes sense, precisely 
because it has been said before, or run the risk of the category mistake. Or 
else, if we believe that knowledge is the ground and aim of thinking, that 
knowledge is simply there to be discovered in the process of research, I 
can only wait longer — always longer — to say whatever it is that I will say, 
which I take to be a different kind of dilettantism, since thought takes 
time but cannot be completed, or given access to completion, in time. 
But if I heed such warnings — the very ones that I am first to give myself 
before I hear the same from others — what happens? One answer to this 
question is offered in chapter 2, where I consider mentorship to be a form 
of bureaucracy, and the answer, I’ll say in advance, is “not much.” Regret 
is one of the important things that the practice of writing has to share 
with the practice of politics, not to mention ordinary acts of sociability.
chapter one
What Is Regret?
How many details, how many pieces of evidence, are required for one to 
know regret? Can one be punctilious in regret? To be punctilious is to act 
correctly. How careful can I be in my evaluation, especially considering 
that what is at stake — if I am experiencing regret — is the lack of care I 
once demonstrated that now has me in an uneasy state of searching? 
What would lead me to conclude that I am now more capable of seeing 
what I could not see then? I say to myself what everyone knows already, 
or could have known, should they be gathering the same details. I can be 
wrong; I have been wrong: I regret that I am no longer in the right. I regret what 
is already known of me, what is known of me before I know it of myself. If I 
regret something, presumably I wish I could have done something other-
wise; I wish that I could have done the, or even just that, right thing. But 
if doing otherwise was an option — if every action implies an otherwise — 
then how could I have been wrong?
Regret is a problem of recognition as it emerges in relation to opposed 
wills, which cannot be communicated — which have failed to communi-
cate and now remain in a state of oblique willing that only appears blank, 
in and as silence. One intends to be punctilious in regret; one hopes that 
the cause of regret can be proven or refuted. But if signs change — or re-
main the same in muteness — then counting or matching becomes sheer 
treachery. One can be exposed as having tried to do so, even as we fail to 
verify the terms of the regret that we now, however tentatively, feel. To try 
is already to have made a confession: I should have done that differently. I 
have been seen, so I might just as well be heard.
32 · chapter one
Regret is a problem of calculation, especially if we suppose regret to be 
the mischievous relative of virtue. I can feel regret and not be wrong — or 
else, I can feel regret and not be evil, since regret implies some relation to 
virtue. It is just that we do not know how to measure the distance between 
what we have said or what we have done and what would otherwise leave 
us in the Good.
the habit of virtue
This is the problem of regret as Aristotle introduces it in Nicomachean 
Ethics as a question of virtue — that is, of what lies outside of the realm 
of virtue. For Aristotle, virtue is of two types: virtue of thought and vir-
tue of character. Virtue of thought, Aristotle says, is something that does 
not come naturally. It has to be taught and it has to be learned.1 We are 
“completed by habit.”2 We have to build our capacities for virtue, which 
will become our character, which is also the character of virtue, since it 
will be possessed by more than one. What this means is that the path-
ways for some things can be changed in the course of habituation, where 
other things by nature — by essence — resist. Like the stone: “A stone, for 
instance, by nature moves downwards, and habituation could not make 
it move upwards, not even if you threw it up ten thousand times to ha-
bituate it; nor could habituation make fire move downwards, or bring 
anything that is by nature on one condition into another condition.”3 If 
the raw matter of the stone in gravity prevents it from tending upward of 
its own volition — no matter how many times we toss it in the air — then 
the human, no less composed of matter, is the being capable of chang-
ing course on the basis of what can be produced as thought in the act of 
habituation. Of course, we might have to make the same claim for do-
mesticated animals, for whom acting well is also a result of habituation, 
of a thought learned by rote repetition. Having acquired the character of 
virtue, the domesticated animal now — and no less than the human — has 
the capacity to pursue a more virtuous course. It can, for instance, defe-
cate outside instead of inside, and largely on the basis of another’s pref-
erence, presumably, rather than by inclination.
In this sense, the distinction on offer here between stone and being — 
whether man or animal — is obvious enough. But what it does, and rather 
importantly so, is to locate the question of virtue outside of a metaphysical 
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conception of morality. Virtue, for Aristotle, is something acquired, not 
necessary. We don’t fall to the ground no matter what. Nor do we arrive 
with, or because of, the virtue of character. And while it might be argued 
that virtue may, in metaphysical terms, remain indiscernibly present in 
the Good, it exists as a category for Aristotle precisely because there are 
things that are — without question and for everyone — wrong. If this is so, 
then virtue, we will have to say, flourishes in the realm of the not so easily 
decided. And I would wager that for most of us this is a fairly common 
understanding of the term. Very few of us, I suspect, find the refusal to kill 
another human being virtuous. If the decision to not kill meets the criteria 
of virtue, then the impulse to kill — in almost every encounter — must be 
appealing to us, in some measure, as a possibility, as something that could 
be enjoyed, understood by myself and by others as acceptable even though 
I now find myself resisting the impulse. And if acceptable, it is merely less 
than absolutely right; if unacceptable, it is absolutely wrong.
Aristotle made a list of acts and emotional states that he considered 
simply wrong, that admit of neither appeal nor complication. One would 
expect virtue, by contrast, to be equally determined. And yet, for Aristotle, 
virtue is not a necessary condition, as are the behaviors defined as wrong. 
Virtue is contingent, even though virtue of character once achieved will 
come to appear and behave as a necessary state and will do so by way of 
the work of moderation that everyone who moves from virtue in thought 
to virtue in character inevitably embraces in the process of habituation; 
this process involves finding a state of moderation — a mean between total 
excess and self- mortification. Aristotle’s list, then, includes only those acts 
and affects that admit of no mean.
For the names of some automatically include baseness — for instance, 
spite, shamelessness, envy, and adultery, theft, murder, among actions. 
For all of these and similar things are called by these names because 
they themselves, not their excesses or deficiencies, are base. Hence in 
doing these things we can never be correct, but must invariably be in 
error. We cannot do them well or not well — by committing adultery, 
for instance, with the right woman at the right time in the right way. 
On the contrary, it is true without qualification that to do any of them 
is to be in error.4
If doing a base thing — even if we do it with great style, as Aristotle per-
haps accidentally suggests that we can (the right woman at the right time 
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in the right way) — is true error without qualification, then we are left 
with an odd problem. Being correct is not the same thing as being virtu-
ous, since having the character of virtue entails habituating ourselves to 
a mean somewhere between excessive vice and total self- mortification. If 
our participation in one of the base activities described by Aristotle were 
understood in relation to virtue, then we would be able cheat just a little 
bit (more than a glance, less than intercourse) so long as we don’t berate 
ourselves for it too strongly. But for Aristotle, such actions and affects do 
not admit of variation or a mean. And yet one would assume that doing 
any of these things or experiencing any of these emotions — murder, adul-
tery, envy, shamelessness — would produce absolute regret. But this is not 
the case for Aristotle, since virtue is always a practice of moderation and 
the establishment of a mean. Regret, then, can only follow something 
related to virtue, which is not a necessary condition. What this means is 
that regret cannot follow from something wrong, that is, from a failure to 
remain on the right side of an absolute. Regret, for Aristotle, only follows 
from a failure to achieve moderation, which is understood to be a virtu-
ous, if habituated, act.
This leads me to wonder about the relation between virtue and virtu-
osity. The virtuoso has special skills, is in possession of more than mere 
mastery. The virtuosic performer, even though he is more than mere 
master of the medium in which he works, nevertheless excels within the 
realm of technique. Virtuosity is an achievement of the possible, since 
the possible is determined by the outer limits of a medium or a techni-
cal form, which was theretofore unforeseen even if always present as an 
option and is rarely achievable even once the conditions of possibility are 
exposed in the moment of virtuosic performance.5 To be virtuous, in the 
Aristotelian sense, is to hold back; it is to do less than the virtuoso and 
more than the idler. And yet one finds in Aristotle’s list of the absolutely 
wrong — and thus the always- outside- of- virtue — an experience of virtu-
osity: the right woman at the right time in the right way. Perhaps we will 
have to say, following Aristotle, that virtuosity thrives in the realm of the 
wrong. One can do something with great aplomb — better than others 
before you, even though the options you see, the loopholes you find, have 
always been seeable — and simply be wrong and as inimitable, as such, 
as the virtuoso.
Consider, for instance, the example of Herman Cain, a former aspirant 
to the Republican presidential candidacy in 2012, who was accused in 
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the middle of his campaign of carrying on a thirteen- year- long affair (a 
virtuosic act that exceeded its limits) with a woman in Georgia — Ginger 
White — who said of the affair, “It wasn’t complicated. I was aware that he 
was married. And I was also aware I was involved in a very inappropriate 
situation, relationship.”6 In other words, she was aware that what she was 
doing was wrong. But if wrong, then she could — at least in Aristotle’s 
terms — experience no regret. For Cain, by contrast, regret will not nec-
essarily follow from the affair itself but from its exposure, which forces 
those signs to be understood outside of the context that made them possi-
ble as wrong and thus beyond, or perhaps it is better to say before, regret. 
The question for Cain is not whether what he did was wrong, but how the 
exposure of that wrong is to be understood in relation to his character. 
Now that the signs have migrated and have no necessary and animating 
limit, can he move from virtue of thought (from a recognition of the 
mean to be reached) to virtue of character, where that mean will become 
habituated as virtue? To do so is no simple task, since what such a move 
requires is the establishment of a mean constituted by non- necessary states 
and contingent signs; one has to move from a virtuosic performance in 
the realm of the all- too- knowable (because wrong) to a realm beyond the 
possible. Regret, then, will follow from the management (and thus from 
the possible mismanagement) of signs — both what I display to others and 
what I see, in turn, in the faces and discourses of others, knowing all the 
while that those signs are, in no sense, grounded, even if sense is what 
we rightly seek in them.
But before we go further into the question of the display of signs, 
we should know what actually constitutes virtue for Aristotle. Which ac-
tions and affects, in other words, admit of a mean, precisely because they 
are not absolute? Aristotle suggests a few, all of which are identified by 
the two related yet opposed actions or affects, all of which demand an 
experience of moderation that defines virtue in each case: pleasure and 
pain (interestingly, to be completely incapable of pleasure, according to 
Aristotle, is to be insensible — that is, incapable of sense), generosity and 
ungenerosity (where money is concerned), honor and dishonor.7 Where 
anger is considered, Aristotle makes a distinction between an irascible 
and an inirascible person. And where truth is concerned, we are meant 
to locate ourselves between self- deprecation and boastfulness: “In truth- 
telling, then, let us call the intermediate person truthful, and the mean 
truthfulness; pretense that overstates will be boastfulness, and the person 
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who has it boastful; pretense that understates will be self- deprecation, and 
the person who has it self- deprecating.”8 One way of reading this proposal 
is to suggest that truth is always present, with or without the achieve-
ment of virtue. Seen thus, to be boastful is to obscure what nevertheless 
remains there amid the excess in any claim that may obscure it, however 
partially. Self- deprecation, by contrast, minimizes a truth that should be 
more properly exposed. Yet, since virtue is only ever a question of our 
response to non- necessary actions and affects, we are left, potentially, with 
a much more interesting prospect: namely, the idea that truthfulness does 
not exist outside of the experience of a mean, which will in any case be 
very difficult to agree upon. How will we find a mean if the set, by which 
any mean can be derived, is itself not entirely closed or even closable? We 
could, of course, imagine a contingent totality that makes signification 
possible, but how would one begin to quantify — even if only for the sake 
of a contingent formation — the distance between boastfulness and self- 
deprecation? What would a three mean? Would a seven, in turn, imply a 
tendency to boast but with the appearance of at least a slight inclination 
toward truthfulness? We are already doing more than numbers must 
when we begin to describe things this way.
nonvoluntary and involuntary relations
Aristotle’s solution to the problem was not to introduce the problem of 
data within a system of measurement, as I have — i.e., the idea that what 
we need to measure is immeasurable because it is ungrounded — but to 
introduce a distinction between nonvoluntary and involuntary relations, 
as it regards the achievement of virtue, or the experience of regret that 
follows from our inability to realize the mean. What concerns Aristotle 
at this juncture is the status of ignorance with respect to the will.9 How, 
in other words, can we deem an action to be lacking in virtue if the agent 
does not understand what is at stake?
Everything caused by ignorance is nonvoluntary, but what is involun-
tary also causes pain and regret. For if someone’s action was caused 
by ignorance, but he now has no objection to the action, he has done 
it neither willingly, since he did not know what it was, nor unwillingly, 
since he now feels no pain. Hence, among those who act because of 
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ignorance, the agent who now regrets his action seems to be unwill-
ing, but the agent with no regrets may be called nonwilling, since he 
is another case — for since he is different, it is better if he has his own 
special name.10
“His own special name,” it should be emphasized, is ignorance. If, in 
Aristotle’s terms, I feel no regret about a particular action, then that action 
cannot be linked to a knowing use of my will. Whatever it is that I did, I 
did without the knowledge or information that I would have needed in 
order to intend to do whatever it is that I have done. Thus, whatever oc-
curred was going to occur with or without my knowing, even if I exercise 
some degree of agency — if, that is, agency can be separated from the 
will. By contrast, if I now experience regret, at least in Aristotle’s terms, I 
do so because I am aware that in the face of what occurred I was unwill-
ing. Hence, it is involuntary. If I was unwilling, then I was not in total 
ignorance of the potential causes of what occurred, nor was I ignorant 
of potential responses, each of which might blunt the cause of the event 
that now has me in a state of regret. An involuntary action is a failure of 
virtue precisely because I refuse to exercise my will in the achievement 
of a mean. If I saw that it was possible — and indeed preferable — to do 
otherwise and nevertheless refused to act, then I am likely to experience 
regret. And surely regret, in this instance, will have the salutary effect of 
making me more careful in the face of signs and decisions to come.
Likewise, Aristotle’s distinction between nonvoluntary and involuntary 
relations makes clear that regret can only be experienced in a situation 
where we are capable expressing our will, which we can only do if we are 
not in ignorance, that is, if we have before us information — signs that 
indicate possible causes and that can be described as possible because 
they are not necessary. These signs can be made to be otherwise if we see 
them as such and then redirect them. A nonvoluntary action, by contrast, 
implies that we could not have seen what was going to occur, nor do any-
thing to prevent it, no matter what we do or do not do. In such cases, we 
might be sad about what has occurred, but our sadness can only imply 
sympathy or empathy, since regret implies a refusal of the will that now 
merits blame. In other words, a nonvoluntary act, at least in Aristotle’s 
terms, might yield an emotional response to what occurred, but whatever 
those emotions might be, they cannot contribute to virtue, to a better way 
of acting in a situation that we have experienced once before.
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But what if, in an alleged nonvoluntary relation, the signs that com-
prise causes and events — which either bring us to grief (whether in sym-
pathy or empathy) or leave us indifferent (as Aristotle supposed) — are 
concealed from us? For one, we might be better able to see that nonvol-
untary relations — the moment when we are genuinely incapable of alter-
ing or even comprehending our relation to what appears before us, and 
thereby assume that no willful relation is possible — occur more rarely 
than we suppose. This is especially true if we assume, as Aristotle did, 
that regret follows from our interaction with others rather than with ob-
jects or, at the very least, nonsentient matter. For instance, if a volcano 
erupts and burns my house to the ground, I may feel devastated, but 
should I feel regret? The volcano is like Aristotle’s stone: it will do what it 
does no matter how hard we try to redirect it. I cannot regret the volcano, 
merely my decision to live near it. However, even this scenario is more 
complicated than it at first seems. For one, I might regret believing the 
realtor, who, eager to sell me the house, was all too willing to show me 
signs of confidence about the impossibility of an eruption. He might even 
have shown me data, produced evidence that it had been centuries since 
an eruption had last occurred, sensing all the while my eagerness to live 
with everything else that exists there: the trees, a view of the sea, my fan-
tasies of solitude, whatever else I have revealed about myself in the hopes 
of becoming this other self that now seems only one more object away. 
But even so, it has to be said that I could have seen otherwise. There was, 
in fact, other information to consider. Concealment may forestall regret 
for some time, and also the response that my regret engenders, but it does 
not suffice as a mode by which an involuntary relation can be successfully 
converted to a nonvoluntary one.
This is the problem of describing a relation as nonvoluntary. Despite 
the fact that Aristotle makes the distinction between nonvoluntary and 
involuntary relations in the pursuit of virtue — and thus in the realm of 
contingency rather than necessity — the nonvoluntary relation takes on 
the appearance of a necessary state, much like the stone that will fall to 
the ground no matter how often we try to habituate it to upward move-
ment. And it does so precisely as an aspectual endeavor, one that the 
realtor coordinates discursively and in a way that correlates the physical 
features of the home and its setting to an image, constituted by and as 
data, to the image of the home that I feature to and for myself. Because 
what is featured for me by the realtor is aspectual — and since the aspect 
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is correlated to what I also feature for myself — I simply take on, as true, 
an appearance that could be otherwise, even though the material basis of 
what is subject to decision or judgment in this case never changes.11 It is 
only because what I desire is coordinated to what appears as unwavering 
(i.e., this particular house and that dormant volcano) that I could under-
stand my decision as following from, even acknowledging, a nonvolun-
tary relation. In that case, I will, presumably, feel no regret — nor assign 
any blame — if and when the volcano erupts and my house burns down. 
One reason for this has to do with the constancy of the object (house, 
volcano) that is subject to, or beneath, aspectual relations. We assume, in 
such cases, that the relative constancy of the object, its inertia (suppos-
ing, as I do, that inanimate objects have no will, or, for that matter, that 
objects are inanimate) is independent of the effects of any relation that 
follows from an aspect that, by definition, results from the object but does 
not inhere in the object.
In this way, I am in full agreement with Bishnupriya Ghosh’s critique, 
in “Governing by Wrong,” of the tendency within human rights dis-
courses to attribute wrongs only to actions done to human beings, which 
supposes — she argues — that what happens to objects never bears any 
relation to human life, itself a major ontological error. If that bias is 
maintained, human rights discourses will do little to redress the wrongs 
done to human beings who cannot but be affected by the objects that 
constitute being in often poisonous ways and that remain unobstructed 
precisely because they are thought to be without rights because they are 
inanimate.12 My example of the volcano suggests one way of understand-
ing the problem. If objects contribute to the constitution of being — and 
there is no reason to say otherwise, especially in the context of a theory 
of regret that bears a relation to virtue, which is, as we have already seen, 
a non- necessary state — then the idea of a nonvoluntary relation will be 
altogether appealing to both the one who wishes to deceive and the one 
who is all too eager to not know. If my house burns down, I shall only be 
able to blame the cosmos. I shall be able to hold no one responsible and 
also, by definition, I will feel no regret. If I were capable of feeling regret, 
I might be made more alert to future alternatives, even as I find myself in 
steady pursuit of a particular object or place and a particular understand-
ing of that object or place. The absence of regret in the face of a supposed 
nonvoluntary relation can only, in this sense, fortify a perceptual habit 
that prevents me from seeing ahead of, or behind, what appears, which 
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is what I shall need to be able to do if I am going to make good — nay, 
any — use of my will. In such an instance, my refusal to see the aspect 
as an aspect and thereby conflate the aspect and the object as a given be-
comes the basis for what I wrongly perceive as a nonvoluntary relation. 
It is also how I prevent myself from seeing that my advisor (in this case, 
the realtor) — while not necessarily intent on doing me wrong, or at least 
wholly so — simply forecloses for him- or herself the possibility that they 
be recognized as also my adversary and be held accountable, as a result, 
for what they have merely failed to recognize, or else deliberately covered 
over in an effort to feature for me what it is that I featured for myself. The 
reason for this is that aspects can be coordinated and sustained in and as 
the same image by conflicting interests: profit, in the case of the realtor, 
and a desire for the perfect home, in the case of the buyer. We can say this 
is so largely because what “agrees” most visibly, in such instances, is the 
constancy of the object, whether in its independence from the aspect or as 
a result of the coordination of aspects on the basis of competing interests 
that depend on agreement.
That competing interests could constitute and also sustain the same 
aspect may seem strange to political theory, but one example of its 
ordinariness — that is to say, of its regularity in psychic and institutional 
existence — can be detected in film production. It is in no way uncommon 
for a producer of a film to have different reasons for wanting to produce, 
and indeed create the conditions for the actual production of, an image 
at odds with the reason that a director maintains in order to produce that 
very same image. For example, imagine a producer and director wanting 
to make yet one more Godzilla film. The producer’s reason for doing so 
is that there is a long history of profit following from the production of 
Godzilla films. So, for the producer, more of the same image is more 
money. Thus, said producer needs the new image of Godzilla to look sig-
nificantly like the images of other Godzillas in order to secure a market for 
the film to come, likelihood of remuneration at a minimum, and profit. 
The director, on the other hand, agrees to the conditions of production — 
to the institution of “Hollywood” filmmaking as such — because films are 
expensive to make on that scale, and also because said director wants to 
be understood as making an intervention in the history of film. Of course, 
the latter concern is more a matter of art historical record and critical 
recognition than fiscal ingenuity, even if those things are also difficult, at 
times, to separate. But in order for both the producer and the director to 
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be satisfied, they will both need, at the level of the image, to share (and in 
this way, accomplish) the same thing: an image of Godzilla that looks like 
what we have come to recognize, aspectually, as Godzilla and not some-
thing else. This happens despite the fact that what they share (the image 
of Godzilla) is potentially different from why they share it: the producer 
wants profit; the director wants cinematic prestige, which includes the 
ability, always, to make yet another film. At one level, then, the motives of 
the producer and the director are importantly not so different, insofar as 
both participate in the same institution of commercial filmmaking. But it 
could also become the case that the producer demands aesthetic changes 
for the perceived purpose of a market (which is something that he can-
not know but only predict on the basis of what came before), changes 
the director must accept and implement, even if those changes, in his 
view, threaten his critical recognition as an artist and potentially — if also 
for different reasons — his future participation in the institution of com-
mercial film production. In terms of my argument, then, what matters 
most — or at least, first — is that the image of Godzilla exists and that it does 
so despite the different reasons for doing so. Both the producer and the 
director share an aspect — they feature a beast that we are intended to rec-
ognize as Godzilla — even if the director feels duped into this or that part 
of the image, comes to regret the working relationship with the producer, 
and vows to never do it again. He might even make another Godzilla film 
with someone else. What we can say about filmmaking and the conflict of 
interests that regularly happen there, we can also say about how we expe-
rience different reasons for sharing the same aspect in ordinary life, not 
to mention the ordinary life of institutions. It is also why I use “feature” 
as a verb and a noun, as a way of indicating how thinking always has a 
pictorial, aspectual quality — as something that we both participate in the 
shaping of and regard, in turn, as a picture that appears independent of 
us, even though it also cannot be so.13
Likewise, the previous example should indicate, in different terms, 
both the difficulty and the importance of telling a nonvoluntary relation 
from an involuntary one. For instance, in the face of criticism, the direc-
tor could say that, while he does not like the final film any more than the 
critic does, he does not regret having made it, since what appeared did so 
against his will, in which case the indicators of the will are given strictly 
in aesthetic terms. Of course, these are not the only terms or reasons that 
matter; they are simply the ones that matter most to the director, who 
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enacts, in this very way, a preference ranking. They are also the effects 
that show as the result of an automation, since the camera records and 
projects (what is peculiar to this Godzilla alone) what it has no hand in 
shaping. But the director would not be particularly convincing with this 
line of appeal, since what shows as the film stems from an agreement 
to make an image of Godzilla, even if the reasons for doing so, on both 
sides, became quickly opposed. What did not get opposed — namely, an 
interest in producing an image of Godzilla — is what remains, is what is 
featured (is also a feature), even if its existence was constituted on the 
basis of otherwise incompatible reasons. It should be added that if the 
director tells the critic that he does not regret having made the film, he 
likely does so in order to continue participating in the institution of com-
mercial filmmaking. And yet, as I stated at the outset, to claim that one 
has no regrets is to indicate that one had no potential — and certainly no 
necessary — relation to what occurred. It is also to indicate, more plainly, 
one’s inflexibility, or one’s incapacity to recognize that the reasons for 
carrying on in a particular institution (however broadly we conceive of any 
institution) might outweigh the relational purity of this one instance, 
which is nothing more than a preference ranking, or an inability to do 
something for someone without having a picture of their particularity, as 
I claimed in the introduction. 
stupidity and akrasia
The examples I have just given — of a realty transaction that could go 
badly and a film that gets made despite the emergence of conflicting in-
terests that nevertheless result in the production of what was agreed to, on 
an aspectual level — should begin to indicate the institutional dimension 
of my theory of regret. It should indicate equally well why the distinction 
between a nonvoluntary relation (in which case I believe, on the presump-
tion of a state of necessity, that my will shall have no effect on what lies 
before me) and an involuntary relation (in which case I do not act when 
in fact what appears before does so in a state of contingency) is regularly 
collapsed in our ordinary experience of institutions. We saw that it is 
possible to share an aspect that features physical existence in the same 
way for parties that are nevertheless in possession of conflicting reasons 
for the existence of the very same relation, or aggregated aspect. And as I 
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hope both examples indicate, it is on the very basis of an assumption that 
what appears before us does so out of necessity — which follows from a 
further assumption of a nonvoluntary relation where there was, in fact, an 
involuntary one — that one forecloses the possibility of doing differently. 
That is to say, the assumption of the nonvoluntary relation where an in-
voluntary one was at work — and despite the fact that we seem, in both 
cases, to be dealing with inanimate objects like film images and houses 
built next to volcanoes — leads, in the stated or simply notional absence of 
regret, to the declaration of a preference ranking. If the failure I endure 
leads me to take recourse to a preference ranking, instead of reflecting 
on what was available to my will in what has nevertheless passed, then I 
will only do what I have done before; thus I should expect either another 
fire (or bad real estate deal) or no more funding for my filmmaking ca-
reer. Said failures are also likely to lead to stupid feeling, and to feeling 
stupid, which is where the question of bureaucracy emerges most plainly 
and also most importantly for my conception of the political potential of 
regret. We need, then, to understand what stupidity might mean in an 
institutional framework precisely as a way of indicating how regret might 
clarify political will.
What I take for granted here is that institutions involve the coordinated 
efforts of more than one person for the sake of members who cannot yet 
be named, since there will always be new and ongoing members of any 
institution. Thus, bureaucracies are implemented in order to tend to, or 
administer, the structure, rules, and concepts that were uniquely instituted 
by the institution as the institution. As a consequence, we can say (if also 
a bit too schematically, for reasons that will become clearer in chapter 3) 
that there is first an institution, then a bureaucracy — or an administration, 
the job of which is to maintain the institution — and then bureaucrats. It is 
important to emphasize that institution, bureaucracy, and bureaucrat all 
serve the same function — namely, the “life” of the institution. Yet these 
three levels do not stand as simple, transparent, and constant reflections of 
the unwavering truth of the other. As I indicated in the introduction, it is 
very difficult to quickly gauge the viability or value of a given institutional 
form or structure precisely because there is an administration, or bureau-
cracy, that stands for the institution but should not be understood as sim-
ply a structural inevitability of that institution, even if that also remains a 
possibility in many cases. For, among other reasons, there are many ways, 
as we know, to inhabit, interpret, and finesse the rules and concepts of any 
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institution, if we suspend our assumptions that we are in possession, neg-
atively or positively, of the truth of the institution. Likewise, if bureaucracy 
and bureaucrat are related but not identical terms, then we are potentially 
at a further remove still from what we think the determining order or 
structurally isolable truth of any institution might be. A bureaucrat can 
work to serve an administrative order that is housed in, and tasked to pro-
tect, in turn, a given institution. If a bureaucrat agrees with the ambition 
of a particular administrative order, he or she can work to protect that 
order in any number of ways. This can include the all too familiar practice 
of obfuscation and evasion. The intent of the bureaucratic obfuscation is 
to distance the one who needs to redress a wrong done to them by and in 
an institution that is being interpreted and defended — at the time of said 
grievance — by an administrative order that cannot sustain itself nor its 
understanding of the institution, which it wants only to hegemonize, if 
such wrongs were addressed. It may also be the case that the bureaucrat 
simply takes as his or her job to mind his or her role and its adherence 
to the logic of administration in ways that take on the air of transparency, 
if by “transparent” we simply mean an orthodox, and necessarily limited, 
presentation of options that have been explained to this bureaucrat by the 
institution as the way of the institution.14 In this sense, transparency is 
never subject to epistemic verification, only to discursive authority. But 
just as importantly, one can find bureaucrats and administrators who rec-
ognize the capaciousness of the rules themselves and demonstrate that 
capaciousness precisely because it is an option within the structure of the 
institution. If institution, bureaucracy, and bureaucrat were all locked in 
a mutually determinate structural relation, such instances of finesse in 
signification — i.e., the way we could not see, which is at odds with the way 
we are told that things are — would not be possible.
What I want to emphasize most strongly is that it is precisely because 
of the contingent character of the relation that pertains between insti-
tution, bureaucracy, and bureaucrat — a relation that is never forged by, 
or founded in, necessity — that stupidity emerges as a central concern 
for institutional experience. Stupidity is, among other states, an affective 
dimension of institutional involvement that often stands in the way of 
the emancipatory potential of regret, especially since the feeling of stu-
pidity that institutions can produce in the one who fails to navigate that 
institution leads us to redraw the lines around what we think we know, 
which might be nothing at all. It is the very opposite of the flexibility in 
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signs and signification that we might otherwise attempt to mobilize. That 
is to say, what we thought was true — which is just a way of naming the 
nature of our grievance more than it is anything essential, articulable 
as a principle — remains, for us, “true,” even though whatever principle 
guided our action seems to have found no correspondence in the place 
where correspondence is most expected. In such moments, if we feel our 
stupidity, we tend to rage against this or that bureaucrat; or else we rage 
against the bureaucracy itself, as if there were only ever just one kind. 
And yet our rage binds us in a terrible paradox, since what it most often 
does is to block our access to the flexibility of the institution to which, and 
in which, we make our appeal. In a state of rage we become inflexible in 
our demand for flexibility and foreclose, as a result, the gap between insti-
tution and bureaucracy, between bureaucracy and bureaucrat, as though 
all were related by necessity. We close the very gap that change requires 
and that marks an institution as an institution and not as an instance of 
natural law. Who would dare comply?
I do not wish to indicate that there is never any reason to subject bu-
reaucrats or bureaucracies to the anger or the demands for a wrong they or 
it may have done. Nor am I trying to defend the justness of institutions per 
se, any more than I am intent to refuse or resist institutions anywhere they 
appear simply because the presence of one institution gone bad means 
that every other, by definition, will also go bad in time. For the sake of 
clarity, then, let us consider two recent and sharply opposed conceptions 
of institution and bureaucracy. The first belongs to John Searle, the second 
to David Graeber. Searle is concerned to defend institutions as a fact of 
human existence, if not nature, despite the constraints that institutions 
might be said to impose on the human and on nature. At its most basic 
level, for Searle, the human’s capacity for language already indicates the 
presence of an institution, which leads him to say, and in a way that I take 
to be important to any conception of an institution, “If by ‘state of nature’ 
is meant a state in which there are no human institutions, then for language 
speaking animals, there is no such thing as a state of nature.”15 Explicit in this 
suggestion, then, is an idea that institutions are human constructs as nat-
ural as the humans that build and sustain them — and more importantly, 
that institution building is a particularly elevated way of being human. 
Searle is quite clear on the point that institutions cannot be separated from 
nature any more than can language, to the extent that he understands in-
stitutions as involved in the largely benevolent increase of human power:
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There is a common element that runs through all (or nearly all) institu-
tions, and that is that they are enabling structures that increase human 
power in many different ways. Think what life would be like if we did 
not have schools, property rights, and above all, language. Some so-
cial theorists have seen institutional facts as essentially constraining. 
[Searle cites Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method as his example 
of constraint.] That is a very big mistake. There is indeed an element of 
constraint in social institutions. For example, you cannot be president 
unless you get elected, you cannot spend money you do not have, and 
in baseball, you cannot have four strikes. But the very institutions of 
money and baseball increase our powers.16
Searle is obviously concerned to distinguish constraint from repression, 
terms that are regularly conflated in the critique of institutions.17 Con-
straint, as his example suggests, is what protects democracy, insofar as 
one observes the rule that x amount of votes must be achieved in order 
for someone to be elected president; the obvious alternative would be that 
political authority be founded strictly on the basis of violence and self- 
interest. Likewise, in his baseball example, the constraint of three strikes 
instead of four indicates that one must learn to do more with less — that 
one must be more attentive, more resourceful, than one would need to be 
if four strikes were allowed.
It is, perhaps, the example of money that is more difficult to accept 
whole. Money does, of course, increase human power, and that power 
might simply have to do with an allocation of goods and services made 
possible by the representational dimension of money. I can use what I 
make from what I do to acquire something I need but cannot produce on 
my own. Why deny this? But then, as we know, money as an institution 
that creates human power can also produce radical inequality, in which 
case “power” takes on a much more pernicious aspect than it does as a 
description of the human’s capacity to satisfy a need other than, and in 
addition to, one’s own. That is to say, we know that institutions can be 
administered in ways that assure and facilitate radical inequality.
This is the idea of institutional constraint as fundamentally oppressive, 
which is what the anthropologist David Graeber pursues in The Utopia of 
Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy. For Grae-
ber, “institution” and “bureaucracy” are largely conflated terms — where 
I prefer to indicate them as related but separable — and are addressed 
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under the heading of bureaucracy. For Graeber, bureaucracies are meant 
to produce stupidity in the ones they manage and do so, in his view, on 
the basis of a utopianism that each bureaucracy assumes: 
Bureaucracies public and private appear — for whatever historical rea-
sons — to be organized in such a way as to guarantee that a significant 
proportion of actors will not be able to perform their tasks as expected. 
It’s in this sense that I’ve said one can fairly say that bureaucracies are 
utopian forms of organization. After all, is this not what we always say 
of utopians: that they have a naïve faith in the perfectibility of human 
nature and refuse to deal with humans as they actually are? Which is, 
are we not also told, what leads them to set impossible standards and 
then blame the individuals for not living up to them? But in fact all 
bureaucracies do this, insofar as they set demands they insist are rea-
sonable, and then, on discovering that they are not reasonable (since 
a significant number of people will always be unable to perform as 
expected), conclude that the problem is not with the demands them-
selves but with the individual inadequacy of each particular human 
being who fails to live up to them.18
Graeber goes further and suggests that the effect of this bureaucratic uto-
pianism is that we take on our inadequacy as a feeling of stupidity — 
indeed, that the aim of bureaucratic organization is to produce stupe-
faction as a response to any potentially irritable demand made. Graeber 
continues: “To put it crudely: it is not so much that bureaucratic proce-
dures are inherently stupid, or even that they produce behavior that they 
themselves define as stupid — though they do do that — but rather, that 
they are invariably ways of managing social situations that are already 
stupid because they are founded on structural violence.”19 For Graeber, 
then, stupidity indicates at least two things. There is the stupidity of the 
structure in structural violence, by which he seems to mean any institu-
tion that produces radical inequality and real violence as a result. I don’t 
dispute the idea of structural violence in the least, merely the idea that 
it would be stupid, in the sense that the ones capable of producing that 
violence — by way of an institutional structure — lack intelligence, are in-
capable of thinking. In order to accept this we would have to presume for 
the perpetrator of violence and also the victim of that violence a nonvol-
untary relation to what occurs. That is, we assume that the stupidity of the 
one doing the structuring is made stupid by the structure he effects and 
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upholds, in which case both the bureaucrat and the one affected violently 
by said structure are both situated in ways that could only be described as 
nonvoluntary, since “structure” stands in place of a reflective use of the 
will in both cases. Or to put it more simply, if structures makes us stupid 
where once we were smart, then there is no room for human agency, 
responsiveness, or responsibility. The presumption then — and in stark 
contrast to Searle — is that the only way out of structural violence is to 
abandon every institution. And while it is very compelling, for a lot of us, 
to imagine the end of the money system, it is important to remember that 
things like Bitcoin (to name just one alternative currency that produces 
quite a lot of stupefaction for the sake of gross accumulation) share that 
same interest for entirely non- altruistic reasons.
The point is not to say that one understanding of institutional con-
straint — either as productive or as entirely repressive — is necessarily bet-
ter than the other. Though I do wish to emphasize, in a way that agrees 
with Searle, that institutions take as their goal the enabling of ways of do-
ing and being that are greater than any of the ways available to one person 
alone, even if that means that one might also sacrifice some dimension 
of what one desires strictly for or as oneself. It is simply that nothing is 
guaranteed of an institution, positively or negatively, since institutions 
emerge on the basis of contingency and never necessity. If the opposite 
were true, what we would have is not an institution but a law of nature. 
What I am most concerned to indicate, then, is how in both instances 
there is, or at least can be (in the case of Graeber), more flexibility in an 
institution than one supposes. So even if one wants to say that Searle’s 
vision is entirely utopian and in ignorance of the deceptive features of 
human motive — in light of his claim that the goal of most institutions 
is to enable human power — we can still imagine ways in which certain 
figures in government (say, the ones who favor and implement tax breaks 
for the wealthiest) can be removed from office, rather than spending our 
time imagining a world without a need for taxation itself. Likewise, in the 
case of Graeber, if we say that the representational system of money can 
only ever produce radical inequality, we would also need to note that alter-
natives to it, like bitcoins, in developing their own obfuscatory networks, 
are simply replacing one institution with another institution.20 The point 
I want to make is, in fact, much smaller. In noting the capacity of institu-
tions (in the case of Searle) and the difficulty of ever leaving one behind 
(in the case of Graeber), I want only to indicate that one effect of the stu-
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pidity that bureaucratic administrations produce for the supposed sake of 
the institutions they serve (and sometimes the logic they are desperately 
concerned to protect) is that it can lead, most productively, to regret. That 
is to say, we can begin to see, if stupid feeling gives way to regret in the 
place of stubborn preference rankings and the angry trumpeting of first 
principles, that most relations within an institution are better perceived 
as involuntary ones rather than nonvoluntary ones. If stupidity gives way 
to rage, then we assume that what keeps appearing will only ever appear 
as it does, which could only lead to nihilism.
For this reason, I understand stupidity, here, to refer to one of two pos-
sible states, neither of which is essential or permanently binding. In the 
first sense, stupidity names an inability to hold together in thought incom-
mensurables, whether such states indicate incommensurable demands 
or seemingly incommensurable phenomena. In the second case — which 
is not unrelated to the first — stupidity merely indicates whatever it is that 
I do not understand and feel shame or rage for not knowing, whether 
or not that shame or rage is reasonable. All that matters, in this case, is 
that I have perceived some aspect of my own stupidity, gone silent at the 
moment in which that gap reveals itself, and stood behind that silence 
as polite disagreement, even if I perform the mute signs of having been 
irretrievably wronged. In a more skeptical vein, we could say that this 
is precisely what the bureaucrat asks of us: that we hide our ignorance, 
leave it concealed by the outward expression of signs of the nonvoluntary 
relation he has produced for us. This is why the bureaucrat can bear the 
complaints about his own stupidity, knowing as he surely does, that our 
complaints do nothing less than register our own, so long as we remain 
incapable of recognizing the oblique relations that are in no sense nonvol-
untary, and thus are in every instance a possible source of regret. Regret 
is, as we all know, the risk of engagement, but the risk is much less than 
we regularly suppose it to be, since regret only emerges in the realm of 
contingency and never necessity.
If I am lingering on the logic of bureaucracy, it is because this is the 
realm where a conception of regret is both most viable or useful and also 
the most challenging, especially when we assume that the bureaucrat is 
lacking in virtue, and even more so when, in fact, he is. I have in mind 
here the cases when a bureaucrat cannot think in terms of, nor feature 
in honesty, a mean. Moreover, if the bureaucrat regularly shows us signs 
and causes — signs set forth as causes — that are to be understood in terms 
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of a nonvoluntary relation, regret may well follow after rage and in the 
place of perpetual stupidity and stupefaction. The consequence of our 
regret is that in place of belief — i.e., that what was shown to me was the 
truth of the institution, whether what was featured for me was done so as 
deception or transparency — we will begin to perceive oblique relations, 
in which case we may begin to see an opening for a more productive use 
of our will. In this sense, I am sympathetic to Aristotle’s distinction be-
tween nonvoluntary and involuntary relations insofar as regret emerges 
in the recognition of our own involuntary response. It is just that we will 
need to be able to recognize that a nonvoluntary relation is more likely 
an involuntary one. If we are capable of breaking with the perceptual 
habits bequeathed to us by the recurrent signs willed by another with an 
intention to deceive, or else breaking those habits that remain with us in 
ignorance,  many so- called nonvoluntary relations can be exposed as the 
dissimulations of obfuscations that they truly are, rather than as evidence 
of our own stupidity. 
Regret, I think we can now say, comes by way of the recognition that 
we have misused our will, that we acted in accordance with signs that 
were featured for us as beyond the reach of the will, and thus nonvol-
untary. Regret is therefore what prevents us from either utopianism or 
nihilism. If we feel regret, it means that we can recognize the difference 
between a nonvoluntary relation and an involuntary one. We can see that 
the involuntary relation — which appeals to our ignorance at the very mo-
ment in which a knowing use of our will is in order — is nested in the 
appearance of a nonvoluntary relation, this thing that I think I can do 
nothing about, and regardless of how I feel about what has happened. 
And if we can see this, then what we can see in any instance is the poten-
tial to do otherwise, which will depend on our ability to perceive oblique 
and spontaneous relations. It is, perhaps, not so redundant after all to say 
that if we become less stupid — if, that is, we become more capable of the 
oblique relation, or holding together in thought incommensurable signs 
or logics — we will be held much less often in ignorance. It may be that 
this requires us to learn to anticipate without precedent, and precisely 
because the bureaucrat — if in thrall to the logic of a bureaucracy that is 
indeed concerned to defuse the demand we make — is himself someone 
who is skilled in thinking obliquely, in a discontinuous relation to what 
appears. Otherwise, we would never have fallen prey to a deception. I 
pursue this more directly in chapter 3. Likewise, it might be the case 
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that what regret allows us to see is our own perceptual habits, which are 
born of first principles, or at least behave as though they were. Regret 
may very well open a gap between what I think a bureaucrat does, or a 
bureaucracy is, and what the institution actually has the capacity for. Thus, 
if regret is related to virtue, virtue should no longer be understood as the 
achievement of a mean, since acting virtuously in the face of bureaucracy 
implies that our thoughts and our actions are to be severed from habit. 
And it is conceivable to act this way since the habits of perception that 
precede a virtuous act owe their occurrence to the contingency of signs 
in being.
In this sense, regret should be distinguished from akrasia, which was 
of paramount importance to Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics and describes 
our capacity to make decisions that run counter to what we normally 
think of as best. As Amelie Rorty — an influential theorist of akrasia — 
has put it, “A person believes akratically when he believes that p, being 
implicitly aware that p conflicts with the preponderance of serious evi-
dence or with a range of principles to which he is committed.”21 Akrasia, 
then, defines a use of the will, but toward an end that is other than what 
we might otherwise believe to be good — much like when we carry on 
with the task set before us by the bureaucrat, even though we curse him 
for setting before us something we know to be of no use. But it does not 
indicate a weakness of will. Just the opposite: “Akrasia is a disease that 
only the strong can suffer. To be capable of it, a person must not only be 
able to note his failures, but also be capable of voluntary intervention in 
his thought patterns, directing attention and inferences by the princi-
ple to which they commit themselves.”22 It is tempting to see in Rorty’s 
suggestion that akratic thought — and the action that follows from it — 
involves an ability to intervene in one’s own thought patterns, which is an 
experience similar to the one I am describing in terms of regret. Regret 
emerges in the recognition that a nonvoluntary relation is better under-
stood as involuntary, such that I will now be better prepared to perceive 
oblique relations that cannot be predicted. And akrasia does indeed imply 
a strong will and an ability to think otherwise. But in such moments, we 
do what we do expressly to act in a non- virtuous manner. Likewise, for 
Rorty, akratic thought can lead to melancholia, our ability to persist in a 
state of mind, or worldview, that runs counter to our principles.23 In this 
sense, regret is small change to the melancholic who can see the alterna-
tive but refuses to release his will from an akratic thought, even though 
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he should be capable of doing so. Moreover, since, in an akratic state, our 
thought and our will are directed expressly against a set of principles that 
constitute virtue as a habit of perception, the deviation from those princi-
ples will always be recognizable by way of those principles. Or as Amelie 
Rorty puts it, the very “conditions of akrasia assure the possibility of its 
reform.”24 And reform is, for Rorty — just as it was for Aristotle — the goal. 
But it need not be. We would be better served by the idea that thinking 
is what happens after or without respect to habituated perception, even 
if that implies that the actions we regard as lacking in virtue are owed 
to the very same capacity for thinking otherwise. An akratic thought/
action merely mirrors, in inverse proportion, the moral logic of virtue 
and its habits. An akratic thought — or what appears to us as an akratic 
thought — might go further than the proportionally inverse limits of vir-
tue allow, but if our perception remains grounded in habit, then we will 
not be capable of seeing what exceeds that limit.
The concept of akrasia is useful for beginning to understand how it is 
that administrations or bureaucracies or bureaucrats can act in a way that 
they consciously know to be at odds with what they otherwise believe. And 
an akratic thought may very well give way to regret. However, if the “con-
ditions of akrasia assure the possibility of its reform,” as Amelie Rorty 
suggests, then reform means only a return to principles, which stand in 
the way of what is most productive about regret. Even more troubling, in 
my view and also increasingly familiar, has to do with how akratic thought 
can be intensified in the form of euphemism, in which case we quite 
cheerily perceive a gap between what we know to be wrong and what we 
carry on doing anyway. I have in mind Alexander García Düttmann’s in-
cisive critique, in “Euphemism, the University, and Disobedience,” of the 
status of euphemism in the administrative life of the contemporary uni-
versity. As García Düttmann sees it, the zeal for euphemism is strongly 
related to the corporatization of what was once the unconditional univer-
sity. Or as he puts it, “an unconditional university is, inherently, a univer-
sity open to risk, to the risk of being subverted, while a university domi-
nated by power, charlatanry, and euphemistic speech is a university that 
has ceased to expose itself or that seeks to minimize such exposure.”25 
The unconditional university, it should be said, is still an institution; it 
is just one in which its “administration makes itself imperceptible, not 
because it has become ubiquitous but because is almost superfluous.”26 
That is to say, the separation between institution, administration, and bu-
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reaucrat still holds. What uniquely shows in the case of the unconditional 
university, however, is no particular principle, condition, or content but 
the very absence of principles, conditions, or form- determining content, 
which is what an administration alone can “provide.” Most importantly, 
“in the unconditional university there can be no euphemism because the 
idea is not separated from reality by a gap.”27 It should be said that the gap 
indicated here in critical terms by García Düttmann is not the same gap 
that I’ve suggested is necessary to keep open between an institution, an 
administration, and a bureaucrat. Rather, “the gap” between an idea and 
reality indicated by García Düttmann is what prevents change from occur-
ring, since euphemism anesthetizes the very gap that an administration 
produces and features for itself and for everyone else in it.
García Düttmann puts it this way:
That euphemism is the linguistic condition of contemporary society 
means that those who live in this condition know about the reality 
of their lives without actually confronting it; deception and belief in 
some magical power merge in euphemistic speech, and the ability to 
deceive oneself and others collapses into self- deception as fate. When 
speaking, writing and thinking, euphemists actively contribute to the 
suppression of their awareness, and are therefore aware of what they 
try to conjure away, as well as of the repelling conjuration itself. They 
produce an ambiguity in which they install themselves. Using a eu-
phemism always signals a resistance that stems from a fundamental 
acceptance.28
The akratic dimension of euphemism, then, is precisely this “resistance 
that stems from a fundamental acceptance.” But worse than akratic thought, 
in which case I simply decide against something that I know to be at odds 
with what I actually believe or otherwise value, it is the cheeriness of 
euphemism itself that “protects” akratic thought from the possibility of 
reformation — though I hope to have indicated the kind of reformation 
akrasia makes possible is a return to first principles, even if that may be 
better than the situation created by euphemism. Put differently still, we 
can say that euphemism — as the name of the sustainability of gap that 
has been opened between an idea and reality — is melancholy’s twin. In 
place of a mourning- without- end, we have instead a euphoria- without- 
end, the effect of which, in both cases, is that what appears before us 
remains entirely unchanged and unchangeable. In the case of euphemism, 
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regret will be even harder to come by, since what keeps going wrong only 
ever feels good. For the one in thrall to a euphemism, the question is not 
“what has gone wrong in what I’ve done?” but “why do I feel so good 
about what only goes worse and worse?”
Perhaps it could be argued, instead, that regret follows from a weak-
ness of the will, which shares certain, but not all, of the characteristics 
of akrasia and euphemism, and does to some extent explain our inability 
to see that what the bureaucrat displays for us as a nonvoluntary relation 
might very well be the dawning of a recognition that what we have expe-
rienced, instead, is an involuntary one. In “Intention and Weakness of 
Will,” Richard Holton defines weakness of will in a manner that distin-
guishes it from akrasia: “Central cases of weakness of will are best charac-
terized not as cases in which people act against their better judgment, but 
as cases in which they fail to act on their intentions.”29 To draw the distinc-
tion, Holton cites a passage from Kingsley Amis’s novel Lucky Jim — the 
moment in which Dixon, an untenured junior colleague, wakes up after 
a night of drinking in the home of his head of department, Professor 
Welch, only to find that he has cigarette burns all over his bedclothes. 
Holton cites the following passage from the novel: “Had he done all this 
himself? Or had a wayfarer, a burglar, camped out in his room? Or was he 
the victim of some Horla fond of tobacco? He thought that on the whole 
he must have done it himself, and wished he hadn’t. Surely this would 
mean the loss of his job, especially if he failed to go to Mrs. Welch and 
confess what he’d done, and he knew already that he wouldn’t be able to 
do that.”30 For Holton, this is not a case of weakness of will precisely be-
cause Dixon never intends to confess what he’s done. As Holton explains, 
“It is because he knows that he is someone with a tendency to weakness 
of will that he acts as he does. So, on the account given here, his weakness 
of will explains his action (or rather his inaction).”31 If his weakness of 
will explains his action, Holton’s account goes, then Dixon does not act 
against what he otherwise intends, since he has no intention to be truth-
ful. His action is weak, but since Dixon knows that he is weak- willed, he 
does not actually break with an intention to be honest. If, however, Dixon 
had vowed the day before never to drink again, then the next morning 
would be proof of weakness of will, since his actions ran counter to his 
intentions. He would have proven himself too weak in will to remain so-
ber, to see his intention through to the end. Likewise, in Holton’s account, 
this episode could not qualify as akrasia since he does not willingly act 
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against his better judgment. As Dixon sees it, it would be bad to confess 
this to his boss’s wife, so he doesn’t.
The trouble here is that weakness of will cannot account for the spec-
ificity of Dixon’s thought — the range of possible signs, possible events — 
which await him on the other side of decision. It is too simple to describe 
him as weak- willed. It would be better to say that Dixon is trying to think 
ahead of the administrator. The situation cannot be defined by reason. 
He has to think politically. He needs to anticipate the possible ways of 
being read, and by the very one who has indulged with him in a night of 
heavy drinking — which involves the loosening of signs in the moment 
of intoxication and in memory. The choice, in other words, is not so sim-
ple. Nor is it a matter of virtue. There is no mean. Signs float and show 
multiple aspects at once. Perhaps Welch wanted to know if his young 
colleague was a good drinker and thus worthy of promotion. Perhaps he 
is a reader of Maupassant and would welcome the very idea of “some 
Horla” with a taste for tobacco. None of this is rational, but a “proper” use 
of the will cannot be restricted to reason, to the pursuit of truth as a stable 
set of signs that can be seen in just one way. What if Dixon gives away 
the wrong sign? That is, what if he shows too much? What if his head 
of department actually loathes Maupassant and is searching for a sign of 
Dixon’s own irrationality? His imbecility? Sometimes we speak too soon; 
sometimes we show the wrong thing.
when to speak?
If I have avoided, up to this point, naming what likely seems to be obvious — 
that regret is a problem of decision — it is because decision is most often 
understood, in political terms, as a problem of time, of knowing when to 
speak. This is surely Dixon’s problem. Not just what but when, knowing all 
the while that one can wait too long. And to wait too long is to have things 
decided for you. But it is also the case that one can speak too soon, in which 
case one decides against oneself at the very moment that a judgment of 
the other is made. However, in this case the decision will be made less on 
the basis of what we know from or about the other, or an institution, than 
from the limits of our understanding, which, in a state of rage, comes to 
us as first principles. Or as Peter Sloterdijk puts it, “The deep simplicity of 
rage satisfies the all- too- human desire for strong motivations.”32
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The paradigmatic instance of this problem remains Kafka’s The Trial — 
perhaps the book that has defined bureaucratic alienation for the last 
century. How it has done so is most succinctly described by Walter Ben-
jamin. Claiming that Kafka’s work “is an ellipse with foci that are far 
apart and are determined, on the one hand, by mystical experience (in 
particular, the experience of tradition) and, on the other, by the experi-
ence of the modern big- city dweller,” Benjamin goes on to describe the 
big- city dweller: “One the one hand, I think of the modern citizen who 
knows that he is at the mercy of a vast machinery of officialdom whose 
functioning is directed by authorities that remain nebulous to the exec-
utive organs, let alone the people they deal with. (It is known that one 
level of meaning in the novels, particularly in The Trial, is encompassed 
by this.)”33 Nested in Benjamin’s account of the bureaucratic universe of 
Kafka’s fiction is an important distinction between authorities and exec-
utive organs. Benjamin notices, in his own way, that institutions, admin-
istrations, and bureaucrats are related entities but are related as separate. 
Otherwise, the authorities would simply know and do what the executive 
organ demands. And in turn, what the sufferers in Kafka’s universe do 
is to try to conflate the authorities with the executive organs. Benjamin is 
also careful to quote, in another essay on Kafka, a passage from The Castle 
that defines for him the strange elusiveness of authority, a passage that 
only heightens the absurd humor of the ones in Kafka who feel they are 
in possession of an understanding: “In Kafka’s works, the conditions in 
offices and in families have multifarious points of contact. In the village 
at the foot of Castle Hill people use an illuminating saying: ‘We have a 
saying here that you may be familiar with: official decisions are as shy 
as young girls.’ ”34 The question, then, in Kafka’s work concerns the se-
crecy of institutions and what it means to gain access to the secret. But in 
Kafka’s world, access is also opposed by certainty, which is nearly always 
louder than these “shy young girls.”
Consider, briefly, the lot of Josef K. in The Trial. Given what happens to 
K., and the novel’s reputation more generally as a parable of bureaucratic 
terror, it is easy to forget the very trouble that K.’s own certainty causes 
him, especially since that trouble is at least coincident with his outrage. 
For what is it that first happens to K. when he awakes to find himself in 
his room surrounded by the strange men who are there to detain him, 
to notify him of his arrest? He is as galled by the actual arrest as he is by 
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an arrest that is introduced in the realm of habit — of the image he keeps 
of his own moral purity and also of the breakfast that he expects to be 
brought to him every day by 8 am. On K.’s initial trips to the courtroom, 
which he makes in an effort to discover what it is, exactly, that he’s been 
charged with, the injury he perceives to his moral standing comes quickly 
into focus. On his second trip, K. encounters a young woman who lives 
with her husband in the building that houses the courtrooms and magis-
trates’ and students’ offices. K. is attracted to this woman; he finds himself 
in a fit of rage as a young student takes her in his arms and leads her 
away, while K. is himself in the middle of trying to get information from 
her about where to go. Despite the young woman’s plea to K. that it is not 
what he thinks, that the young student is just doing what was asked of 
him by the magistrate, K. accounts for his failure differently:
Of course, there was no reason to let that worry him, he had suffered 
defeat only because he chose to do battle. If he stayed home and led his 
normal life he was infinitely superior to any of these people, and could 
kick any of them out of his path. And he pictured how funny it would 
be, for example, to see this miserable student, this puffed- up child, this 
bandy- legged, bearded fellow, kneeling at Elsa’s bedside, clutching his 
hands and begging for mercy. This vision pleased K. so greatly that 
he decided if the opportunity ever arose, to take this student along to 
Elsa one day.35
K. presumes only that the young woman’s relation to the man carrying 
her away — who is also not her husband — is nonvoluntary, precisely be-
cause the image he keeps of himself organizes his own visual and au-
ditory field in such a way that seemingly prevents him from seeing the 
kinds of complications that would, at the very least, render the relation 
as involuntary and subject, as a consequence, to regret. She may, for in-
stance, be choosing not to act for the sake of a decision or a relation to 
which K. has no access and will carry on having no access.
For K., regret never registers even in the moment in which he indi-
cates it. For instance, just before the young man takes the woman away, 
both K. and the young woman confess to one another that they find each 
other attractive. K., however, quickly assumes that her confession of at-
traction is proof of her belonging to the very institution that is set on his 
ruin, and he tells her, triumphantly,
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Keep your present relationship with these people, it seems to me you 
really can’t do without it. I say that with some regret, because, to return 
to your compliment at least in part, I like you, too, especially when 
you look at me as sadly as you do right now, although you really have 
no reason to. You’re part of the group I have to fight, but you’re quite 
comfortable among them; you even love the student, or even if you 
don’t love you at least prefer him to your husband. That was easy to 
tell from what you said.36
If K. feels “some regret” and gives up on that regret, on the idea that she 
really is attracted to him, in favor of the image of institutional complicity, 
then what shows in the description is a dawning of the aspect. It is a 
choice he quite deliberately makes to perceive her in the image of ad-
ministrative complicity, when the sign of sadness might indicate instead 
someone with a more complex relation to the institution in which she 
is nevertheless, and also quite literally, housed. What makes him say so, 
since he does not in fact know her, can only be predicated on an image — 
 or a discourse — about the institution itself, so much so that the very per-
son who might help K. to find his way becomes folded into what he can 
only see in just one way. That is to say, K. assumes that since she lives in 
the space of legal administration she is that administration, even though 
her pleadings to him indicate the awareness that Benjamin offers about 
Kafka’s world. Namely, she, like him, may very well be “at the mercy of a 
vast machinery of officialdom whose functioning is directed by author-
ities that remain nebulous to the executive organs, let alone the people 
they deal with.”
Perhaps the trouble for K., or at least a part of it, is that he speaks too 
soon, and in a way that cancels out the emancipatory potential of regret 
by virtue of the certainty that he brings to bear on the institutions that 
nevertheless confound and destroy him. He confuses the simplicity of 
rage with the clarity of signs. This is indicated rather forcefully in K.’s first 
visit to the courthouse, a trip he makes — somehow — without any definite 
indication of where he is meant to go and at what time he is to be there. 
Upon his arrival, the narrator describes K.’s state: “He was annoyed that 
they hadn’t described the location of the room more precisely; he was cer-
tainly being treated with carelessness or indifference, a point he intended 
to make loudly and clearly. Then he went up the first set of stairs after all, 
his mind playing with the memory of the remark the guard Willem had 
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made that the court was attracted by guilt, from which it actually followed 
that the room for inquiry would have to be located off whatever stairway 
K. chanced to choose.”37 What we have in this astonishing passage, then, 
is an important link between rage, certainty, and time. If the court is 
attracted by guilt, then the court cannot be cleanly told apart from the 
one who is attracted there. K., as the narrator suggests, cannot but go 
where he belongs, since where he “belongs” is the place he has only ever 
imagined. So any door will do. What he can see in just one way, so much 
so that any door will be the right door, is bolstered by his eagerness to 
set things straight before having a clearer picture of what “things” are. 
This is also one way of thinking (in no sense the only way) about how K. 
manages to find himself ensnared. K. begins his search on day one, you 
will recall, by inventing a name of a carpenter, Lanz — a name he intends 
to use simply as a pretext for asking people if they know what apartment 
“Lanz” lives in. K. believes that this pretext, this imaginary Lanz, will give 
him an opportunity to see into many apartments on the very idea that he 
might detect, in one of them, the site where the commission of inquiry 
might actually be located. As he is taken from room to room, floor to 
floor, K. grows weary and the narrator tells us, “He regretted his plan, 
which at first had seemed so practical.”38 However, as soon as he coun-
tenances his regret — which would, presumably, have afforded him the 
chance to rethink his strategy and just go home, since he remains free to 
do so — someone answers the question about the carpenter affirmatively 
and leads him in. In attempting to show one thing for the sake of doing 
another, which is what we often say about the bureaucrat, K. encounters 
someone who is prepared to participate with K. in the image that K. has 
nevertheless fabricated for very different reasons. In his haste for justice, 
K. behaves in the very way that he expects the bureaucrat to behave. They 
can agree on an image of how things are, but do so, we can only assume, 
for very different reasons. Or perhaps it is better to say that what fails K. 
are his reasons, that his failure cannot be separated from the reasons he 
takes as the ground of his liberation.
chapter two
Impossible Advice
When we anticipate the possibility of regret — when we worry over a de-
cision we nevertheless have to make — we typically seek advice. If regret 
is an opening, if it enables us to better perceive the relative scarcity of 
nonvoluntary relations and to see the oblique relation where once we 
insisted merely on what appears, as I have suggested in the previous 
chapter, then how will we regard advice, which we regularly experience 
as a way of managing the contingencies that appear to us as contingency 
and never as something necessary? What will advice contribute to the 
opening that regret makes possible? Or to put it more directly: What will it 
mean for us to regard regret as possible? Our question, then, is about how 
or even what advice contributes to regret, especially since one typically 
seeks advice expressly in order to avoid regret. Were these options before 
me not an expression of contingency — of contingent paths — then there 
would be no option at all; there would be no occasion for decision. If there 
is no occasion for decision, then there is also no error and thus no regret. 
The way will have been obvious. And herein lies the problem. Regret, as 
I have argued, brings us into attunement with the contingency of things. 
It forces me to recognize an action — or inaction, as the case may be — as 
involuntary (despite the fact that I’ve done nothing) rather than nonvol-
untary (in which case doing nothing bears no relation to the will). And yet 
advice — if it is good advice — will prevent me from experiencing regret. If 
I have been spared the occasion of regret, then it would seem that I will 
also not be in a position to recognize the way in which involuntary rela-
tions are often passed off, or perceived, as nonvoluntary ones.
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There is, perhaps, no greater expression of the problem of advice as 
that which forestalls regret — and thus the emancipatory potential that 
comes from the awareness that I have acted in error, at least once, if not 
many other times — than Tay Garnett’s adaptation of The Postman Always 
Rings Twice (1946). I begin this chapter, then, with a brief account of 
the problems raised by Garnett’s film, insofar as the reference makes 
clear, albeit in a fictional domain, the problem that will need to be ad-
dressed in this chapter: namely, the “error” that comes nested in every 
instance of altruism, which the anticipation of regret always runs the risk 
of summoning.   
the postman always rings twice
The Postman Always Rings Twice tells the story of Frank Chambers, a law-
less drifter who happens upon Cora, the young wife of a much older 
proprietor of a roadside diner and service station on the California coast. 
An immediate consequence of their mad attraction is a plan to kill the 
husband, which they eventually succeed in doing when Frank and Cora 
drive up a winding stretch of a coastal highway and send the husband 
over a cliff with the car. It is an event well described by the district at-
torney (da) prosecuting the case as something performed “accidentally 
on purpose.” In order to succeed in their attempt to kill the husband 
“by accident,” Frank and Cora must perform the signs of decisiveness in 
intoxication — in both Frank and the husband — for the da, who has been 
watching them for some time and who appears before them at the very 
moment in which the trio are just beginning to embark on this lethal trip. 
Once the da turns up at the roadside station — on the pretense of needing 
air for his tires — the pair reward that particular fiction with a fiction of 
their own: the performance of a scene of drunken struggle. What the da 
sees, in particular, is Frank, who is pretending to be drunk, arguing with 
the husband, who really is drunk, over who will drive the car on this trip, 
which the husband foolishly believes to be the beginning of a holiday in 
western Canada. To the da, however, both Frank and the husband appear 
drunk. He is convinced. Let us say that Frank and the husband are united 
under the same aspect, related to each other as “drunks.” Cora comes 
along as planned, pushes both Frank and the husband aside, and takes 
the wheel.
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In this brief performance, the da is prepared to see what he will nev-
ertheless not be present to witness. The signs of drunken struggle are 
intended, in this way, to be understood by the da as an indication of a de-
cisive will to drive, in the case of both men, that will presumably resume 
once they are out of the da’s sight, at least as the da is meant to see it. 
These signs of an exaggerated decisiveness in intoxication will express — if 
they are to succeed in producing a sense of continuity across a period of 
time in which they will not actually be visible — an unexpected distinction 
between an involuntary relation and a nonvoluntary one. Frank insists on 
driving drunk — an insistence that Frank performs strictly for, and in view 
of, the da. Likewise, he performs this insistence as failure, in that Cora 
finally takes the wheel. And yet, should the drunken battle between the 
two men occur again, as the staged performance implies that it will, only 
the husband will be held responsible, however paradoxically, for his own 
death, which will, at best, be understood as an involuntary relation, since 
the husband will come to be understood as having been capable of doing 
otherwise. Frank, who will also appear on the record as drunk, and about 
whom it will be told that he lost his battle with the husband for control 
of the wheel, will be declared innocent, since his actions rendered him — 
albeit subsequently — incapable of allowing the situation to be otherwise. 
The accident, in other words, will be shown to be something that was 
necessary and thus not subject to contingency.
What will matter most of all, if Frank’s and Cora’s plan pans out — that 
is, what will allow the involuntary relation to be read as a nonvoluntary 
one — is that the signs on display be performed and understood continu-
ously as something continuous, and as such, only barely noticeable. That 
is, the signs must create a visual sense of continuity that spans across a 
phenomenal gap in the field of the da’s vision during which the event of 
the husband’s death will have occurred. Frank and Cora will have to fix 
the signs of an accident that never really was one. What was accidental 
in the accident — the fall that Frank will take along with the car and the 
husband in his effort to merely nudge the car over — is what must also 
remain repressed if the crash is to appear as something that was beyond 
any reach of the will. To put it somewhat differently, the accident will 
only be knowable if it can be understood as continuous, and if contin-
uous, then also as something necessary. What remains unseen in the 
accident must be visible in what appears. If the husband’s death is to be 
understood as nonvoluntary, where Cora and Frank are concerned, then 
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the signs must remain just as they were initially featured. For if the death 
of the husband is found to be the result of an involuntary relation (i.e., 
involuntary manslaughter), then some guilt can be assigned; some time 
can be served. We can, in this way, begin to understand the potential 
for criminal sovereignty that is opened up — and rather inadvertently, I 
can only imagine — by the severing of all nonvoluntary relations from the 
achievement of virtue that Aristotle performs in such a trivial- seeming 
manner in his Nicomachean Ethics and as we saw in chapter 1. Frank and 
Cora understand that the perfect crime is bad murder, insofar as bad 
murder shows the signs of the accidental or the unstudied. Or as Frank 
says in a voice- over that begins the scene I have just described, “This was 
going to be such a bad murder that it wouldn’t be murder.”
The past tense of Frank’s admission announces his regret in advance 
of the event we are about to see, which has already occurred. This was 
going to be a bad murder. Frank’s voice- over tells us what should have 
occurred, while the images display, with some important exceptions, what 
actually occurred. What the past tense allows us to see, in particular, is the 
contingency in what was meant to appear to all as something necessary 
because it was unavoidable — the discontinuity in what was meant to be 
continuous and thus barely noticeable as something that requires, or once 
required, both a decision and an action. Let us not confuse the two. In this 
way, Frank’s confession stages the emancipatory potential of regret, and 
does so strictly for the spectator — for the one who will still have an oppor-
tunity to act otherwise in an event that is nevertheless entirely unrelated 
to what appears before her. It is too late for Frank, but it is not too late 
for us, since whatever regret has to teach us is that what has passed will 
only help us to see the unexpected in what might come in an altogether 
different form.1
If the temporal discontinuity between voice- over and image mimics the 
structure of regret in its emancipatory form — insofar as it simultaneously 
displays both what should have happened and what actually happened — 
 the problem that necessitates this temporal disjunction to begin with is 
the failure that follows from, and that can be attributed to, the advice 
Frank and Cora receive. That is to say, Frank and Cora fail precisely be-
cause of the advice they take and their subsequent inability to measure 
up to the demand made by that advice, which is the risk we all run when 
we seek advice in a state of panic, when we might instead stay with what 
remains uncertain a while longer.
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The advice Frank and Cora receive comes in two particular instances. 
In the first, the problem of advice will be best understood as a question 
of the frame and what it makes visible and possible. That is, Garnett is 
careful to feature the limits of the film frame as a full expression of what 
is available to thought. The limits of the frame constitute the visibility 
that is made possible by advice, while representing at the same time the 
entire, if also a foreclosed, field of signs from within which any decision 
must be made. What is most thinkable is what appears in a frame. Gar-
nett’s attention to the frame as the subject of the film slightly upsets, as 
we will see, the promise of the film frame summoned by Stanley Cavell 
in The World Viewed:
The camera, being finite, crops a portion from an indefinitely larger 
field; continuous portions of that field could be included in the pho-
tograph in fact taken. Hence objects in photographs that run past the 
edge do not feel cut; they are aimed at, shot, stopped live. When a 
photograph is cropped, the rest of the world is cut out. The implied 
presence of the rest of the world, and its explicit rejection, are as essen-
tial in the experience of a photograph as what it explicitly presents. A 
camera is an opening in a box: that is the best emblem of the fact that 
a camera holding an object is holding the rest of the world away. The 
camera is praised for extending the senses; it may, as the world goes, 
deserve more praise for confining them, leaving room for thought.2
Garnett’s frame cuts off the rest of the world for the sake of thought, but it 
does so on a much more cynical register than the one suggested by Cavell, 
who regards the frame as an expansive mode of attentiveness predicated 
on the limits that every frame introduces. In The Postman Always Rings 
Twice, the limits of the frame or the edge of the photograph constitute a 
world that is intended to be understood as more reliably knowable insofar 
as the presence of the image’s edge is felt to be the demarcation of what 
is most factual and thus most worthy of reflection because most concen-
trated. And by concentrated I mean at least two things: first, the gathering 
together of what can be held most tightly, as if all that is can be squeezed 
in one, and second, that which is subject to reflection. If something else 
mattered more why would it not have appealed to the visible “inside” 
constituted by the edge of the frame? Are we to believe that what appears 
is always what is most worthy of reflection?3 The evidentiary dimension of 
the frame, thus conceived, is registered in the lawful, predatory language 
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with which Cavell describes the capture of the object on film: “they are 
aimed at, shot, stopped live.” Cavell’s description of the frame will just as 
readily, in another context, describe the work of a gun. If such a conflation 
is unavoidable — if the fullness of world that a restricted field of visibility 
gives to attention is also readable as an instance of brute force — will we 
know more or less about what appears there? If something is stopped live, 
can it truly be said to tell us more than that which resists capture? Won’t 
the frame simply tell us what it has prepared the ones or things contained 
within it — as a frame — to say? Perhaps the frame itself tells us something 
more definitive than what it shows in any single instance.
Let us consider these provocations with reference to two extended 
scenes from Garnett’s film. The first scene occurs in the immediate after-
math of the car crash that kills the husband and takes Frank — who never-
theless survives — along with it. The scene opens in a long shot that shows 
Frank in bed at the front of the image and to the right. Behind him and at 
the center of the frame is a doorway, to the left of which sits a policeman 
reading a newspaper (figure 2.1). As the da enters through the doorway 
and walks past the policeman, Garnett’s camera moves with him, clos-
ing in on the da and Frank in a more intimate medium two- shot, which 
allows us to see just enough of the door, through which the policeman — 
who might otherwise have been a witness to the exchange to come — now 
exits (figure 2.2). The da very quickly attempts to coerce a confession 
from Frank, and as he does so Garnett’s camera moves between a tightly 
framed shot/reverse- shot sequence, which produces a sense of tension 
in the frame by virtue of the combative sense of separation it effects, and 
then back out to a medium shot, which features both men in the frame at 
the same time (figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7). This most basic — and also 
the most iterated (i.e., the most possible) — of all stylistic routines enacts 
a logic of separation and unity, which identifies at the level of form the 
stakes of the decision Frank must make: either remain against the law, as 
if in permanent shot/reverse- shot, or else remain in continuity with the 
law, as if in a medium two- shot that echoes (figure 2.2), on a smaller scale, 
the limits of the world announced by the long shot with which the scene 
began (figure 2.1). Frank initially denies his involvement in the murder. 
His denial only exacerbates the antagonism of the shot/reverse- shot con-
vention until the da tells him something that he does not seem to know, 
namely, that Cora had just two days earlier taken out a life insurance 
policy on the husband. Noting Frank’s surprise at this new detail, the da 
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offers Frank a piece of advice: sign a complaint against Cora, which will 
have the effect of condemning her but also of securing his innocence. 
Knowing that he needs to maintain his story about having been drunk at 
the time, Frank cannot plausibly — even if correctly — demonstrate that he 
knows otherwise simply because he has seen otherwise. He must commit, 
instead, to a blind spot that really is not one even though it is redoubled 
by the film frame, which now excludes Cora and emphasizes, as such, 
the problem of maintaining continuity in the absence of visibility. That 
is to say, it would be difficult for Frank, or any other, to carry on thinking 
about what remains to be seen as something that will be seeable in the 
same way as what now appears. To rehearse Cavell’s claim in a slightly 
different way, then, any other portion of the world could be taken, shown, 
and thus understood as most pertinent, as an expression of what can be 
known most reliably by virtue of what can be generalized about what ap-
pears within this frame. Frank will have to decide what to do on the basis 
of something he does not know for certain: Did Cora actually purchase 
the insurance? The limits of the frame constitute a world, and they also 
compel an unsettling of another world. How well do I know her, really? 
What will I make of her now that she no longer appears in the same way?
At the end of this scene, once the da has secured Frank’s assent to 
the advice he offers, Garnett reframes the shot, returning to a medium 
long shot much like the one with which the scene began, at which point 
Cora’s lawyer appears in an effort to assist Frank (figure 2.8). However, 
2.1 2.2
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whatever sense of hope we might feel for Frank 
in the reframing movement of the camera that 
expands space and visibility does not last long. 
Cora’s lawyer quickly learns that Frank has de-
cided to file the complaint, which compels the 
lawyer to cease listening and to ask Frank, in 
turn, to stop talking (figures 2.9 and 2.10). If the 
lawyer knows what it is that has been concealed 
from Frank — and thus also from us, which is 
also marked by the edge of the frame — the po-
tentially emancipatory signs he has to offer are 
muted by the advice Frank accepts and must 
now measure up to in silence. As the lawyer, 
Keats, tells Frank on his way out, “Just once 
more: I’m handling this. And that means, what-
ever I do, I’m handling it.” The advice Frank re-
ceives commits him to an order of appearance 
and way of understanding, that is, to a partic-
ular aspectual arrangement of details. Frank 
takes the advice of the da because he cannot 
see otherwise, because he does not know how 
to live with indecision. Cora’s lawyer will remain 
in the frame as if he had nothing different to say. 
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he will quickly come to regret, gives rise to another form of advice that 
will create another enclosure, even when it looks like an opening. 
The second piece of advice is given to Cora and follows from the bad 
advice that her lawyer understands to have been given to Frank, who now 
appears with Cora in a holding room just after her pre- trial hearing takes 
place, wherein the lawyer — anticipating Cora’s hotheadedness— enters 
a guilty plea on her behalf. In other words, when the judge asks Cora 
the nature of her plea, Cora’s lawyer is the one to answer even though 
it is only she who has been addressed. The lawyer withdraws the charge 
the next day, ultimately, as a way of performing — in a public and legal 
space — the movement of his thought from certainty to doubt. What he 
will want to establish in particular is that what yesterday seemed so obvi-
ous today seems more ambiguous. Between these two court appearances, 
however, we witness Cora blow up at Frank in the holding room for hav-
ing turned against her. So entirely full of rage, Cora asserts her right to 
commit a confession to the record, which will, she assumes, bring Frank 
down along with her. Having allowed the confession to take place, the 
lawyer offers to rip up the confession, which would give the couple a 
chance to begin again. That is, Cora’s lawyer admits to having staged the 
documentation of the confession, which he rips up expressly so that Cora 
will have the opportunity to take his advice; this should prevent an expe-
rience of regret, which is all that could follow from the legal registration 
of her confession, made in a moment of passion. Indeed, the lawyer tears 
up the confession strictly on the condition that from now on she take only 
his advice, that she speak only when spoken to. Cora is advised to take 
only his advice, to do only what he says to do.
Immediately after this scene of advice taken, and regret forestalled, 
Cora and the lawyer return to court and enter a plea of not guilty, which 
the lawyer expects the da to accept on the basis of what he knows that the 
da does not yet know: namely, that the insurance company has already cut 
the check for the husband’s death. Cora’s lawyer, in other words, knows 
that the da is only hoping for a confession of guilt from Cora, since the 
da’s own investigation is unlikely to have produced more conclusive evi-
dence than the investigation conducted by the insurance company, which 
yielded no conclusive evidence whatsoever. If an insurance company can-
not find the signs of intent in what has been filed as an accident, then how 
will the da do better, knowing (as the lawyer does) that an insurance agent 
will look much harder than will a detective since the insurance agent 
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will have more to lose? The da quickly agrees on the condition that Cora 
accepts a plea bargain of manslaughter, which comes with a suspended 
sentence. What Cora agrees to — what delivers back her freedom — is a 
charge that admits of wrongdoing and yet goes on record as an accident.
The trouble for Cora and Frank, stemming from the advice they take, 
is that any departure they make from the lawyer’s advice, which involves 
living consistently and manifestly within the limits of the law, will result 
in a new criminal charge authored by the da, who will, in the aftermath 
of this particular decision, seek other signs of criminal wrongdoing in 
recompense for the justice that he believes to have gone missing. This 
is what happens, in the end, to Frank. At the end of the film, Cora and 
Frank attempt to reconcile. In order to test the extent of Frank’s desire for 
reconciliation, Cora takes him on a swim. At first we see the couple enter 
the ocean together, swimming outward. Garnett then cuts to a two- shot 
of the couple already in the sea, floating in place. The edges of the frame 
eclipse any possible view of the land, which underscores in visual terms 
Cora’s claim that she is too exhausted to swim back. The frame, in other 
words, simplifies the terms of decision: Frank can let Cora die, which will 
speak only and also officially of his rage, or else drag Cora to shore in an 
act of avowed compassion. Immediately following the couple’s return to 
the shore, which is also an expression of unity, they wind up in a car crash 
that takes Cora’s life.
The da frames Frank for murder, knowing that what he is calling 
murder may indeed have been an accident. However, in the process of 
investigating Cora’s death, the da found a note left in the cash register of 
the diner by Cora, who had been thinking — up to the point that the swim 
began — of leaving Frank forever. This note, which was only ever meant 
to be a goodbye, included an admission of the pair’s culpability in the 
murder of the husband. In the final scene of the film, we witness the da 
tell Frank, who otherwise awaits his demise on death row, that he can, 
in fact, plead not guilty to murdering Cora and that he might even beat 
the charge. But, as the da goes on to insist, he will just end up where he 
is now and in no time, since Frank can now be tried and convicted for 
the murder of the husband, owing to the confession Cora left behind. 
Frank comes to believe that death is his fate, which he also confesses 
to God, despite the fact that there is a better explanation at hand than 
the supposed necessity of divine intervention. The difference between 
a nonvoluntary relation and involuntary one depends, then, much less 
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on anything essential or necessary than it does on the arrangement of 
signs in a continuous way, such that what appears again, in an aspectual 
relation, is what appeared in fact just once.
Our problem is twofold. Advice, or the one who advises, institutes and 
features a world in which regret might be alleviated. But in taking the 
da’s advice, Frank can live in a world that suits just one way of being and 
that was authored by just one. But how will we know this one way since 
it involves at least two people and has nothing to do with romantic love, 
even if it began in a state of mad attraction? Frank, as we know, cannot live 
with the advice he initially receives since he wants to live in world with 
others; he wants to live, at least, with Cora as if one. But the only way to 
do this, given the advice that Frank has already taken, is to accept — and 
without even a hint of variation — the advice of another, which now comes 
from a third. Failure to live in strict accordance with the limits of what 
this advice now makes possible, however, guarantees death, or non- being; 
this non- being comes by way of an extension of the logic of signs of the 
advice spurned, which has the capacity to give the appearance of necessity 
to something that is better understood as contingent — multifaceted in its 
non- necessity.
But what would have happened if Frank just said, “I don’t know”?
possible advice
We will come to consider what it means — or what it could do — to say, 
“I don’t know.” The opportunity to do so, we can at least indicate briefly, 
depends on our ability to recognize the possible in every offer of advice — 
 to be able to recognize advice as something much greater than one idea 
among others. Advice begets the possible, which is also a world that ap-
pears as one no matter how many things or persons it involves or in-
cludes. In many respects, The Postman Always Rings Twice is a parable 
about the possibility of advice itself and of what nevertheless remains 
impossible in the advice we take. Thus, before we can come to an under-
standing of what it might mean to insist on not knowing, we will need 
to understand something more basic yet: namely, whether or not advice 
is “possible.” To what extent, that is to say, does the advice we receive or 
the advice we give consist strictly in the ligature of the possible? To be 
clear, I am interested to know not whether it is possible to give advice (it 
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is, of course), but whether advice itself is only ever an expression of the 
possible, which, as we will see, will come to share something important 
with bureaucratic logics.
By “possible” I do not mean something that happens “by chance,” nor 
do I mean to invoke some version of infinite relativity. Rather, the no-
tion of “the possible” I have in mind here is derived variously from the 
accounts given of it in a continental philosophical tradition — including 
Heidegger, Adorno, Blanchot, Derrida, and García Düttmann — as a limit 
that is constitutive only of sameness, iterability, repetition, and above all 
else, non- being, whether or not non- being comes to stand for, or even 
just with, death. What unites the various conceptions of the possible on 
offer, regardless of the important nuances that each of these thinkers in-
troduces to the concept, is an understanding of the possible as something 
that has, by definition, already occurred. Something can happen or appear 
because it has already happened or appeared. I know that it is possible 
because I know that it has happened at least once before. The possible is 
also a way of understanding the persistence of a given aspectual relation 
or form of seeing, one that acquires its durability on the basis of advice. 
The possible is, in this way, a mode of recognition that can never contrib-
ute to our comprehension of what could, and in all likelihood will, lie just 
outside of what it describes.
In this respect, death determines the ontological stakes in the relation 
between the possible and the impossible, which is perhaps best indicated 
in Heidegger’s suggestion that “death is the possibility of the absolute 
impossibility of Da- sein.”4 In one sense, the consciousness of death — as 
Heidegger more broadly conceives of it — is what makes life possible as 
something that we ourselves will as something singular. If death is what 
we know to be lying in wait, then we cannot but give to being what we think 
it most uniquely requires, or can be accessed with or by way of care. But 
if death is what awaits us all, and the singularity of being — of Dasein — 
is predicated on what will happen to us all equally, as Heidegger’s exis-
tential analytic supposes, then perhaps life will have never happened — at 
least to no one in particular — even if we all stick around for some time. 
Or as Derrida asked, with respect to Heidegger, “Is my death possible?”5 
Put this way, the impossible is either what death makes possible, insofar 
as death stands as an imperative to singularity and autonomy, or else the 
impossible is what it appears to us in more ordinary language usage as 
something that cannot be — which implies that being cannot be, if death 
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makes life possible, if by “life” we intend something marked by distinc-
tion, singularity, and thus brevity.
Before we can understand the ontological stakes of the possible as a 
question of what life might be, we should consider the possible as something 
that comes to us more immediately as a problem of comprehension — 
of seeing in general, and seeing generally — especially insofar as com-
prehension is understood as what follows from apperceptive activity, or 
an aspectual relation sustained as if unwavering through time. And it is 
important to emphasize here that comprehension is never converted to 
knowledge, not even in the dawning of a new aspect. The aspect stands in 
place of knowledge, if by knowledge we mean to imply some thing or rela-
tion that is subject to epistemic verification. Rather, if I can see the same 
thing in two ways, then the shift that takes place is simply from one mode 
of comprehension to another. What I have in mind here resembles the 
conception of the possible indicated by Maurice Blanchot in The Infinite 
Conversation, where comprehension is understood to follow from what is 
appropriable. If any given phenomenon is appropriable, then it will have 
to bear an at least partial likeness to something that has been recognized 
or used once before. Or, as Blanchot has it, “Even comprehension, an es-
sential mode of possibility, is a grasp that gathers the diverse into a unity, 
identifies the different, and brings the other back to the same through a 
reduction that dialectical movement, after a long trajectory, makes coin-
cide with an overcoming.”6 In Blanchot’s formulation of comprehension, 
the possible is an overcoming, which is something other than an advance, 
since what the possible overcomes is difference. Appropriation is the name 
given to a sameness that consists only in a quenchless expansion, here 
identified by Blanchot as dialectical movement. Excess — or whatever re-
mains in diversity, for any being in time, and also for the time being — is 
merely a condition for the satisfaction of sameness by the always more 
that the possible requires, even if we can say that the possible is nothing 
more than what has happened at least once. To speak of the possible, 
then, is to refer to both the conditions of possibility — to the conditions 
by which something will become visible or knowable with respect to the 
features that something can be said to share, identically, with something 
else — and to what continues to accumulate as same.
The steady knowability of what appears, which is the promise common 
to every instance of the possible, depends — in Blanchot’s formulation, at 
least — on an understanding of the possible as a frame. Unlike Cavell’s 
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frame, which enables a privileged mode of attentiveness, by which the 
more that can be known is accomplished through the work of conden-
sation afforded by the frame, Blanchot’s frame depends instead (much 
like Garnett’s frame) on a mode of attentiveness that involves neither 
concentration nor reflection nor circumspection. If Cavell’s frame is a 
reduction that is also an expansion, Blanchot’s frame is an expansion 
that yields only a reduction, no matter what is added to, or absorbed by, 
it. What the frame orients, in particular, are the aspects of phenomena 
that remain available to be seen and yet go unnoticed by virtue of the 
consistency in and across multiple aspects of objects, persons, and places 
that the frame begets. In an experience of the possible, we think we are 
merely seeing — that we are seeing in an immediate way — since what ap-
pears makes no particular demand of us; we believe that what the frame 
features is what there is to see. What “appears” works. We know our way 
around. Better to say that all we know in any instance of the possible is a 
way around. Or as Blanchot puts it, “We say something is possible when 
a conceivable event does not run up against any categorical impediment 
within a given horizon. It is possible: logic does not prohibit it, nor does 
science or custom object. The possible, then, is an empty frame; it is what 
is not at variance with the real, or what is not yet real, or, for that matter, 
necessary.”7 As an expression of the possible, the frame is not at variance 
with the real, or the not- yet- real, simply because what appears appears 
real, since we see what we see according to the way that we have seen 
before. The frame appropriates in advance the difference that would come 
to us, Blanchot indicates, as either a category mistake — which is how 
difference would indicate an otherness to logic — or else as a break with 
custom. This is what we saw happen with Josef K. in chapter 1. I would 
add that the possible is a moral condition, or better to say a moral failure, 
since it can only uphold — much like an instance of preference ranking, 
as I discussed in the introduction — what it confuses as an instance of 
the good with the expression of what is real, or beneath aspectual ar-
rangement. Yet what feels most real, in such moments — the feeling of 
conviction that both follows from the possible and makes the possible 
possible — is derived from a relation of aspects in a logic of sameness that 
accords with principles that remain external to me, even if the existence 
of those principles is ostensibly owed to the confirmation registered in 
and about my being, which can only imply being- in- the- right- way. What 
being- in- the- right- way involves, then, is the appropriation of aspects such 
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that the world appears to me as something familiar, which implies that 
aspects never appear to me as aspects, as otherwise discrete phenomena 
that have been coordinated thematically in terms of resemblance. Should 
an aspect appear to me as an aspect and not as something in full view as 
one thing, then I will relinquish that particular aspect, which has proven 
resistant to appropriation, to a realm beyond the frame. The frame holds 
only what works, which is also what will not be noticed. I will go on 
not noticing what resists by dint of the security I feel in what accords, 
even if what accords is something that makes no demand of reflection, 
which is how we feel, for example, when we are somewhere familiar. The 
experience of familiarity is nothing if not the forgetting of signification 
in place, which nevertheless does not cease. Likewise, we might say the 
same about foreignness, which can be understood as signs that appear to 
us as ceaselessly related in — and by dint of — their discontinuity.
Obviously, my understanding of the aspect here is indebted to a partic-
ular understanding of Wittgenstein’s ideas about aspects and the problem 
of “seeing as.” In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes the 
aspect by way of an example: “I contemplate a face, and then suddenly 
notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see 
it differently. I call this experience ‘noticing an aspect.’ Its causes are of 
interest to psychologists. We are interested in the concept and its place 
among concepts of experience.”8 In this respect, the dimension of aspect 
seeing that concerns me here has to do with the way in which Wittgen-
stein describes “experience,” which emerges in Philosophical Investigations 
in his discussion of “aspects of organization.” In such cases, Wittgenstein 
avers, we see something like this and now like that — a change of aspect, 
a different way of perceiving the same thing, which remains the same 
no matter how we perceive it — on the basis of our experience, which 
Wittgenstein very curiously describes not as something real but as some-
thing that can only follow from “the mastery of a technique.”9 We can see 
something this or that way if we have seen it this or that way at least once 
before. Experience is not reality but merely something possible. “It is only 
if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such- and- such, that it makes 
sense to say that he has had this experience.”10 Wittgenstein’s discussion 
of the aspect concerns, more generally, the difficulty of deciding when 
we are merely seeing something and when we are thinking about the 
something that we see. What his discussion of “aspects of organization” 
describes so well, then, is the way in which experience is understood as 
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a thinking that becomes a forgetting, insofar as we stop noticing that we 
are still seeing an aspect; we now take seeing this aspect for granted as 
we operate in space in a manner that observes the aspect as it once dawned 
on us and now remains with us, but it does so as something forgotten. 
If the dawning of the aspect shows thinking in seeing, then experience 
becomes thought — no longer thinking — which is one more version of 
the possible.11
This, it seems to me, is why Blanchot refers to the possible as an empty 
frame in a given horizon. We will ask what it means to regard a horizon 
in terms of givenness. But for now, let us say that if the frame is said to 
exist in a given horizon it must also be in accord with what lies outside of 
it, such that the frame is not merely an instance of the possible but also a 
force of possibilization. The aspects that will be brought into accord must 
lie in wait. The “horizon” is constituted by possibility itself, by whatever 
lies in wait as the somewhere else I can go, somewhere else I might be, 
which is constituted by the very same limits as the frame or the field of the 
possible in which I find “myself.” The not- yet- real of Blanchot’s formula-
tion is merely what lies in wait as possible because appropriable and thus 
conducive to an experience of continuity. But if it is possible for me to 
go beyond where I am now, how will we measure the distance traversed, 
since where I will be and what I will see once I get there is simply what 
works because possible? In this sense, we shall have to say that there is 
nothing beyond the possible, even when we surpass whatever has been 
framed in any particular instance.12
This is, for example, what happens in the reframing of the medium 
shot that opens itself up in a continuous process to the long shot, or the 
initial and determining frame that we see at the outset of the da’s interro-
gation and advisement of Frank. The smaller shot does not cut to a larger 
one, as if in contrast or forced sympathy. Rather, the frame widens in 
what is experienced as one consistent movement. And it does so despite 
the fact that the frame also features Cora’s lawyer, who could change the 
way that everyone reads the signs on display in the very frame in which 
he still stands. He could also expose the frame as a limit.13 In this respect, 
the “emptiness” of the frame denotes nothing absent. What emptiness 
indicates instead is a capacity for appropriation, so much so that a succes-
sion of frames produces only consonance and never discord. The empty 
frame denotes, in this way, a thematic conception of existence — which sim-
ply means that aspects remain in accord and are forgotten or else de- 
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emphasized as aspects. Cora’s lawyer remains mute, even though he is ca-
pable of saying otherwise. The frame does not belong to him, even though 
he is featured within it in a prominent way. He both observes and is 
observed by the limits of the advice given and the advice taken, which now 
form a given horizon. In other words, the lawyer participates in the advice 
that gives continuity to the possible, even though he could do other wise.14 
He is seeable in what is possible as one who remains in accord and also 
as one who might not remain so. In this respect, the possible has to be 
understood as a way of seeing and as the coming to presence of what can 
be seen, even though what is seen is not all that is there to see. And what 
comes to presence does not do so in an essential or original way. What 
comes to presence in an experience of the possible are aspects drawn in 
a similar way, even though there is always more before us and more that 
lies in wait, which is not on view because not appropriable. If something 
is not appropriable, we cannot say of it that it does not exist.
This is how the possible comes to be a question of advice — a question 
about how advice contributes, in particular, to the maintenance of the pos-
sible, which we have now identified as a way of seeing that begets a way of 
doing, and this way of doing is predicated on what came before and can 
thus be trusted to come again in the same way, if it is maintained as such. 
We seek advice precisely because we can see what might remain resistant 
to appropriation, the discontinuity of which might very well become the 
source of our ruin. The possible, in other words, is only at variance with 
the real if the conditions of possibility fail to be both met and sustained. 
This would be, presumably, a potential source of regret, since the possible 
is what works. Typically, we do not regret what works, only what failed 
to work. We crave the possible as a solution to a regret that we can only 
anticipate and never know, since in choosing the possible, we opt for what 
has worked at least once before.
By contrast, regret is more closely aligned with the impossible, in-
sofar as regret leaves us in a state of attunement to what is not yet. Or 
else regret indicates the aspects that have not been featured thematically, 
even if they have appeared at the very same time as something linked, 
both thematically and independently, to other phenomena that do more 
than merely participate in the consistency of what is given. If a given 
phenomenon can be said to consist, then it exists with something else at 
the same time — with something that can be recognized as different, or 
is in possession of aspects that may very well be featured in an altogether 
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different theme than the one in which it also appears, even if never to us. 
If so, we will never be able to say that this or that theme is a reality, nor 
even a contingent totality, since it will remain inextricable from the aspect 
of itself that is featured in an unrelated theme. A theme, we might say more 
simply, is merely one more way of fashioning continuity from what also 
remains — at least potentially — in some other relation of continuity and 
does so in or at any time whatsoever.
Regret gives us access to what is not yet featured thematically by virtue 
of the awareness we now have that what has passed us by was merely 
something possible, even if the possible comes to us, as Blanchot sug-
gests, as an empty frame. By contrast, we can see that aspects gathered 
thematically, producing a sense of continuity — or possibility — are what 
regularly appear to us as reality, so much so that we fail to recognize the 
thematic character of perception, which prevents us from doing some-
thing, anything, to or with what appears. Without regret, we often (and 
wrongly) understand ourselves to exist in the realm of the nonvoluntary 
relation. The thematic arrangement of aspects in an empty frame is what 
assures us that a use of our will shall not be necessary, since what appears 
works. This is what Frank decides, for instance, when he wakes up from 
a coma with the da at the foot of his bed.
For this reason, I contend that regret — if the feeling is not submitted 
in haste to advice, or if regret continues to haunt the advice we never-
theless receive — shares something important not only with the impossi-
ble but also with reality conceived as the impossible. One might look to 
Theodor Adorno’s conception of utopia, which he articulates in a much- 
considered passage from Negative Dialectics, for a theorization of the im-
possible as an experience that provokes advice as a form of relief in the 
possible. Adorno writes, “Utopia is blocked off by possibility, never by 
immediate reality; this is why it seems abstract in the midst of extant 
things. The inextinguishable color comes from nonbeing. Thought is 
its servant, a piece of existence extending — however negatively — to that 
which it is not.”15 If advice is, as I have argued, an instance of the pos-
sible, then the advice we receive could never appear to us as something 
“abstract in the midst of extant things” — or what Adorno calls utopia and 
what we might regard as thinking. It should be said that what features, as 
an extant thing, for Adorno, is nothing phenomenal, or at least nothing 
durably and persistently present to any perceiver whatsoever. It is a way of 
seeing and also a contingent — if habituated — order of the social, at least 
impossible advice · 79
in terms of its thematic manifestation.16 The possible is more abstract 
than the abstraction described in more favorable terms by Adorno, even 
if it comes to sense (or as sense) more quickly and completely than does 
“immediate reality.” In the terms of my argument, the possible — which 
is extended to us in the advice we receive — allows us to go on not think-
ing, since the cost of not thinking seems surprisingly small, save for the 
fact that what appears in a thematic arrangement of aspects in the empty 
frame of the possible is merely an “extant thing.” And if the possible is 
an extant thing, as Adorno proposed, and advice is what holds us within 
the possible, then what we so regularly describe as an extant thing, or 
even materiality as such, is significantly less enduring and durable than 
we are most often wont to believe. This is also why the possible is so 
difficult, because it appears to us as a material thing — indeed, as the very 
ground and immediacy of materiality itself. Why else is it so difficult for 
us to define materiality if not for the tautological nature of the possible? 
This should not, however, ask us to relegate thinking or the impossible 
to an ideality, precisely because an ideality supposes a regulated form, for 
and of appearance, which is itself a tautological conception of materiality.
Why, then, do we seek advice? Especially if everything is always right 
there before and beneath us. Let us say, with some amount of sympathy, 
that advice is the preliminary step we take in order to make sense of the 
abstraction that has us in a state of worry about immediate reality. It de-
mands that we make a decision, or enables one, about how to participate 
in a world that we cannot comprehend. This happens even though our 
participation has been beckoned by a social abstraction, or else by an 
abstraction that will become — once we commit to it — an at least partial 
order of the social, which will in turn block our access to immediately 
reality. We seek advice when the ground opens, or when we believe that 
it is about to. When the ground opens we grasp for what once was, since 
it seems to have worked, so much so that I never thought about it. Until 
I do.
We can now say that we typically seek advice, in such cases, from peo-
ple we assume to be in possession of an experience strongly related, if 
not identical, to the one that now lays before me — hence the always at 
least minimal social dimension of every instance of advice. I hope that 
the experience of my advisor and one of the options that I am currently 
considering can be understood as identical, or at least thematically rel-
evant, which is also the very point at which things begin to go wrong. I 
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expect that not only will my advisor have my best interests in mind, but 
also that he or she will know what it is that I do not yet know; and I do 
not know it since, up until now, the option before me has never been 
available, never been possible. Rather, the option that now appears has 
never had the opportunity to be possible. As such, the option before me 
has only the opportunity to be possible, since I do not yet recognize it. 
Thus, I am compelled to trust my advisor. I depend on him to be a seer. 
However, if my advisor is a seer, it is not the case that I expect him to be 
a visionary. Rather, I expect him to resemble the seer that one finds in 
the definition given to the concept by Heidegger in “The Anaximander 
Fragment,” where we will have the occasion to understand the possible as 
a problem of seeing that stems from guidance. As Heidegger’s conception 
of the seer will make clear, the endurance of the possible depends entirely 
on the advisor and advice. Or as Heidegger put it, “Only when a man has 
seen does he truly see. To see is to have seen. What is seen has arrived 
and remains for him in sight. A seer has always already seen. Having seen 
in advance he sees into the future. He sees the future tense out of the 
perfect.”17 To have seen truly, in other words, is to not have seen at all, or 
to have seen only once, even if I go on seeing. This is why Heidegger ad-
dresses the seer as the one who sees “the future tense out of the perfect.” 
I have just seen. I will continue seeing what and how I have just seen. What, 
then, could it mean for the seer to give advice? And what will become of 
the trust I extend to the one who gives that advice?
In one sense, the advisor can only act in good faith, since what appears 
to him will do so in a familiar way, and what I am in search of, in fact, is 
familiarity. Put this way, my advisor has no compelling reason to abstain 
from giving me advice. He cannot act in bad faith since faith, as we know, 
is predicated by doubt, and he will be in no position to have experienced 
doubt since what he sees — what he has only ever seen — works. Put dif-
ferently, my advisor has no idea that what he is, in fact, is an idealist. It 
is what leads the giver of advice to believe that he is acting pragmatically, 
when in fact, he is adrift in a realm of ideality or mere possibility.
If it can be said, especially if we stay with Adorno for a little while 
longer, that my advisor is incapable of genuine thinking, then what good 
could come of me and my situation should I follow his advice? On the one 
hand, if I have sought advice it may very well be the case — though it is not 
necessarily the case — that I’m not willing to carry on thinking, if thinking 
implies a mode of attunement to that which remains abstract in the midst 
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of extant things. More of us are satisfied to be told what to think than are 
willing to admit it. If so, then I shall also have no reason to complain 
if my advisor wills for me in a deceptive or evasive way. I may not even 
notice. On the other hand, my advisor cannot, as I’ve suggested, advise 
in bad faith. In this respect, the possible, most generously considered, is 
the blind spot of altruism, insofar as our appeal to the possible delivers 
us to a master, even if the one who appears does so in good faith. The 
advice works, because it has only ever been possible, and now I can carry 
on without regret. But if I carry on without regret, then I remain perfectly 
oblivious to the non- necessity of the path that I have chosen. Indeed, if 
one of the options before me appears certain, then I have not chosen 
at all. Advice is possible, but the cost of its possibility is the absence of 
“me,” insofar as doing what the other has done prevents me from seeing 
anything other than what the other has seen.
A good example of this is in the success we might find in so- called 
mentor networks, although anyone whose job it is to field questions 
within a bureaucratic structure will do the very same work.18 If my men-
tor’s intervention in a field of study — the “once” of his seeing — opens up 
an area of inquiry that I now pursue, there is every chance that you will 
recognize me as the student of my mentor, so much so that if you are see-
ing me for the first time you are more likely to refer to me as the student 
of so- and- so rather than by my own name. There will be no reason for 
you to say otherwise. The work that I do was made possible by the work 
of my mentor and will rightly go by their name, even if I’m the one who 
has done the writing. Moreover, because I accepted the advice my mentor 
gave many years ago, I have been given access; I have become visible as 
a result but visible as a constellation of signs that most strongly indicate 
someone and something else. I participate in a realm of the visible even 
though I myself will never be seen. To appear I must submit to the con-
ditions of disappearance. I will have become thematically organized. I 
will be seen, but always in the image — or generalized aspect — of some-
one else.
The question, then, splits in two directions. As the recipient of advice — 
which we seek in an effort to forestall regret — we will need to know what 
it means to trust. This is especially important since if what I receive is 
possible, and what is possible also feels extensive and immediate, then I 
may no longer have any questions. But in order to understand trust, we 
will also need to know what it means to give.
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To what extent can we say that advice — as an expression of the possi-
ble — is also given? What will it mean to heed or dwell within a given? If 
the given is what I seek, and I do so from the one who gives, what will 
become of my trust? If I am to receive the gift of advice, in what will my 
trust consist?
the gift of advice
In Philosophy of Exaggeration, Alexander García Düttmann offers a con-
ception of trust that importantly complicates the problem of the possible 
as I have sketched it. That is, I have described the possible, when in the 
form of advice, as something that feels only generous and expansive when 
access to a generalized way of seeing, and also of being, comes as the very 
gift of advice. García Düttmann reminds us instead that “trust is haunted 
by the doubt that it likewise assimilates.”19 If I trust my advisor, then 
presumably I have overcome the doubt I once had about my advisor’s 
capacity to know and to act in an altruistic manner. What my character-
ization of the advisee supposes, up to this point, is that the assimilation 
of doubt in the experience of trust is total. But what if the advisee finds 
her trust “haunted by the doubt that it likewise assimilates,” as García 
Düttmann suggests? If trust remains haunted by doubt, then doubt will 
be what reminds us — even as I remain bound to the other to whom I have 
pledged my trust — that this relation can be otherwise. The assimilation 
will never be absolute. If I am haunted by the awareness that the possible 
can be otherwise, then what doubt features, in any experience of trust, is 
a glimpse of the impossible, even if it feels like ruin.
The question of trust, as articulated here by García Düttmann, should 
enable us to think about the problem of the gift — what it means to “give” 
advice — in a slightly different way, insofar as we understand the act of gift 
giving to involve an expectation of reciprocity.20 The question of reciprocity 
in the gift is troubled by two seemingly incompatible understandings of 
what it means to give and, in turn, to heed givenness — which is also a way 
of thinking about an incompatibility that pertains between certain strains of 
phenomenology and deconstruction. In a phenomenological tradition, if I 
say that something is given, then I am referring to something that exists or 
carries on with or without my intervention. Jean- Luc Marion has described 
the phenomenality of givenness, in this regard, as “presence thought in 
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terms of subsistence,” which is to say, what remains present in a state of 
consistency at a minimal level.21 In this respect, to refer to something as 
a given is to say that something exists in a state of necessity, and thus my 
relation to what is “given” — even as mere subsistence — could only be de-
scribed as nonvoluntary, since whatever happens or appears will do so with 
or without me. That relation could only be described as involuntary if I 
come to realize that I could have done something and yet chose not to.
If it seems strange to consider the concept of givenness in terms of the 
will, then one need simply consider the problem of the gift as a question 
that concerns the economy of signs, which is what Derrida articulates 
most forcefully in Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. For Derrida, the rec-
iprocity demanded in the acceptance of the gift, which is a debt that only 
enlarges and can never be paid off, has to do with the duty the donee feels, 
and ceaselessly observes, to the political economy instituted by the donor 
and what that donor gives. What the phenomenologist calls givenness — 
whether one means, by this, the bracketing of reality or, in Marion’s terms, 
that which subsists in a minimal way — Derrida considers the political 
economy of the sign, or the apparition of what appears. It is, for example, 
what lies behind Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s conception of intuition 
as the “originary donating intuition (gebende Anschauung), the one that 
delivers up the thing or the sense themselves, in person or in flesh and 
blood, as people still say, in their immediate presence.”22 If intuition is 
given — if it is donating — then what appears, what seems to exist in per-
son as flesh in blood in an immediate way, will do so only insofar as it has 
been filtered by the possible, or the empty frame. Therein lies Derrida’s 
important critique of phenomenology as an ideality, a lesson that is today 
almost entirely unheeded in the contemporary zeal for the non- correlated 
object and the “for us” relation we are said to maintain only foolishly.
Derrida’s thinking about the political economy of the sign is in this 
way importantly linked with a conception of the possible as a mode of 
visibility, especially insofar as the gift involves both a transaction and the 
symbolization of that transaction. This is what preserves the terms of 
the economy established in the successful exchange of a gift, from which 
the donee will never get free.23 Ordinary language, for instance, can sym-
bolize and make visible as a representation that we nevertheless forget — 
even in the very act of employing it — the extent of what is given in, or 
given to, a particular economy. Derrida furnishes the following example: 
“I would say in French that a window ‘donne sur la rue,’ it gives [donner, 
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in French, is ‘to give’] onto the street (understanding by that, I suppose, 
that it gives visible access to, and so forth).”24 In other words, the giving 
of the visible is contained in a phrase one regularly uses without thinking. 
And the phrase describes a space of visibility that must be purchased even 
though what is purchased can never be owned. In more literal terms, the 
expression also indicates an empty frame that can be seen through. It is 
what we might just as typically call a “selling feature,” which as we know, 
always costs more. If the expansiveness of the given costs more, then I 
will be required to participate in an economy in an abiding way if I am to 
afford what I most want to see, which is the extension of visibility itself. 
Likewise, I will have to know already what to ask for as a condition of 
what I might be asked to pay. For me, the view is possible, and my access 
to the possible is “owed” to the conformity I have demonstrated to that 
economy. The possible is not for me alone. Whoever chooses this room 
will see what I have seen and will have been able to do so by virtue of 
participating in a related economy. The window marks the continuous 
extension of visibility (as givenness) and symbolizes an economy in which 
I have already agreed to participate.
Considered more directly in the terms of my argument, this is what 
the work of advice also involves, insofar as my advisor is a seer and what 
he gives is the gift of his insight. I accept it because it has been known 
to work (why else would I have asked him?), and nothing else seems 
very clear. For Derrida, reciprocity is linked to a system of credit, which, 
in terms of advice, becomes more expressly a problem of attribution or 
accreditation. If we return to my example of the academic advisor, we can 
now say that to accept the advice of my advisor — to do what he tells me I 
should do, which is what he would do — then I will credit my advisor with 
whatever insights I “discover”; this will give an economic advantage to my 
advisor, who will carry on accumulating citations that will be quantified as 
cultural capital, which become, for him, real money. What I get in return 
is nothing more than what I already have: continued visibility without 
advance. I persist as the same in a state of indenture, since I can never 
pay off what I continue to use. The question of advice, then, involves a 
problem of political economy in precisely the way that Derrida imagines 
it, but my way of dealing with that contract and the prospect of permanent 
indenture will be different from what Derrida imagined, especially where 
the question of doubt is concerned.
For Derrida, the way out of the phenomenality of the gift as a binding 
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and destroying contract is to imagine what an impossible gift might con-
sist in. One of Derrida’s primary suggestions along these lines involves 
a simultaneous act of forgetting in the giving and in the receiving of the 
gift, which constitutes an “aneconomy,” by which no less than two remain 
bound in ways that never become apparent to the other and thus subject 
to exchange in an indebted way. I quote Derrida’s proposal at length:
As the condition for a gift to be given, this forgetting must be radical 
not only on the part of the donee but first of all, if one can say here first 
of all, on the part of the donor. It is also on the part of the donor “sub-
ject” that the gift not only must not be repaid but must not be kept in 
memory, retained as a symbol of sacrifice, as symbolic in general. For 
the symbol immediately engages one in restitution. To tell the truth, 
the gift must not even appear or signify, consciously or unconsciously, 
as gift for the donors, whether individual or collective subjects. From 
the moment the gift would appear as gift, as such, as what it is, in 
its phenomenon, its sense and its essence, it would be engaged in a 
symbolic, sacrificial, or economic structure that would annul the gift in 
the ritual circle of the debt. The simple consciousness of the gift right 
away sends itself back the gratifying image of goodness or generosity, 
of the giving- being who, knowing itself to be such, recognizes itself in 
a circular, specular fashion, in a sort of auto- recognition, self- approval, 
and narcissistic gratitude.25
Curiously, what Derrida’s proposal involves is not so much an abrogation 
of the will as it is a demand that we forget what we have done just as soon 
as we have done it. We are meant to prevent any use of our will from 
coming to consciousness, either as something we have done or else as 
the thought of something we might do. If giving is an instance of willing, 
then presumably signification is where the will goes awry, insofar as sign 
or symbol gives rise, as Derrida indicates, to a narcissistic loop that assim-
ilates everything in the image of its own desire. As that which is secured 
by the symbol, the political economy of the gift is akin to Wittgenstein’s 
notion of “aspects of generalization,” where, as I have already suggested, 
aspects remain organized in a thematic way for the sake of existence. For 
Wittgenstein, recall that experience implies nothing phenomenal, or at 
least nothing that inheres in an object as expression. “Experience” re-
fers instead to a technique for living that has been mastered and quickly 
forgotten once mastered, so much so that the aspects remain but are 
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no longer recognized as aspects. Once the dimming of the sign in our 
consciousness occurs, what remains is not immediate reality, in the way 
that Adorno imagined it, but technique, which now comes forward euphe-
mistically as “existence.” What for Derrida is an image of freedom that 
consists in the showing of no signs, is better understood, I contend, as 
an economy of the aspect that can no longer be negotiated, since what 
was aspectual in the aspect fades in forgetfulness. With respect to Der-
rida’s scenario, then, we are not free, if being free means being outside 
of an economy. Rather, it is merely that we no longer think about the 
eventuality of indenture, even though tethered we remain. The forgetting 
that Derrida proposes here might be said to prevent the expansion of the 
possible or even of a given political economy, but that is something very 
different from what it would mean to live without relation or without any 
economy whatsoever. In Derrida’s proposal, we merely settle for one last 
economy, which one could only — and wrongly — come to understand as 
a nonvoluntary relation in the forgetting of the signs that can neverthe-
less not be isolated from the gift, just forgotten. If merely forgotten, then 
what stands as an instance of the impossible, because beyond utility or 
exchange, is not so terribly different from an instance of the possible that 
has become sedimented. When an aspect becomes sedimented, the “as 
if” of the aspect does not disappear so much as absent itself by turns from 
the reflective activity. Seen this way, the impossible is not so much an an-
economy as it is a forgetting of signification that forged a social relation 
that now feels like second nature, or a nonvoluntary relation.26
Curiously, Derrida’s theorization of the aneconomy of the gift is itself 
concerned with a generosity that can be said to derive, in its worst instances, 
from a “natural power.” If generosity finds its source in nature, then it is, 
presumably, a resource drawn from necessity that has no bearing on the 
will. If one is generous “by nature,” if one is “naturally generous,” then 
the will shall have no role in any act of exchange. Derrida puts it this way:
Would a gift that proceeds from a natural power, from an originary 
aptitude for giving, be a gift? Simultaneously, we come around to dis-
associating the gift from generosity in a paradox the full rigor of which 
must be assumed. If it is not to follow a program, even a program 
inscribed in the phusis, a gift must not be generous. Generosity must 
not be its motive or its essential character. One may give with generos-
ity but not out of generosity, not so as to obey this originary or natural 
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drive called generosity, the need or desire to give, regardless of the 
translations or symptoms one may decipher in it.27
If one gives out of generosity, as Derrida supposed, one gives only what is 
possible — what is derived from an infinite reserve of what is renewably 
the same. By contrast, to give with generosity is to give in an uncondi-
tional way, which in the context of Derrida’s argument is to give without 
signification or memory. Rather, the giving always signifies, but if it is 
done with generosity both the donor and the donee must forget what was 
given and what was received. But what difference does the difference in 
preposition, here, actually make — especially if both are retained and said 
to occur simultaneously? If a giving of implies a form of giving that is 
conditioned — that is, if the gift is both something useful and also a work-
ing symbol of indenture — then what would it mean to give with instead? 
Does not giving “with” merely imply giving alongside of a giving that is 
conditioned? In other words, if we are giving with, then we are giving in 
addition to what will nevertheless have been given of. What was given of 
will take on the character of givenness.
The forgetting that follows the unconditional “with” poses greater 
problems for thinking about the givenness of things, in a phenomeno-
logical register, than is necessary. In the best instance, generosity merely 
comes to imply a givenness that appears to us as something that was 
never instituted, and thus it can neither compel my gratitude or inden-
ture, nor can it fortify the coffers of the giver. Unconditioned generosity, 
thus construed, is way of acting as if what appears as given in fact has no 
origin, that there was no moment of institution that we might consider or 
imagine in relation to its co- present aspects. Hence Derrida’s stipulation: 
“As the condition for a gift to be given, this forgetting must be radical not 
only on the part of the donee, but first of all, if one can say here first of 
all, on the part of the donor.”28 In making the qualification, “if one can 
say here first of all,” Derrida speaks about origin in terms of contingency 
rather than necessity. And yet, what forgetting in this instance produces 
is an image of givenness that only thoughtless- ness can manage, however 
paradoxically it may be to manage something that is impermissible to 
thought. The will exists, in such a scenario, only insofar as it can produce 
a forgetting that allows us to live with no further forms of indenture. In 
the move from a political economy to an aneconomy, then, we might very 
well find ourselves freed of obligation, but the cost of that freedom is also 
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a supposed nonvoluntary relation to what appears, which — in terms of 
my larger argument — also means no more regret and thus no further 
opportunities to see otherwise. I will live with what was lost as an expe-
rience of freedom.
Put differently, if something is merely given, then I shall have no rea-
son to be grateful. I cannot be given access to what is given, nor can I 
acquire it. In this respect, the distinction between “giving of” and “giving 
with” that Derrida introduces here as a question of generosity returns us 
to the very problem he rightly notes about Husserl and phenomenological 
givenness to begin with. Giving “with” re- creates the donating intuition 
by other means, and it does so, ultimately, in an effort to think about 
an economy without signification (in the form of symbolization), on the 
understanding that symbolization is a binding and destroying pact. But 
what is it about the gift that leads Derrida, of all thinkers, to try and move 
beyond or beneath signification?
One of the problems, in my estimation, has to do with the absolute 
character of a distinction commonly made between conditional and un-
conditional acts. If an exchange is conditioned, the logic seems to go, then 
the exchange can happen in only one way — what is intended, thereby, will 
always work, and the donee will always be the one who does that work and 
will thereby also never be the author of the work done. But as we know, in-
tention only rarely guarantees a result. And if we can agree that intention 
is not a guarantee of any particular result, then why would we assume 
that the conditions of the gift given would be observed and reciprocated 
precisely as intended? By contrast, if an exchange is unconditional, ab-
solutely nothing is expected or demanded of me in return. I can take 
without reflection on, or consideration of, the other from whom I have 
nevertheless received something. I can do whatever I like. I shall have no 
regrets. My will is guided by no expectation, as if the “mutual benefit” that 
defines reciprocity implies a determined measure and thus an inflexible 
economy. And yet nothing compels us to understand mutuality as identity 
or absolute equality. For one, if an exchange is defined by mutuality it 
could not be a relation of identity, at least not in the terms provided by an 
understanding of reciprocity as permanent indenture. If what I give back 
is the same as what I have received, then our exchange is not mutually 
beneficial; it is identical. If identical, then no giving has occurred, since 
giving implies at least two. There is no relation, only oneness, no matter 
how many. However, if our exchange is mutually beneficial, then what I 
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do for you will not be the same as what you do for me, but the exchange 
will be of benefit to us both.
An insistence on mutuality in the experience of reciprocity merely 
demands that we take seriously the idea that there is never just one econ-
omy, even in the one economy in which we knowingly participate. Ob-
viously, it is easy to think of an economy as just one economy — one, 
moreover, that is always in service of permanent indenture, gross accu-
mulation, and irreversible inequality. And it is to our continued peril to 
simply ignore the reciprocity of the credit system as global gift in the ways 
imagined by Derrida and readily understood as such today.29 However, 
we should take just as seriously that this is also what the forgetting of 
the gift in the achievement of an “aneconomy” might imply. Perhaps the 
difficulty of thinking of any economy in terms of a reciprocity that pro-
duces indenture has only to do with the very idea of symbolization itself, 
especially insofar as we regard the symbol as a mode of signification by 
which something stands for something else in a relation that does not 
depend on semblance, which would render it more obviously subject to 
an aspect shift. And yet it is precisely because a symbol does not derive 
from a natural power — is not indexed to a necessary condition — that even 
it can be subject to a change in aspect. One need only recall the famous 
scene in Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin (1925) in which a crazed, 
white- haired priest stands at the top of the ship’s deck, looking down at 
the mutiny about to unfold. Noticing the chaos below, the priest, who is 
holding a cross, brings both arms into the air, at which point an inter- title 
reads, “Bring the unruly to reason, O Lord.” From there, Eisenstein cuts 
rapidly between shots of the mutiny as it is about to begin and a series 
of close- ups of the priest, who now lifts the cross up and down across his 
palm to the extent that the cross now appears as if it were an ax. One can, 
of course, read the sequence in a way that follows continuously from our 
recognition of the cross as a symbol of Christianity and say that Eisen-
stein is showing us Christianity itself as a form of violence. But in order 
to arrive at this understanding, an aspect shift is needed, which is what 
Eisenstein provides with the close- up of the cross turned on its side, so 
much so that it reads as an ax. As a consequence of that aspect shift, a dif-
ferent understanding of Christianity emerges — one that depends rather 
ingeniously on a recognition of the aspectual dimension of the object we 
first call “cross,” and thus on the contingency of the symbol itself. What 
the shift from cross (as a sign of divine authority) to ax (as a privileged 
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sign and mode of anti- revolutionary force) depends on is less a forgetting 
than a willing. That is, if we can recognize that “cross” can also function 
as “ax,” we become aware that, above all else, signification is not tied to 
metaphysical coordinates or states of necessity but resides instead in the 
realm of the will. What we can see is that there is always more than one 
economy in every economy. Every economy depends on a logic of signs, 
but the signs themselves are always contingent and thus always capable 
of being otherwise, of being read and distributed in more than one way. 
How else to describe the way in which the very same object can express 
now Christian metaphysics and then an atheistic worldview? Nothing in 
the object changes, merely our understanding of it. A visual economy is 
a political economy, precisely insofar as the aspect shift that remains as 
a potential alternative in any given social formation indicates a way of 
reimagining what appears before us in more agreeable terms.
economy, economies
One reason I use film as an example so often in this book is that what 
filmmakers routinely do is to show us a world we recognize but in an order 
we are not accustomed to experiencing. And if cinema stands as a model 
for the political dimension of the aspect shift — and by extension, the idea 
that there is always at least one more economy in every economy — that 
model cannot be completely removed, either, from real politics. For what 
cinema shows us of the world are material objects and relations recon-
figured, just without the tension that regularly follows from any effort to 
now see this object in that place and this idea as a way of understanding 
those things. A striking example of this phenomenon is found in Olivier 
Assayas’s Summer Hours (2008), which takes on quite explicitly the idea 
that there is always more than one economy in every economy, and details 
the national and global tensions and consequences that follow from the 
re- contextualizing work of aspect seeing.
In Summer Hours, Assayas shows one of his main characters, Frédéric, 
an economist, as he is engaged in a discussion of his new book on a ra-
dio talk show. The host of the show demands clarification about what he 
perceives to be a flaw in Frédéric’s logic. Describing what he sees as the 
argument of the book, the talk show host wonders how as an economist 
Frédéric can maintain the idea that all economies are infinitely relative, 
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that they are always beyond prediction or control. What point would there 
be in being an economist, this talk show host in thrall to reason wonders, 
if one could not predict how any given economy will function? In other 
words, how can one be an authority on something that cannot be known 
in the same way twice? What could it mean to write books about some-
thing one claims not to understand, at least insofar as understanding 
implies mastery, if not epistemic verification? In reply, Frédéric avers, 
“I say that because an economy is the opposite of a science, any attempt 
to control it, no matter how well intentioned, is often capable of totally 
backfiring.” It is not that we can do nothing, nor is it the case that our will 
shall be entirely exterior to the function or future of any given economy. 
Rather, the signs that organize any given economy can shift, be rerouted, 
or most compelling of all, function in more than one way in more than 
one economy at the same time. There is never just one economy, even 
when there is more than one in the one in which we now find ourselves 
most directly situated. What moves does so simply because signs can 
be read and arranged differently. What moves does so precisely because 
every economy is a political economy — every economy is anchored by a 
will to read signs in one or another way.
Assayas illustrates this point most fully in Summer Hours as a question 
of collecting, inheritance, and the gift. Shortly after we witness the heated 
exchange about the possibility of being an economist, which is to say, 
about the impossibility of every economy, Frédéric undertakes the task 
of disassembling his recently deceased mother’s home, which features a 
host of paintings by his uncle, a revered impressionist, in addition to a 
wide array of objects and collectibles that are about to be sold to the Musée 
d’Orsay, with some important exceptions. Frédéric, in the end, insists 
that Eloise, his mother’s longtime housekeeper, take something that is 
meaningful to her. Eloise chooses, without knowing, one of the things the 
Musée d’Orsay wanted most: a “Bracquemond” vase. She takes just one of 
many and does so precisely because she knew that the mother didn’t care 
that much for them, hidden away as they always were. As such, Eloise 
assumes that unlike everything else in the house, the vase must not be 
worth much, which is what she tells her own son as they leave the house 
together one last time. What this means for the Musée d’Orsay is that they 
will have some Bracquemond vases, but not all of them. The collection, in 
other words, could never be complete. The missing piece will now remain 
somewhere else, out of public view, and in an entirely different economy 
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of signs — an economy that will be predicated alone on the nostalgic im-
pulses of the housekeeper, who has no understanding of what the piece 
is worth in any other economy, even though it is also worth quite a lot of 
money. Likewise, when Frédéric and his wife later visit the Musée d’Orsay 
and see some of his mother’s objects in a new context — one moreover 
that is assembled on the logic of the homogeneity of production and the 
totality of the set marked by authorship and periodicity — they see them 
otherwise, as material traces of an economy (of their home, of the family) 
that has since passed, even though the family remains together, just in a 
radically different arrangement (figures 2.11–2.14). Where once the family 
home and its effects marked a particular mode of French living — of being 
together as family in France as French — the reason to sell the house and 
2.11
2.12
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its effects is owed to the fact that Frédéric’s brother and sister are now 
working in China and the United States, respectively, which is to say, in 
different economies, all of which affect each other, just not in the same 
way. And certainly not in ways that can be easily predicted or controlled.
Finally, the materiality of the objects in a process of redistribution is 
important, insofar as we understand them both as objects of exchange 
and as signs, which participate equally in no less than two different econ-
omies at once. And it should be noted that the vase received by Eloise 
was a gift given by Frédéric. As such, the gift given was a financial loss 
to the donor (and by extension, the museum, which has no idea that it 
was once in the offing), even though the donee gains something that she 
does not know to be financially lucrative. The exchange does not, however, 
2.13
2.14
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involve a forgetting. Rather, it involves an avowed expression of apprecia-
tion in and as exchange. What remains disavowed — or simply unknown 
to Eloise — is nothing forgotten or unknowable. At any point, someone 
could notice it — see it as belonging to another series, as one aspect of a 
particular aspect of generalization, to come back to Wittgenstein’s term. 
One could then do something else with it, should Eloise need or want the 
money, that is, should Eloise find herself subject to an economy that she 
herself could not predict. It is simply that, in this instance, the aspect of 
the vase that appears to Eloise is one that stands for a relationship that the 
sign nevertheless does not resemble, and it could be seen in some other 
aspect and used in some other way. Frédéric gives of generosity, since he 
stood to lose what was given and also what it was worth in a different 
economy. Eloise received the gift with generosity (and it is necessary to 
say that we can receive something with generosity, as well), believing as 
she did that the vase was worth something only to her, and strictly as a 
reminder of the life she led for so long and with whom she lived this 
portion of her life: with and for. In receiving the gift, she intended only 
to minimize any potential loss to others while still preserving an aspect 
that worked in the economy of signs organized in and around her name.
Frédéric, of course, is not solely someone who gives a gift in a gener-
ous way, inasmuch as he stands to lose forever what he gives. As an econ-
omist, his job, presumably, is to be an advisor. The logic of exchange that 
I have detailed should suggest what kind of advisor he might be, which 
is someone other than what the dismissive talk show host imagines — in 
other words, any advisor who will know and deliver in the advice he gives 
precisely what will happen. For our purposes, let us say then that advice is 
a gift that participates in and creates an economy. But the economy is al-
ways more than one, and often more than one at once, as when the object 
given participates in multiple economies or fields of visibility. The gift of 
advice gives a way, but it does not do so conditionally, at least not in the 
sense of an intention that cannot fail to work or be observed without fail. 
Frédéric, for instance, intends something unconditional. The condition of 
the gift is that it be unconditional, insofar as condition here means mone-
tization. And yet Eloise will also die at some point, potentially unmooring 
that object from the economy in which it will have most recently been 
one aspect of, and the object will find its way to another economy, the 
homogenizing logic of which Frédéric was all too willing to deny as the 
condition of what he gave. But only potentially. Eloise’s son, for instance, 
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may hold the vase longer, include it in the economy of effects that now 
come to give visibility to his life in the partial objects assembled from a 
time (which is also more than one, even as we share an instant) that has 
passed, which includes something of his mother that marked a space he 
never inhabited.
sameness and trust
If there is more than one economy in every economy — and if the gift of 
advice has something economical about it — then we have reason to re-
turn to García Düttmann’s suggestion that “trust is haunted by the doubt 
that it likewise assimilates.” If I trust my advisor to be a seer, I believe that 
my advisor knows more than I know but remain skeptical about what I 
might hear. And I do this despite the fact that I have exposed myself, my 
future, to his way. The risk, of course, is what was established early on: 
namely, that I may only contribute to the once of my advisor’s seeing. 
However, if “trust is haunted by the doubt that it likewise assimilates,” 
then assimilation can never be total, irreversible, or shot through by a 
condition that is unshakable in its necessity. The gift of advice can very 
well be an invitation to an economy. However, if that gift demands rec-
iprocity in the form of indenture — if the conditioned gift means that it 
must be just this one way — then our doubt will comprise whatever else it 
is that we begin to see, even as we remain in the ligature of the possible. 
In order to have doubts, even in an experience of trust, I must be capable 
of seeing another aspect in the same sign. Moreover, if “trust is haunted 
by the doubt that it likewise assimilates,” then assimilation itself could 
never be associated with the possible as the once of seeing, since assim-
ilation implies a way of being with others in an agreeable way without 
disavowing the differences that remain between us, and for however long.
And let us not forget, if I offer my trust, I do so precisely because I find 
myself in a state of concern about what I perceive to be something that I 
want or need but have no known way of ascertaining that thing. At least, 
I have no way before me that I have previously known for myself. The 
same will be true of a bureaucrat in any institution, from whom and from 
which I have sought an answer that will alleviate the suffering I feel. It is a 
problem I experience as something that I cannot seem to fix, so much so 
that I am beginning to forget what it was in the first place. And if I forget 
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what it was that I demanded of the bureaucrat, or the advisor, it is not 
freedom that I will experience, even if I now appear to meet the condition 
of living without relation or signification. Likewise, what I regularly want 
from the bureaucrat or an advisor — even if I assume that what I will be 
shown is an instance of dissimulation or obfuscation — is that he show 
whatever he shows me in a continuous way. However, if I am assimilated 
to the once of my advisor’s seeing — which could only follow from the 
trusting affirmation of my advisor, whether my mentor or the bureaucrat 
before me — then that trust may very well carry me along to the point at 
which I begin to sense, but do not give sway to, my own disappearance as 
a condition of knowing something continuously. Put differently, doubt is 
a memory with no particular content, beyond the awareness that it com-
pels in us of a forgetting exacerbated by the possible as a way of knowing 
something continuously.
It is important to emphasize here that if trust is haunted by a doubt 
that it likewise assimilates, then it does not necessarily matter if the ad-
visor or bureaucrat we have before us is one who intends to feature an 
obfuscation in response to my request. That is, I take for granted that the 
bureaucrat, just like the advisor — the altruistic mentor — can intend to 
offer me solutions, whether as access to the supposed transparency that 
persists between bureaucrat, bureaucracy, and institution, or else as the 
gift of flexibility in matters of policy that the bureaucrat may himself find 
oppressive. That is to say, what if we were merely to act as if we trusted the 
bureaucrat whom we nevertheless suspect of a having a will to obfusca-
tion, and who is no less concerned to offer me advice than the one from 
whom I expect only benevolence? If we can agree that there is no reason 
to assume that the bureaucrat is incapable of thinking, which is what our 
rage at bureaucratic obfuscation otherwise implies, then we have every 
reason to entertain the as if of trust, at least so long as we still do not 
know whether or not our trust is warranted. If we think the bureaucrat is 
incapable of thinking, then we can just do the opposite of what he advises 
us to do. But as I’ve suggested, what this means is that we will just have 
done what was asked of us, since there was never any expectation that the 
job we do or refuse to do bears any relation to the bureaucrat’s intention, 
which could only be encountered obliquely or as what withdraws from 
whatever it has also made present. In this respect, we have every reason 
to stay with — to think with — the bureaucrat in a continuous way. It will 
just depend on how we begin to think about the problem of continuity.
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The challenge for us emerges precisely when we consider what it 
would mean to allow doubt to retain the same capacity to indicate an other-
wise, even in the face of the bureaucratic dissimulation that has left me 
convinced of the nonvoluntary relation, and even if that nonvoluntary 
relation is nothing more than an involuntary relation that appears to me 
as an enforced necessity. Obviously, I do not mean to suggest that we 
should regard the bureaucrat as simply benevolent and thus undeserving 
of our doubt. Rather, there is something in the experience of trust that 
remains instructive as a mode of resistance, especially if we consider that 
our regular experience of doubt involves a belief that what we remain 
with, or else what we would like to occur, may not be permissible. To be-
come conscious of our trust, which follows from an experience of doubt, 
is to be aware that we are turning over a portion of our will to the one we 
hope knows something that we do not wholly comprehend. We become 
conscious of our trust only when the alternative seems obviously undesir-
able, even if it were possible. By the same logic, then, we can only remain 
in a relation of trust with the bureaucrat if we are going to remain with 
him — if we are going to remain importantly critical of what he does. In 
order to do so, we merely need to recognize that a presumption of benev-
olence is not a necessary condition of the experience of trust. Rather, trust 
can stand as an alternative to the nonvoluntary relation, which is in fact 
an involuntary relation stripped of the productive potential of regret as the 
coming to consciousness of the contingency of things that once seemed 
necessary. So long as trust remains haunted by doubt, as García Dütt-
mann rightly proposes, we will have the capacity before us to do otherwise 
insofar as we remain privy to the logic that guides the aspectual relation 
of what is featured for me, even if that means something that is continu-
ously discontinuous. What we need to understand more fully is the eman-
cipatory character of doubt itself, so long as doubt is assimilated by trust, 
which allows us to stay with something just long enough to see some-
thing else. In this regard, doubt is relieved of its relation to skepticism, 
insofar as skepticism is informed by a nihilistic attitude predicated not on 
a certainty that nothing can be known or verified but instead on a belief 
that everything seems to fail the test of the absolute. I have in mind, here, 
Linda Zerilli’s important suggestion that “the skeptical impulse, in its 
classic form, never questions the ideal of absolute knowledge that governs 
the dogmatic assertions the skeptic would contest; rather, it dramatizes 
our disappointment with the impossibility or failure of such knowledge.”30
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What such a casting of doubt allows for is a conception of continuity 
founded on trust even before agreement — especially if “agreement,” as a 
euphemism for “proof,” is couched in epistemological terms. That is to 
say, when assimilated by trust, doubt comes to stand as an inside that is 
always imagining an outside should a relation of trust show itself to be 
no longer in good faith. Or, as the case may be, if the relation now seems 
to us to have been wrong from the moment it began, which is something 
I now regret. In this very way, regret is the affective registration of the 
dawning of a new aspect. In the dawning of a new aspect, we no longer 
agree to call something by the same name. When we no longer agree to 
call something by the same name — when my doubt, or yours, is no lon-
ger assimilable — the dawning of a new aspect begins.
In this respect, trust bears just as important of a relation to sameness 
as it does to doubt. Trust indicates how sameness implies agreement but 
in ways that make no essential claim about what inheres in the object 
that stands before or between us. One of the most compelling discus-
sions of the problem of sameness — especially in this context — is to be 
found in Stanley Cavell’s “Knowing and Acknowledging.” There, Cavell 
introduces an important example for reckoning with what it means to 
say that we share something, that we share the same thing — whether we 
share one object between us, or else the same object multiply produced. 
He provides an example that concerns the make of a car — in this case, a 
1952 mg- td — and arrives at two incompatible statements about identity. 
He writes, “To say we own the same car . . . is to say that there is one car 
we own. (What makes it the same is its physical integrity, so to speak.) 
To say we have the same car is to say that my car is the same as yours 
(both are 1952 mg- td’s). That they are the same means that they are not 
different, anyway not different makes.”31 What Cavell’s description of an 
object or objects makes clear is that “same” can imply both many and 
just one. The simple phrase “we have the same car” can indicate one car 
and two owners and also many owners of many cars that are of the same 
make — at once and without contradiction. Neither statement cancels the 
other out. It merely depends on the aspect we seize upon when we con-
template “the same.” Or better to say, in a Cavellian/Wittgensteinian vein, 
that the difference between them is a matter of grammar. It is a matter of 
knowing what an ordinary usage of the word “same” between us might 
indicate, only to discover a new context or grammar, which compels us to 
arrive at a different understanding of “same.” For instance, imagine that 
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two of us are attempting to rent a car. We might find that we have both 
just rented the same model, in which case there will be at least two cars 
in the lot — one for me, one for the other. “Same” will indicate two cars. 
However, if following our conversation about renting the same car — at 
which point we are likely still in a mutually affable, phatic relation — we 
arrive to the lot only to see that there is one car, then we will have learned, 
on the basis of this car lot that shows not two cars of this model but one, 
that we have misunderstood what the agent meant when he told us that 
we have rented the “same” car. That is to say, much to our chagrin, there 
is only one car between us.
It is not a question of knowing which use of “same” is right or wrong 
but of the context for understanding it this way instead of some other way. 
As Cavell puts it in “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,”
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are ex-
pected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further con-
texts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, 
not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just 
as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same pro-
jections. That on the whole we do so is a matter of our sharing routes 
of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of sig-
nificance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar 
to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is 
an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation — all the whirl of 
organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.”32
We might also add to Cavell’s list of situations the idea that grammar and 
context are also ways of knowing when something is a matter of politics. 
And politics, which requires a trust haunted by doubt that it likewise 
assimilates, in García Düttmann’s terms, may very well be the term that 
holds us in an agreement about “sameness” for a while longer than it 
takes us to acknowledge a shift in grammar. Or the moment when we are 
forced to say that we really will be driving the same car, that there’s only 
one of them. This is also an indication of how advice itself can be politi-
cal, even in its most altruistic instances, insofar as sameness involves a 
prolonged agreement to inhabit the possible as a technique of experience 
while thinking about a different way around the same object or objects, 
relation or relations.
In this sense, we might openly entertain a deception — first as trust 
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and then as performance — which might give politics a bad name, but what 
this passage from Cavell should indicate before all else is that there is 
no essential ground for any political claim, any more than there is “cor-
rect” usage of one word or another. Grammars depend on clarity and 
distinction in observation, rather than on anything essential. This is why 
the possible is often a political experience, a special instance of thematic 
existence, regardless of whether we favor or reject any given arrangement 
of the aspects of generalization — or what comes to us in and as advice, 
as a gift that has the power of indenture, just not the guarantee of it. This 
is also, I would suggest, how the distinction that Cavell makes between 
knowledge and acknowledgment is so significant to politics: “It isn’t as if 
being in a position to acknowledge something is weaker than being in a 
position to know it. On the contrary: from my acknowledging that I am 
late it follows that I know that I’m late (which is what my words say); but 
from my knowing I am late, it does not follow that I acknowledge that 
I’m late — otherwise, human relationships would be altogether different 
than they are.”33 Human relationships, in other words, would be some-
thing other than political: Please send my regrets. Acknowledgment, in this 
sense, is related to the time of decision, less as a matter of urgency than of 
grammatical comprehension and also of a delay that may need to persist 
beyond that particular instance of comprehension.
This is why we are so often poorly served by our anger in the face of 
what we can only imagine as a stupid bureaucrat. It is, at the very least, 
reason enough to resist an impulse to rage at the bureaucrat or advisor on 
the basis of a certainty that depends on no grammar of comprehension 
whatsoever. Should we announce our disagreement — as we often do — in 
advance of what the bureaucrat has to tell us, he will rightfully go silent 
and learn all the more about what it is that we want, which is something 
more than he can deny us. And if I speak by rote and in rage against the 
bureaucrat, chances are I am revealing only my own perpetual recourse 
to the possible, which is what the bureaucrat knows about me already. But 
what if I simply agree? What if I say, instead, to the bureaucrat: You know 
more than I know, which indicates that we know, at the very least, the 
“same” thing.34 If I do so, I can flatter the bureaucrat and do something 
else with the gift of advice that I receive, especially since the gift is not all 
that binding. The exchange merely asks that we agree, that we accept the 
terms. But what do I have to lose in agreeing that we share the same car? 
Strictly speaking, what I am agreeing to is impossible. If I tell my advisor 
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“you know more than I know,” what my flattery might indicate is that he 
understands much less.
Isn’t this where, in The Postman Always Rings Twice, Frank goes wrong? 
What if Frank really had said to the da at the moment in which he comes 
back to consciousness, “You know more than I know”? For one, he would 
have been given more time to think about what happened and thus about 
what to do next (or instead). Moreover, he would not have had to expose 
himself to the vengeful wrath of the da, which followed from the change 
of heart that he and Cora publicly and legally demonstrated when they 
accepted the advice of their own attorney; accepting that advice won them 
back their freedom, for a brief moment, but exposed them in turn to 
the da’s hostility, which was a result of the public humiliation visited 
upon him with the quick overturning of the verdict. That is, once the da 
accepted the eventuality of the retracted statement, which allowed Frank 
and Cora to live under another’s advice, he merely lay in wait for a sign 
that ran in excess of the limit constituted by the opposing attorney’s ad-
vice. Cora died in the car crash but was not murdered. However, having 
Cora’s admission in the form of a note she left only for Frank, the da 
knew that he could force Frank to agree to murder, even though the one 
he actually killed was not Cora but the husband. This is why Frank says at 
the end of the film — realizing that he no longer has any defense against 
the da and the appropriation of the sign in a different frame — that the 
postman always rings twice. Or, as he tells the da from within his prison 
cell, “You know, there’s something about this that’s like, well, it’s like 
you’re expecting a letter that you’re just crazy to get, and you hang around 
the front door for fear you might not hear him ring. You never realize that 
he always rings twice. What’s that? Well, he rang twice for Cora, and now 
he’s ringing twice for me, isn’t he? The truth is, you always hear him ring 
the second time, even if you’re way out in the backyard. Father. You were 
right. It all works out. I guess God knows more about these things than 
we do.” Of course, the one who knows is not God but the da. What the 
da knows is simply what is possible: a way of making two deaths into one 
death, of making two deaths the same death, which is what they also are. 
The trouble for Frank is that when the doorbell rings twice, he ultimately 
thinks that it has rung just once, that it only ever rings just once. Should 
he have been capable of hearing two rings in the same ring, should he 
have maintained his doubt as a condition of trust (when I say that the 
doorbell has rung, how many times do I actually indicate?), he may very 
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well have been capable of the impossible. He may have been capable of 
seeing many and the one at the same time, so much so that he becomes 
capable of thinking ahead and doing otherwise. And in the end, what does 
Frank show us if not what Derrida suggested about the nature of confes-
sion? “Confession does not consist essentially in making the other aware 
of something. One can inform the other of a crime one has committed 
without that act thereby consisting of an avowal or a confession. The in-
tentional meaning of confession supposes, therefore, that one does not 
confess in order to inform, to give information or teach a lesson, to make 
known. Consequence: the eidetic purity of confession stands out better 
when the other is already in a position to know what I confess. That is why 
Saint Augustine wonders so often why he confesses to God who knows 
everything.”35 What one confesses is strictly what is possible, which is 
what is already known by the one to whom a confession is made. And in 
Frank’s case, what this particular confession makes possible is his death, 
about which he now seems to have no regrets. To have no regret is to live 
with the possible, to live as though already dead. Unless one insists a little 
while longer: you know more than I know.
chapter three
The Problem of Withdrawal
If the previous chapter was something of a long pause, it was also a re-
flection on what pausing might come to mean. It matters little whether 
pausing is something we are forced to do, by either the mentor or the 
bureaucrat, or is something that we take upon ourselves to do in a mo-
ment of weariness. What concerns us in such occasions is that our weari-
ness might only grow and take on the distinctness that remorse requires, 
which is an emotional state that stands between melancholy as hopeless 
repetition and regret as the mere acknowledgment of an instance of fail-
ure. As an instance of regret, as opposed to the ongoing character of melan-
cholia, our acknowledgment also indicates that we do not expect to have 
an opportunity to repair or restore what has passed just as it was. And 
yet, if we take our regret seriously, we will become better attuned to how 
or when we might perceive a nonvoluntary relation as one that has the 
capacity to be described as an involuntary one, should we fail once again 
to see the contingency of what appears before us in the signs arranged in 
the likeness of necessity. And we fail to do so, as I have argued through-
out, when we insist on the necessity of what appears: whether on what 
we perceive to be the necessarily stupid character of bureaucratic speech 
and appearance, or else on the necessity of our own rage at what we think 
cannot but be an instance of obfuscation, which is something we think we 
cannot stop, nor stop ourselves from railing against. In such moments, 
we justify our rage to ourselves as a sign of moral strength, which cannot 
exist unless we believe ourselves to have seen the same thing go wrong 
in precisely the same way more than once. We may be equally inclined to 
104 · chapter three
rage against our mentor if he or she fails to keep us in the realm of the 
possible, when in fact their failure to do so is better understood as a gift 
that demands no known form of reciprocity as the continuation of the 
possible, even if reality comes to feel like ruin.
What I am describing here as a pause is another name for an experi-
ence of blockage that follows from the continuity of the possible. That is, 
a “pause,” in this context, is the same as “blockage” insofar as both words 
describe the same arrangement of signs in the realm of the possible, or 
what Wittgenstein refers to as aspects of organization. It is what I refer 
to, in the previous chapter, as thematic existence — which has been given 
to us, offered to us, in and as givenness. And what exists as given is pre-
sented to us at the moment in which we both seek and accept advice in 
order to forestall the regret that we anticipate but have had no occasion to 
know for ourselves. What I intend in offering these terms as descriptively 
the same is merely a suggestion about how we might think with, along-
side, and within the thought of another person at once, insofar as thought 
assumes for itself the quasi- phenomenal character of givenness, which 
becomes a way to carry on existing in the givenness of what is given, 
while also beginning, at the very same time, to orient ourselves differently 
insofar as we begin to reorient aspects of generalization while appearing 
in prolonged agreement. That is, the barely perceptible shift (perceptible 
to ourselves, never to others) may very well prove to be a way of feigning 
agreement while we decide what else to do.
The appearance of agreement will come to matter regardless of whether 
our half of the agreement is made in sincerity or in a state of prolonged 
uncertainty or even duplicity. Rather than involve ourselves in a mutual 
act of forgetting in a relation of givenness that results in the relation- less 
field of an aneconomy — such as we saw with Derrida — we have the op-
portunity, instead, to reactivate the contingency of the aspect as a mode 
of appearance that requires accuracy. What appears does so in distinction, 
inasmuch as it requires the recognition of the non- necessity of what it is 
that we think we recognize. In an experience of the possible, of givenness, 
the movement from the possible (or blockage) to the pause indicates the 
work that regret must do in silence and expressly as sustained agree-
ment, even if only as feigned agreement. The movement from blockage 
to pause, then, indicates no change in the order of appearance, only in 
my reflections on how or why things now appear as they are, which is 
something I share with, or feature for, no one else. More plainly put, what 
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the movement indicates is a relation between feeling and willing, and 
between what I show and what I am now thinking. It also marks the 
passage from an imperfect instance of comprehension, or an instance of 
comprehension that remains faithful to what can only be held in place 
as indistinct, to a state of preparedness, in which case I stay with, and in 
control of, what cannot be understood. In sensing something, I sense also 
that I may be able to change whatever it is that provokes that feeling. It 
is, in this very way, the second chance that regret has always on offer. It is 
how regret becomes useful within the realm of the possible but only as a 
way out of the possible.
Put this way, regret describes the moment in which we judge differ-
ently from within the situation of an at least putative agreement. Without 
putative agreement, I will not be made privy to the advice of the mentor, 
bureaucrat, or administrator, which is not something I am obliged to 
take but is something I ought to know. If regret converts what is blocked 
(even when blockage feels like freedom) in the realm of the possible to the 
realization of the not- yet- knowable, then it will be important to remain in 
a state of repose at the very moment in which regret begins to dawn on 
us. Perhaps it is better to say that it will, at the very least, be important to 
feature repose, even if what we show is at odds with what we think. The 
reason for this is not, strictly speaking, to outwit the bureaucrat, adminis-
trator, or mentor at his or her own game. It is not that we are merely lying 
to the liar for the sake of what we need and against the needs or demands 
of others. Nor is it to open ourselves, as we will see further ahead, to the 
charge of hypocrisy, at least not in the conventional understanding of the 
term as the moral condemnation I begin to experience before the eyes of 
others for the contradictions that I fail to observe in myself.
I shall argue that hypocrisy can be understood as another name for 
thinking, and especially as thinking — in such a scenario — involves a with-
drawal from appearance while we nevertheless remain an appearance 
for others. What this implies, among other things, is that if thinking is a 
mode of withdrawal from appearance, which is in no sense an unusual 
conception of thinking in continental and intuitionist traditions, then we 
will have to come to terms with what it means that the most common 
understanding of bureaucracy in the era of dispersive logics of adminis-
tration and control, otherwise known as post- Fordist capitalism (if not by 
a variety of names), can be described in the same terms. What I want to 
take seriously, here, is an idea that our most compelling descriptions of 
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thinking bear a striking similarity to the ways in which we commonly de-
scribe instances of bureaucratic withdrawal, in which case the bureaucrat 
intends or means something other than what he shows. In this respect, 
we are assuming for the moment the bad intentions of the bureaucrat 
who wants only to block our access to whatever it is that will allow one to 
rectify a wrong that one perceives to have been done in an institution. But 
the same basic relation holds in the more altruistic configuration of an ad-
visor and an advisee. If the advisee has been offered something that gives 
him or her a place in this or that economy of visibility and does not yet 
know what to make of what has nevertheless been made possible (given 
as possible), then that very same mentee may retreat in thought while re-
maining bound, at the same time, to what remains possible. Of course, I 
realize that the conjunction of bureaucratic withdrawal and the instances 
of withdrawal that earn the name of genuine thinking may sound hereti-
cal, or at least be hard to take. And in some cases, it may prove to be so. 
But I want to suggest here that the similarity that exists in the casting 
of thought and bureaucratic obfuscation as related forms of withdrawal 
presents us instead with an opportunity, regardless — ultimately — of what 
we assign to the motives of any advisor or bureaucrat. Moreover, it is an 
opportunity that our anger and our haste may prevent us from taking. 
For this reason, then, we will need to linger a bit longer on what good 
“putative” or even “merely feigned” agreement might do, expressly as an 
attempt to avoid the arousal of anger, suspicion, and distrust such that 
nothing further gets said or shown, which will lead us to consider what 
bureaucracy and thinking come to share as related modes of withdrawal.
the trouble with agonism
If I anger a mentor or a bureaucrat, he will likely retreat from what he has 
made possible at the very moment in which my dissent is registered, and 
he may do so for a variety of reasons. For instance, my mentor may simply 
perceive my rejection of what he has made possible as an expression of 
ingratitude, in which case I am perceived to have failed to reciprocate, in 
the traditional sense of the experience, what I was given, which in our 
case is givenness itself. That is, my advisor may not be capable of seeing 
me as hopelessly caught in a demand for reciprocity that is nothing more 
than an experience of indenture, since what he offered also worked. I can-
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not account, nor be held responsible, for my advisor’s capacity to adjust 
to signs as they shift or as they can be sorted otherwise. The risk of the 
possible, as I stated in the previous chapter, is that it will work forever, 
and thus never for me. It is the way in which experience — as something 
inseparable from technique — earns its exemption from time. However, 
if we continue to feature agreement at the moment in which we regret 
having submitted to what is possible, whether in earnest or ignorance, we 
stand the chance of remaining with what holds us or shows us — even if 
in the likeness of the other — such that we will be able to avail ourselves 
further to a decision being made for us.
In this regard, the space between blockage and pause is an important 
alternative to agonism and related modes of reckoning with the emer-
gence of antagonism or disagreement in the public sphere. The space 
between blockage and pause works to prevent any recourse we might other-
wise take to competing absolutes that could yield only violence. I have in 
mind Chantal Mouffe’s by now influential conception of agonism, which 
she distinguishes from antagonism in the following way: “While antag-
onism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do 
not share any common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the 
conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solu-
tion to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their oppo-
nents.”1 For Mouffe, the difference between antagonism and agonism is 
the difference between an enemy and an adversary. Of the latter, Mouffe 
claims that “adversaries fight against each other because they want their 
interpretation of their principles to become hegemonic, but they do not 
put into question the legitimacy of their opponent’s right to fight for the 
victory of their position.”2 By contrast, an enemy remains an enemy no 
matter what gets said, since whatever I say, or my enemy says, will only be 
regarded as nonsense, will always already be characterized as an offense. 
For this reason, the clash of adversaries, in Mouffe’s view, “is the very 
condition of a vibrant democracy.”3
As tempting as it may be to countenance such a view of adversarial re-
lations, there is not much in the realm of contemporary political struggle, 
on a local or a global level, that inspires me to accept that the recognition 
of an adversary’s legitimacy is likely to take place. I am inclined to say, 
instead, that “the adversary” is merely the formal recognition of the soon- 
to- be enemy, which is also the moment in which my opponent disappears 
before me and refuses further conversation, but not further pronounce-
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ment, which means that we are well past the point of acknowledgment, 
well beyond conversation. What Mouffe’s theory describes is something 
like a public expression of a collective instance of moral perfectionism, 
in which we decide — and precisely as a political constituency — to clarify 
ourselves to ourselves and, most importantly, to our adversaries, such that 
the goodness of my will, or the collective will, is apparent even though 
its use will negate the other’s demands. I take congressional deadlock 
in the United States and the return to a nationalist fervor about separat-
ism, whether in the varied claims for the disaggregation of the European 
Union or else in the aggressively aggregative force of isis/isil in the 
Middle East, to be a clear sign that we have never been more remote from 
the realization of agonism.
These examples also suggest, on both a domestic and an international 
register, what Aletta Norval describes in Aversive Democracy as the problem 
that pertains in Mouffe’s formulation of the relation between antagonism 
and agonism, insofar as the former is necessary to the establishment of a 
new political order based on a perceived lack in the existing order of the 
social, to which one responds negatively, adversely. Norval writes,
But is it possible both to assert and maintain the primacy of antago-
nism, and to argue for its domestication in adversarial relations? This 
route is promising only if one divides the terrain in which the differ-
ent forms of antagonism appear. Antagonism (proper) would occur 
in the constitution of the political field as such; it would accompany 
any political regime, including also (but not exclusively) that of de-
mocracy, while the agonism could be reserved to capture moments of 
antagonism occurring within the already constituted domain of the 
democratic regime. In the former case, there is no shared symbolic 
space since it is precisely a symbolic space that is being instituted, 
while in the latter one assumes the existence of space and proceeds to 
analyse the relations that obtain between democratic citizens. There 
are, however, two potential difficulties with this account. First, it lacks 
a clear conceptualization of the movement from one set of relations to 
another; there is no discussion of the transformation of “enemies” into 
“adversaries.” Second, the characterization of adversarial relations is 
now argued to be about differences within a common space.4
In other words, the institution of a new political order — as an instance 
of radical politics — depends upon an enemy that is also a lack and must 
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remain one. As long as what is instituted persists, there is no way, as 
Norval points out, to imagine how one might become an adversary at 
some point, having been an enemy in the first place, which is also what 
one needs in order to sustain the social order instituted against its very 
name. Presumably, the adversarial space of agonism would collapse by 
virtue of the structural transformation it seems nevertheless to require. 
The problem, at least in part, has to do with the very notion of “radical” 
politics, where we might be better served think about aspect change. Or 
as Norval suggests, “It is crucial that one acknowledges this moment of 
change [i.e., the moment in which we admit that we think or do some-
thing differently], since without it there is no way for accounting for the 
very institution of a new political grammar. . . . This should not be treated 
as a radical break, but as a rearrangement of elements that makes possible 
a new way of seeing something.”5 In Norval’s account, and on a slightly 
more pragmatic register, we have to be able to countenance our opponent, 
whether he or she goes by the name adversary or enemy, as inhabiting 
the same space but in a different way than we ourselves choose to. Put 
differently, if the exclusion of the enemy is a matter of absolute spatial 
delimitation, or permanent partition, then one has no access to what or 
whom one hopes to change, or to simply bring to the less vitriolic condi-
tion of respectful disagreement.
If a change in aspect is going to occur, then our perception of a lack can 
be notional — representational, even — but it cannot be structural, insofar 
as the passing from enemy to adversary requires the institution of a new 
world, even as we understand a world to be something less than a totality, 
something less than a plane of immanence. And it is not very likely that 
opponents are going to come to a genuine agreement or an unmediated 
comprehension of what it is that we demand.
Our ordinary experience of politics today, it seems to me, tends more 
in the direction of absolute, unwavering conviction than it does toward 
respectful expressions of disagreement, to the extent that what matters to 
so many — as a political value — is incompetence as a measure of political 
innocence.6 To be uninformed, in such a world, is to be less corruptible, 
as if the vitality of a democracy is best realized as something that will 
happen with the least amount of interference, with the least amount of in-
formed conversation. In a culture that regularly speaks of an information 
economy, an “informed” conversation is tantamount to nothing: there is 
so much information that none of it matters more than anything else. 
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For these reasons, I think we are better served by taking a slightly dim-
mer view of human motive, but not of human potential, as the starting 
point for the elaboration of an emancipatory theory of political change, 
which is exactly what a theory of regret promises. My mentor might be 
my friend, but he may also prove to be my enemy, if “he” is the limit of 
“me.” Likewise, the bureaucrat may very well be my enemy, but it might 
be the case that he is merely my adversary. The point here is that I will 
only ever know if I continue to sustain agreement, live in and with what 
each makes perspicuous as an order of the social. Otherwise, I could be 
proven wrong too soon, or ruled out in advance by my own assumptions, 
by what I feature for others as a constant expression of my own political 
values, which cannot be put into conversation with radical disagreement, 
since the first step in the achievement of agonism involves the total rejec-
tion, rather than assimilation, of the enemy.
keeping up appearances
In sustaining the appearance of agreement, as we move from blockage 
to pause, we have an opportunity to reorient the aspects that have been 
made available to us precisely because we carry on as if we are still in the 
position of the advisee, in which case no threat of antagonism is regis-
tered while we also seek a way out. What I am describing as the move-
ment from blockage to pause — in which nothing changes except what I 
think, or begin to think, about what appears — is importantly related to 
what Stanley Cavell describes as the experience of what goes missing in 
the ordinary, or “the ordinary as what is missable.”7 And it is, in its own 
way, an important theory of the aspect.
I have in mind the distinction that Cavell makes in “Something Out 
of the Ordinary” between a performative utterance, which he importantly 
describes with respect to Austin’s influential theory as “an offer to partic-
ipate in the order of the law,” and a passionate utterance, “an invitation 
to improvisation in the disorders of desire.”8 The performative utterance, 
so conceived, is importantly related to the possible as the once of seeing, 
insofar as what I become in declaring something for myself or of myself 
may be something that I already recognize, something that most everyone 
will recognize: I now pronounce you husband and wife. I become what the 
words say but only because they have been said before, have been proven 
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to work. I recognize what it is that I will become, just as you recognize 
what becomes of me in saying what has been said. In this way, the per-
formative utterance mimics, as the expression of a law, an essential state, 
even if it comes to be by way of nothing essential at all.
By contrast, the passionate utterance, as “an invitation to improvisa-
tion in the disorders of desire,” is provocatively described by Cavell as 
the movement from thinking to singing, which is modeled in the physi-
cal transition from walking to dancing. To make this point, Cavell draws 
on the opening sequence of Vincente Minnelli’s The Band Wagon (1953), 
in which we see Fred Astaire, in the role of a superannuated Broadway 
performer, returning to New York after a long absence. In the opening 
sequence, Astaire steps off of the train at Grand Central and makes his 
way to Times Square. What Cavell is concerned to emphasize in the se-
quence is the manner in which we first see Astaire walking alongside the 
train toward the exit while “singing with a little self- conscious laugh” and 
humming rhythmically.9 He does so as if developing a structure for which 
there is not yet a defining melody or lyric, and also on a low register — in 
terms of the volume of what he utters and also the movement of the 
body — such that he seems to others, in the world of this film, unexcep-
tional. For Cavell, the humming suggests, as rhythmic, wordless expres-
sion, the work of thinking: the passionate pursuit of an idea that does 
not yet have form or definition, at least not as the completed song and 
dance soon will. In this state — still wordless, still walking — Astaire goes 
missing in the ordinary. He does not yet distinguish himself from others. 
When humming gives way to singing and walking becomes dancing, As-
taire will move from participation in the order of the law (the realm of the 
performative, or in my terms, the possible), or what constitutes ordinary 
experience as a form of hovering in the familiar — in which case he is 
just one body among other bodies — to the ecstatic state of the passionate 
utterance. As a passionate utterance, the song and dance will be complete 
as a form now recognizable in relation to something else, but not as that 
something else. Astaire will be noticeable. He will be something out of 
the ordinary. If something out of the ordinary, he is both from the ordinary 
and beyond the ordinary at once, so long as we understand the ordinary 
as a sedimented order of aspects of generalization. If so, then he is not 
simply somewhere else. Rather, he remains perceivable as an indistinct 
thing that can nevertheless be seen. Put this way, to be out of the ordi-
nary, as an experience of the passionate utterance, does not imply that he 
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or anyone else will not be seen, but rather that what we now regard as 
conspicuous — because thinking has become singing — will have changed.
Importantly, in Cavell’s formulation, the move from the performative 
utterance to the passionate utterance, in which one is “singled out,” de-
pends on our standing. That is, it depends on a supposition that we have 
some standing and that it is perceivable, if not always namable, in its 
distinction. If we leave the order of the law, Cavell contends, we will need 
some standing, the difficulty of which is owed to the fact that “standing” 
is not something that we gain from the law as the simple act of leav-
ing the law. Rather, it must come by way of the seriousness one must 
demonstrate in responding to, or else in realizing for oneself, a passionate 
utterance.
There is (as Austin notes) no conventional procedure for appealing 
to you to act in response to my expression of passion (of outrage at 
your treachery or callousness, of jealousy over your attentions, of hurt 
over your slights of recognition). Call this absence of convention the 
first condition of a passionate utterance; and let’s go further. Whether, 
then, I have the standing to appeal to or to question you — to single 
you out as the object of my passion is part of the argument to en-
sue. Call standing and singling out the compound second condition 
of passionate utterance. This compound condition for felicity, or say, 
appropriateness, is not given a priori but is to be discovered or refined, 
or else the effort to articulate it is to be denied.10
The compound condition, in Cavell’s terms, of felicity and appropriate-
ness is another way of casting a relation between improvisation and the 
work that will come of that thinking, in which coming out of the ordinary 
while remaining in the very place of the ordinary will be understood as 
appropriate. And by appropriate, I take Cavell to mean something like se-
rious, something carefully considered with respect to what one imagines 
to be a worthy response to some other, despite that fact that what is worthy 
must also be unconditioned.
Likewise, it is important to indicate, as I just have, that the work of the 
passionate utterance is imaginative, precisely as a way of indicating the 
social dimension of imagination. In this respect, I have in mind Richard 
Rorty’s distinction between fantasy and imagination, which he makes in 
expressly social terms. “To be imaginative, as opposed to being merely 
fantastical,” Rorty contends, “is to do something new and to be lucky 
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enough to have that novelty be adopted by one’s fellow humans, incorpo-
rated into their social practices.”11 Put this way, we could say that fantasy 
is still a form of thinking but a form that never becomes perspicuous for 
others as something that can be incorporated into a social practice. Fan-
tasy remains concealed in the ordinary. One benefit of this distinction is 
that it should emphasize that fantasy has to pass over into imagination if 
it is to become perspicuous — this thing I now do and that others also find 
appealing — as an instance of the social. And in Rorty’s terms, which echo 
Cavell’s own, there must be novelty — which means that what appeals 
must do so without respect to a precedent that is strong enough, present 
enough, to assimilate the innovation under the heading of some other. 
Precisely as an instance of imaginative effort, as opposed to mere fantasy, 
the passionate utterance secures one’s standing on the basis of an appeal 
that has no overwhelming precedent. What the distinction between a per-
formative utterance (in Cavell) and fantasy and imagination (in Rorty) 
should likewise make clear is that “standing” denotes a mode of appear-
ance that follows from a novel appeal that does not, nevertheless, come 
from nowhere. Rather, if the passionate utterance gives an appearance 
to what Astaire now uniquely does, it does not mean that he could not 
be seen before, as if the work of imagination were to enable one to leap 
from a metaphysical void. Rather, Astaire has always been seeable, just 
not conspicuous. To speak of appearance in this way — and when I speak 
of feigning appearance as well — is not to oppose appearance to reality, or 
to a void. An appearance is what has become conspicuous having been 
inconspicuous, not invisible. Or, in the case of the possible, as a mode of 
sustained seeing, appearance is merely what has remained conspicuous, 
even though there are always other ways of seeing in what shows.
In terms of the question of standing, then, we can say that it is not 
something we can achieve on the basis of an exact imitation of known 
authority, known ways of doing and being, but it cannot be wholly severed 
from them either. What will ultimately be identifiable as standing has 
first to be perceived in its indistinctness — that is, perceived as something 
distinct and yet without definite outline from within the very form that 
may negate the achievement of distinction itself.
To make this point, Cavell ventures what might strike one as an ethi-
cally troubling move in an effort to address the moment in which think-
ing has become singing, walking has become dancing. What interests 
Cavell, in this respect, is the moment that follows this opening scene of 
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The Band Wagon of humming and near- artful walking. It is a moment in 
which thought is beginning to take place but is not yet realized as an idea, 
and it takes phenomenal expression (in this instance) as dancing. In the 
scene that is of interest to Cavell, we see and hear Astaire as his singing 
begins, which happens as he trips over the feet of an African American 
man working as a shoeshiner on 42nd Street, leading to a pas de deux 
between Astaire and the shoeshiner. The ordinary act of shining shoes, 
and also of having one’s shoes shined, is elevated rhythmically by way of 
the meticulous expression of the bodies together as dance and in place 
of acts of service, postures of authority. The dance both preserves and 
supersedes the ordinary actions of shining and of receiving the shine. 
Describing the scene as the most “elaborate and stunning in the history 
of Astaire scenes,” Cavell says it is “one which provides him [Astaire] with 
an occasion for acknowledging his indebtedness for his existence as a 
dancer — his deepest identity — to the genius of black dancing. (How fully 
such an acknowledgement is acceptable is a further question, one that I 
hope will be considered in connection with the extraordinary details of 
such a routine as the one in question.)”12 What matters for Cavell, in other 
words, is Astaire’s movements as an explicit acknowledgment of what he 
owes to black dance culture — to his dance partner, to black culture, and 
to his audience most generally (i.e., that he tells us that he is in control of 
what he is doing, even if it makes us uncomfortable, which is an ordinary 
response to unordinary expressions). Likewise, the movements are also to 
be understood as an expression of his singularity, which can only be known 
in relation to others, even if another will now become inconspicuous — 
not, to say again, to become invisible or erased. That is, Astaire’s move-
ment cannot merely be a reproduction — if reproduction implies complete 
appropriation — of a tradition any more than any image could be said to 
have the ontological authority to confer on us, against our will, an identity 
derived in its own likeness.
From there, in Cavell’s account, Astaire proceeds to dance by himself, 
and “as an artist whose public has dispersed, he discovers that for a come-
back it is himself that must be singled out, or resingled, by himself.”13 The 
way that he re- singles himself — having initially singled himself out in the 
pas de deux — is to take a photo of his feet in a photo- booth; an image of 
himself that exists for others leaves his hands at the moment of the cam-
era’s automatic registration of the performance. About this, Cavell adds, 
“That the discovery of intact existence here [that foot and body remain 
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together, that the dance is coherent even though until then unknown] 
expresses itself as ecstasy is linked in my mind with Thoreau’s once ex-
pressing his recognition of his double existence, say as seer and seen, 
as a condition of being beside himself, roughly the dictionary definition 
of ecstasy.”14 In photographing his feet, not only does Astaire re- single 
himself — insofar as he will have done so by virtue of the photograph he 
produces — such that he is both seer and what is seen, but he can do so 
precisely because the work, this work, is also acknowledged as complete in 
the production of a photograph and is now beyond him as something to 
be maintained just as it was. As photograph, the dance is now for others, 
as well as for him, but only in the way that others will appreciate it — as 
something to reckon with, to be informed by potentially, and also to tell 
oneself apart from, which means one could not do so unless something 
had once been given to one, and understood in the moment of reception 
as a given, as an idea about how to move. Until, that is, one learns to move 
on one’s own. Most importantly, if the passionate utterance is, as Cavell 
importantly describes it, a re- singling, then what the photograph shows 
Astaire in the first instance is an image of what he has just done exactly 
as he just did it: an image of himself that is also now beside himself. 
Put differently, Astaire makes contact with himself in the form of an im-
age as re- singling — what will become an appearance for others — which 
also means that he will withdraw from what is featured in the image as 
an instance of perfected movement, since failing to do otherwise would 
amount to an imitation, such that nothing like a re- singling actually takes 
place. What he must prove to the shoeshine is what, on another register, 
he must prove to himself: that he can be beside himself as an expression 
of re- singling rather than conjoined with something that overcomes the 
trace of him as something also apart from what is shared. And he will 
withdraw into himself again, participate in the phenomenal display of 
the ordinary, and begin to hum anew. It should be noted that this with-
drawal, this return to humming upon completion of the photograph that 
gives form to lyric and movement, is not fundamentally different from 
what happened in the imitative dance between Astaire and the shoeshiner. 
What he does there he does as an acknowledgment of what he knows and 
why he knows it, which is what he can already do, while also preparing to 
do something else. The photograph is the record of that something else, 
a document of what the achievement of one’s standing contributed to, 
while becoming the trace of the passionate utterance that no longer shows 
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what it nevertheless knows well. Or in Hegel’s terms, we might say that 
the photograph might be described as the “daylight in which conscious-
ness wants to display itself.”15
Let us say, then, that standing is something that shows itself in a confi-
dent acknowledgment of what the other has accomplished, and that what 
has been accomplished is what I have a capacity to reproduce but choose 
not to appropriate, even if I have to risk — or at least venture — an imitation 
for the sake of what I can do for myself, in my own name. In this respect, 
the racial dimension of Cavell’s example is telling, especially in the chal-
lenge he makes to his critics: namely, that in order to describe the scene 
as an appropriation rather than a respectful re- singling, one must know 
at least as much as he knows, since what Cavell knows is also, presum-
ably, what Astaire knew at least that well, which is what we would have to 
acknowledge about Cavell’s assessment, even if only to criticize it. What 
Cavell is saying, in other words, is that if we wish to criticize this as an 
appropriation of black culture by a white dancer, and not as an acknowledg-
ment that yields a re- singling, then we will have to come to some agreement 
first about one of the ways that the signs have been coordinated between 
what Astaire did, what was or has become of a certain strain of African 
American performance, and what Cavell says or at least implies of them 
both. How else would one show one’s standing? How else would an ethical 
critique of the image gain its force, if not by acknowledging and then bet-
tering the specificity of what Cavell describes or Astaire does? In this way, 
the ethical critic must first confront the logic of what appears in its own 
terms — must join the work in that logic rather than submit the work to an 
expectation of malice derived from a repetition that we have not yet seen.
The question, then, is why we choose to act differently in our encoun-
ters with the bureaucrat, with an adversary, with someone about whom 
we have decided, for good or ill, that they do not think simply because 
they do not think the same as we do? Why presume that a bureaucrat 
has or expects from us, in turn, something less than standing? Doing 
so would imply that we have no opportunity to achieve our own stand-
ing, or admit and perceive, however indistinctly, the standing of another, 
which is the minimal precondition for an aspect change in the social. 
As Heidegger puts it in What Is Called Thinking?, “We should fall victim 
to a disastrous self- deception if we were to take the view that a haughty 
contempt is all that is needed to let us escape from the imperceptible 
power of the uniformly one- sided view.”16 One immediate solution to this 
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problem is to admit, in terms of an institutional struggle in which we find 
ourselves mired, that there is no bureaucracy in itself, only a logic that can 
be learned, made conspicuous and shared as if inconspicuous. We would 
have to admit, perhaps, in a way that is no trouble in Cavell’s example 
but would be in our own, that the bureaucrat may actually be capable of 
thinking. What would be the risk? A capacity suggests nothing inevitable. 
If there is no bureaucracy itself, then each one will look and function dif-
ferently from every other. And yet that difference might very well be what 
binds me, when I am without standing, to what I cannot help but oppose.
appearance and withdrawal
Cavell’s notion of the passionate utterance as an expression of something 
that comes out of the ordinary is especially relevant to our concerns with 
the political struggles that take place within and also about institutions. 
And as we will see, it is quite relevant to the work of regret, insofar as 
regret helps us to understand the way in which we can begin to per-
ceive, even if only in error, the nature of our agency in any institutional 
arrangement. Most simply, my contention here is that we must remain 
tethered for some time to another — whether the altruistic advisor or an 
ill- intentioned bureaucrat — precisely in order to replace what has gone 
missing in the ordinary or else to find our way out of it altogether. This 
is especially true if we countenance the idea that an institution, its ad-
ministration, and its bureaucrats are not in a relation of mutual determi-
nation. And if in fact they are not, then none of the three can be said to 
exist in a necessarily transparent relation to the other two. The instability 
that pertains in the constitution and maintenance of a given institution 
only complicates the critique we make of it, which follows from our own 
principled beliefs about a structure we assume to be always in place. And 
too often, we take our failure to find the structural relation we assume 
to be always present as the proof of its presence and also as proof of an 
attendant obfuscation that is featured for us as a veil that covers over 
that structure. And to be clear, I do believe this to be something that oc-
curs, or at least can occur. It is just that I am much more concerned with 
what happens when we assume that a bureaucracy or institution only 
ever functions in this way, so much so that we might even begin to make 
them function this way.
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For one, we would have to believe in the rational character of institu-
tions, or what Weber described at the beginning of the twentieth century 
as the pyramidal form of bureaucracy, in which case everyone who partici-
pates in an institution knows how to navigate one’s way through it and all 
have equal access to that process.17 For Weber, it was simply a question 
of deciding whether one wanted to go up or down. One could choose to 
remain in one’s station, knowing full well that alternatives exist. Put dif-
ferently, the will was aided by the transparency of social and occupational 
norms so much so that the will itself becomes practically redundant. 
There would be no point in trying to distinguish between nonvoluntary 
and involuntary states. I do not see much evidence of this scenario any 
longer, if it was ever in evidence in earlier forms of bureaucracy. But let 
us say, for the sake of distinction, that in such a model there is, first, the 
structure in all of its transparency and divisions of labor and then there are 
known ways around that structure that transcend the specificity of each 
subject of that institution.
By contrast, if we assume that institutions and the bureaucracies that 
maintain them are not in a relation of mutual determination, then we have 
much better reason to stay with the advisor or the bureaucrat as the very 
way in which we might begin to access a logic of the institution that can 
be changed or made conspicuous, no matter what the advisor or bureau-
crat intends. This is so precisely because the contingency and variability 
of the structure that that logic describes or enacts is not always apparent 
in the same way. This is also one reason why the presumed logic of bu-
reaucratic withdrawal that produces obfuscations and then our fury might 
be worth entertaining, at least for a while longer, and understood in terms 
of what such appearances and modes of withdrawal share with thought-
fulness more than the supposedly clear instance of stupidity. That is to 
say, following Cavell’s example — albeit in a radically different context — 
I want to ask what might come of the conjunction between theories of 
thinking and bureaucratic withdrawal? How might the time of staying 
with that pertains between conceptions of thought and conceptions of 
bureaucratic withdrawal offer us, to use Cavell’s felicitous phrase, some-
thing out of the ordinary?
For one of the most striking features about philosophies of thinking 
in a continental tradition, at least — which we regularly regard as more 
vigilant about questions of administration, power, mechanization, and 
deception — is that thought is often characterized as a withdrawal from 
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appearance. For this reason alone, we might have reason to feign agree-
ment long enough for our blockage to become a pause, which might 
produce the conditions by which a passionate utterance becomes both 
detectable and convincing. We cannot be heard as convincing unless we 
have stayed around long enough, which we can only do if we presume the 
other — bureaucrat or mentor — to be capable of thinking, even if we don’t 
know, at the outset, in what ways. In other words, we might pause in the 
realm of the possible, since, as professed thinkers, we will also withdraw 
from appearance, just as the bureaucrat does.
One of the most influential theories of thinking in the continental tradi-
tion comes from Heidegger and is offered, among other places, in a series 
of lectures called What Is Called Thinking? There, Heidegger importantly 
makes a distinction between two questions: namely, “What is called think-
ing?” and “What calls for thinking?” The first question — what is called 
thinking? — is a demand for a definition, one that will reduce thinking to 
a set of known and reproducible procedures, if it can even be answered. 
If thinking can be learned or demonstrated, Heidegger proposed, then 
no thinking will occur. Any attempt to define thinking is merely an effort 
to submit thought to possibilization. By contrast, the second question — 
what calls for thinking? — points in the direction of a necessarily unnam-
able and un- locatable calling that instigates a withdrawal from the actual, 
which is itself something possible. Or as Heidegger puts it, “The event 
of withdrawal could be what is most present in all our present, and so 
infinitely exceeds the actuality of everything actual.”18 If we are thinking, 
as Heidegger sees it, we are beckoned by what comes to presence and 
nevertheless withdraws in the very instant of its appearance. The call for 
thinking is also a demand for a name that comes from what cannot be 
named, since what beckons us is also what cannot be known continuously 
in the same way.
Consider a fuller description of thinking as a process of withdrawal 
that Heidegger gives in What Is Called Thinking? I take it to be a para-
digmatic instance in the continental tradition. It may also remind you of 
Joseph K.
What withdraws from us, draws us along by its very withdrawal, 
whether or not we become aware of it immediately, or at all. Once we 
are drawn into the withdrawal, we are drawing toward what draws, 
attracts us by its withdrawal. And once we, being so attracted, are draw-
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ing toward what draws us, our essential nature already bears the stamp 
of “drawing toward.” As we are drawing toward what withdraws, we 
ourselves are pointers pointing toward it. We are who we are by point-
ing in that direction — not like an incidental adjunct but as follows: 
this “drawing toward” is in itself an essential and therefore constant 
pointing toward what withdraws.19
To be fair, Heidegger’s theory of thinking is related to his concern (typical 
of his late work) with technological domination, which includes the instru-
mentalization of thought, or the act of enframing, such that withdrawal 
is understood to be, in its own right, a refusal of the applied usefulness of 
concepts. If we read this passage as an expression of what calls for think-
ing, as Heidegger clearly intends, then the refusal to arrive at, or secure, 
what withdraws is an expression of our autonomy from an administra-
tive order. If I read it instead as a description of bureaucratic obfuscation, 
in which I am always pointing in — or being pointed to — a direction that 
leads nowhere, then I experience not autonomy but alienation. In this 
case, if I am alone, I have been made to be so. And yet what binds both 
descriptions is a denial of political intervention; one refuses, the other 
is refused. Either we become capable of thinking and thus remain out 
of the reach of what has been instituted as an administrative order, or 
else we remain barred from political intervention by the very fact that the 
bureaucrat is the animal capable of withdrawing from what he shows. In 
other words, if we heed the call for thinking as something to be respected 
as a form of withdrawal that we nevertheless point toward, we will have 
no way of righting the wrong that we perceive to have been done. If we are 
caught in the grip of bureaucratic resistance, we expect that our search will 
deliver us to the encounter that we most require, which is the place where 
a demand can be made, the satisfaction of which will depend on an agree-
ment about appearance. We will have to decide duck or rabbit. That is, in 
order to overcome a supposed instance of bureaucratic obstruction that 
covers over an injustice we may very well need to come to a decision about 
whether saying that we have the same car means that we have one car 
between us or that there are before us two cars that share the same make 
and model, to return to Cavell’s example from chapter 2. We will not need 
to share that view forever, nor even for the same reason, but we will need 
to share it for some time if we stand any chance of rectifying what has gone 
wrong — which has gone wrong as something contingent, not necessary.20
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Of course, one way out of this problem is simply to say that Heidegger’s 
theory of thinking as perpetual withdrawal is itself a refusal of a partic-
ular model of bureaucratic administration that no longer applies to us. 
One could point to the ways in which Heidegger’s theory of thinking 
tacitly rejects — is structurally opposed to — the pyramidal conception of 
bureaucracy that one finds, arguably, in both Hegel and Weber, where ad-
ministrative hierarchies are largely transparent and excessively rational, 
so much so that one knows what ascension in a given pyramidal structure 
requires, and how the demands from above and below are mediated by 
the mid- level bureaucrat, as I suggested before. Clarity — or perhaps it is 
better to say consistency — is actually the problem in such a model, inso-
far as what is clarified is the rationalization of labor itself. For instance, in 
the section on “Executive Power” in The Philosophy of Right, Hegel imag-
ines the bureaucrat as an elected official who clarifies the necessarily im-
partial demands that emanate from civil life, which is governed, he says, 
“in a concrete manner from below,” in relation to the universal charac-
ter of the state.21 Interestingly, Hegel describes the middle sector as the 
“consciousness of the state” that is in possession of the most “prominent 
education.”22 He writes,
Civil servants are not appointed, like agents, to perform individual 
contingent services; instead, they invest in this relationship the chief 
interest of their worldly being, both spiritual and particular. Similarly, 
what is imposed upon them and entrusted to them is not merely a 
particular thing, external in character; the value of such a thing is 
something inward and therefore distinct from its outward character, 
so that it is in no way impaired if what has been stipulated is not 
accomplished. What the servant of the state is to do, however, is as 
such a value in and as itself. Hence the wrong committed through its 
non- performance, or through positive injury to it . . . is an injury to the 
universal content itself . . . and so is a transgression or even a crime.23
For Hegel, thinking is no one thing or series of things in particular, at 
least in what appears in and as a result of thinking, just as it would later 
be for Heidegger. But unlike Heidegger, who expressly opposes thinking 
to the rational administration of the state, the thought of the bureaucrat, 
for Hegel, is marked by an inward rather than an outward consistency.24 
And it should be emphasized here that Hegel understands thinking as 
a matter of willingness. In this scenario, the particular only fails to be 
122 · chapter three
reconciled with the universal character of the state — and regardless of the 
external form that any one thing might take — when the bureaucrat has 
become unwilling to think in a consistent way, and that consistency owes 
nothing to what is particular to the bureaucrat. It stems, instead, from his 
preparedness to think in just this way, the way of others similarly trained 
(however few they may be). The willed consistency of the bureaucrat’s 
thinking, which mediates the relation of the particular to the universal, 
is also what Hegel believed to protect the government against “the other 
subjective aspect, namely the personal passions of the governed, whose 
private interests, etc., suffer injury when the universal is made to pre-
vail against them.”25 For these reasons, it is not hard to imagine why the 
very idea of withdrawal appealed to Heidegger as a solution to political 
administration, insofar as he understands thinking to take place only if 
what we think ceaselessly moves and rejects all moorings, and especially 
as thought is identified in Hegel as that which does the work of social 
regulation and control.
And yet, as Claude Lefort began to demonstrate around the same 
time that Heidegger was preparing his lectures on thinking, bureaucra-
cies thrive on the dispersion and fragmentation that fosters a unified 
authority. “The more that activities are fragmented, departments are diversi­
fied, specialized and compartmentalized, structural levels are multiplied and 
authority is delegated at each level, the more the instances of co­ ordination 
and supervision proliferate, by virtue of this very dispersion, and the more 
bureaucracy flourishes.”26 This is, it seems to me, what has come to pass. 
As bureaucracies flourish, they become increasingly fragmented, which 
means that their outward appearance might seem to us — at best — an 
uneven assemblage of tiny particulars that hang together in a non- 
binding constellation. More likely, that constellation is bound; it is just 
that we cannot see the binding, nor will we look if we continue to con-
sider ceaseless change — whether it goes by the name of the rhizome, 
becoming, event, and so on — as a necessarily emancipatory condition. 
The more that activity becomes fragmented, the more those fragments 
contribute to the centralization of an authority that will nevertheless not 
be seen in any of its constituent parts. This is what Hegel demonstrated 
when he distinguished the consistency of thought from what manifests 
externally, either for or from that thought. And it does so to protect the 
authority of the executive power and despite the fact that the structure ap-
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pears rational since what binds top and bottom is something consistent 
and continuous.
Too often we think the opposite, namely, that logics of the rhizome, be-
coming, de- territorialization, the event, all work against the consolidation 
of authority, when in fact such occurrences just as often diversify and ex-
tend the centralization of an authority that remains unseen and unimag-
inable. This is something like the way that Deleuze and Guattari describe 
Gregor Samsa’s transformation in The Metamorphosis in response to bu-
reaucratic forms, though not without a subtle and important stipulation:
The bureaucratic triangle forms itself progressively. First, the direc-
tor who comes to menace and to demand; then the father who has 
resumed his work at the bank and who sleeps in his uniform, demon-
strating the external power that he is still in submission to as if even 
at home he was “only at the beck and call of his superior” and finally, 
in a single moment, the intrusion of the three bureaucrat lodgers who 
penetrate the family itself, taking up its roles, sitting “where formerly 
Gregor and his father and mother had taken their meals.” And as a 
correlate of all of this, the whole becoming- animal of Gregor, his be-
coming beetle, junebug, dungbeetle, cockroach, which traces an in-
tense line of flight in relation to the familial triangle but especially in 
relation to the bureaucratic and commercial triangle.27
That is to say, if Gregor’s father and by extension the director are symmet-
rical bureaucratic forms against which Gregor’s animality takes shape, we 
would have to take seriously that Gregor’s flight, which is also a transfor-
mation, is an escape from bureaucratic administration; escape remains, 
in conventional terms, the promise of freedom. But Deleuze and Guattari 
take care to note that “the problem is not that of being free but of finding 
a way out, or even a way in, another side, a hallway, an adjacency.”28 It 
seems to me that not only is it the case that the question does not concern 
freedom, but Gregor’s flight, his transformation, also marks the shift in 
bureaucratic appearance as we began to discover it late in the twentieth 
century (and as Hegel imagined it in the early nineteenth century, albeit 
for different reasons), insofar as the rhizomatic movement of the bu-
reaucrat is what appears and also what remains tethered to a centralized 
administration that we nevertheless cannot see. If Gregor’s monstrosity 
is also an image of thinking, we have one more reason to understand how 
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thinking, which resembles the rhizomatic, cannot be easily severed from 
bureaucratic logics.
A particularly instructive and particularly recent example of the con-
junction of withdrawal and quasi- rhizomatic bureaucratic logics is to be 
found, however unintentionally, in Catherine Malabou’s What Should We 
Do with Our Brain? There, Malabou describes the work of the brain in 
terms of plasticity, which she opposes to flexibility. What Malabou rejects, 
in particular, is a model of the brain as a central command — the brain 
as a thinking machine that works in a manner not unlike the pyramidal 
or rational bureaucracies that I’ve just described. Her reasons for doing 
so are related to questions of labor and exploitation that lead her to favor 
plasticity over elasticity, which corresponds to the top- down and outdated 
model of the brain as central command. Thought is plastic, she says, in-
sofar as our neuronal activity is “something that cannot return to its initial 
form after undergoing a deformation.”29 If thought is instead understood 
as elastic, then it may expand, but only to return to where it was before it 
moved. For Malabou, plasticity describes the brain’s capacity for improvi-
sation, creativity, and the aleatory — and most of all, non- recurrence. She 
argues, and in a way that weds Heidegger’s conception of Dasein with 
his later appeals to thinking, that “the interaction of the brain with its 
surroundings instead acts as a commanding authority, whose unknown 
form and location disrupt the traditional geography of government. The 
functional plasticity of the brain deconstructs its function as the central 
organ and generates the image of a fluid process, somehow present ev-
erywhere and nowhere, which places the outside and the inside in contact 
by developing an internal principle of repair, and an external principle 
of adaptation and evolution.”30 In other words, the brain moves as we 
move and repairs itself as it breaks continually, which is something other 
than a return to the state in which it once consistently was. This is also a 
disruption, she says, of the “traditional geography of government.” How 
so? Malabou writes, “To ask ‘What should we do with our brain?’ is above 
all to visualize the possibility of saying no to an afflicting economic, po-
litical, and mediatic culture that celebrates only the triumph of flexibil-
ity, blessing obedient individuals who have no greater merit than that of 
knowing how to bow their heads with a smile.”31 And yet, if thought is 
plastic, then, as an instance of the political, it could only ever constitute an 
outside that no longer exists — i.e., a rational bureaucratic administration 
that demands flexibility. Thinking, in other words, could only ever mirror 
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the logic of withdrawal that fosters the very consolidation of authority, 
just as Lefort proposed. In this case, this constitutive outside could only 
confirm what exists, and what exists resembles the disinformatic logics 
of bureaucracy.
For this reason, flexibility strikes me as a more apt metaphor for 
thought’s relation to politics, and social relations more generally. On the 
one hand, Malabou opposes the notion on the idea that flexibility implies 
our willingness to do what we can, as workers, to combat the falling rate 
of profit. Even if this is the case, what cannot flex further typically snaps, 
and thus we start again, differently. And while “flexibility” indicates a 
form of alienation that is our capacity to do more as workers, it just as eas-
ily suggests a capacity for thinking. One need only recall Henri Bergson’s 
claim that our laughter is a corrective to what has become automated or 
mechanical in us, even if simply by habit. The corrective, for Bergson, 
demands elasticity, which he perceives to be a socially responsive gesture: 
“Society will therefore be suspicious of all inelasticity of character, of mind 
and even of body, because it is the possible sign of a slumbering activity 
as well as of an activity with separatist tendencies, that inclines to swerve 
from the common centre round which society gravitates: in short, be-
cause it is a sign of eccentricity.”32 The automatism installed by habit has 
to be understood as eccentric because it is the inflexibility in perception 
and awareness that leaves one unresponsive to whatever exceeds or defies 
this particular regime of seeing. Even more promising, in my estimation, 
would be to consider how a notion of flexibility, or elasticity, also indicates 
a capacity to stay with something that does not yet work but could, which 
is what any useful conception of the political ought to aspire to. That is, 
one might stay with something as possible, but most often as a way of 
creating a different experience, a different ordering of aspects that strike 
us not only as our own but also as better. How would we sustain or even 
implement an order of the political that, by definition, has no relation to 
what it was before? Staying with what works does not mean doing the 
same thing one has always done in a dogmatic way. It means accepting 
a notion of continuity that depends on the collective will of a given he-
gemonic order to discover ways of sustaining what we once believed in 
to the extent that a new order of the social was instituted. In this sense, 
we simply have to remain attached and find different ways to express the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of those attachments to whatever contingent he-
gemonic articulation of the social we currently believe in. If what we have 
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instituted fails as an order of the social, and as the result of an involuntary 
act, then we may feel regret, which will simply give us a way of thinking 
about a contingent social formation on the basis of what has now passed, 
knowing (as we cannot now help but do) that what we need now will also 
be slightly different than what we had before. This is, in my view, what it 
means to be politically serious — that we can find a way of honoring our 
attachments by finding different reasons and different ways of expressing 
and renewing what we want to remain the same.
Malabou’s notion of plasticity, which we might also regard as the suc-
cession of unrelated automatisms, leaves no trace of what came before 
it, which I take to be less a problem of history, and notions of historical 
continuity, than an unhelpful conception of space. In this sense, the prob-
lem in Malabou’s conception is not so different from the one that Norval 
identifies in Mouffe’s conception of agonism, insofar as the production 
of adversaries instead of enemies involves not an aspect shift but a radical 
spatial break between opposed parties. That is, preceding the conceptual 
distinction of enemy and adversary is a spatial logic that would resemble 
something like a series of incommunicable, wholly distinct totalities. In 
Malabou’s theory of the brain, what heals when broken are not two pieces 
that were once one. Rather, what heals is the edge of whatever remains 
after the break and is sealed off without a trace, in the work of healing, 
from what it was once attached to. The new cannot be renewed, submitted 
to aspect change; the new can only be what was severed and what remains 
outside of any relation whatsoever. In short, Malabou’s image of the brain 
is an image of revolution, the success of which depends as much on for-
getting as it does on total rupture. And it would be hard to imagine how 
something like a revolution could be sustained on the basis of forgetting 
and an opposition to relationality. For this reason, it is also important to 
emphasize that this deconstructive vision of the brain’s function fails as 
deconstruction, precisely because it wants to locate the rhizomatic move-
ment of thought as an essential feature of the human brain, hence, the 
conceptual foreclosure of our capacity to imagine or constitute an out-
side. If we admit that much, then what we have is less a revolutionary 
conception of cognition than a normative statement about how we think, 
in a hardwired way, which means that it would also be impossible to 
count the bureaucrat out as someone capable of thinking. How, if we 
follow Malabou’s image of the brain, could we imagine the bureaucrat 
to be otherwise than we are? Namely, as discontinuous thinkers whose 
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discontinuity — the presumptive source of our capacity for autonomy — is 
automated by the plasticity of the brain that we nevertheless all have. 
Whether the discontinuity of thought is tied to a mechanized conception 
of what it cannot cognitively help but do, or else it is understood as the 
very manner in which rational authority is avoided or even undone, we 
are faced with comparable models of withdrawal as the basis of thought. 
However, if comparable, the two cannot be identical. If two things are 
comparable, they simply share an aspect or aspects and have, as such, 
a way to remain together long enough so that we might achieve for our-
selves and acknowledge in the other our respective standing. If we feign 
agreement, in the instances where genuine agreement cannot be reached, 
the best and also the worst that can happen to us is that we would come 
to regret it. We might stand accused of hypocrisy, which is simply, or at 
least potentially, another way of describing thinking.
hypocrisy and regret
It would not be difficult to imagine a situation in which my suggestion that 
we take the bureaucrat seriously as someone capable of thinking might 
open me to the charge of hypocrisy, especially if I have been heard, let’s say, 
to complain about an administrator or an administration, or to have written 
about the importance of monstration as a revolutionary act in the work of 
a filmmaker long thought to be interested only in transcendence. Or else, 
one might think my goal here is to submit the continental tradition, which 
I also greatly value, to a form of moral condemnation, to append to it the 
charge of hypocrisy, insofar as I can show that the logics of bureaucratic 
dissimulation are mimicked or anticipated by continental descriptions of 
the work of thinking. After all, what else could it mean to accept what I also 
intend to reject? The hypocrisy would be twofold — that which I demon-
strate in others and then expose in myself as a condition of my immersion 
in those texts. I have no interest in making this case precisely because the 
charge of hypocrisy is relevant, just not as a moral charge or condemnation, 
not even as something unfortunate, if also benign. Rather, I want to show, 
by way of bringing things to a point, that hypocrisy and regret are at times 
importantly allied as expressions of thoughtfulness.
A better conception of hypocrisy itself will allow us to see why there is 
nothing much to lose in remaining in at least putative agreement with an 
128 · chapter three
ill- intentioned bureaucrat or an altruistic advisor — that we acknowledge 
his capacity for thinking so that he might begin to acknowledge our own. 
Hypocrisy is, of course, a moral charge, one we readily level against those 
who profess first principles while doing something that would be in ob-
vious defiance of that commitment. However, we might be better served 
by recognizing a usage of the term that may very well complicate, if not 
eliminate altogether, the moral claim.33 “Hypocrisy” is derived from the 
Greek word hypokrisis, the combination of hypo, or “under,” and krinein, 
“to sift or decide.”34 In this sense, we can, most basically — and before any 
moral determination — define hypocrisy as a sifting from under, as an act 
of featuring or merely regarding one thing while sorting a new relation to 
what we feature or regard from under. Interestingly, hypokrisis also sug-
gests, in its early Greek usage, “acting on the stage, pretense.” It is for this 
reason, surely, that hypocrisy gets caught up with morality — or, better to 
say, moralism — insofar as the actor would seem to be the embodiment of 
saying or doing something that is in opposition or at least is not identical 
to what one actually thinks or believes. To be an actor is to become and 
display something or someone who one nevertheless is not. The actor 
is, in this way, regularly subject to doubts about his or her “proper” or 
real self. There are, to be sure, instances when the charge of hypocrisy is 
meant — especially in the realm of real politics — to uncover a deception, 
such as when one is shown to have signed a public statement in favor of a 
strike in order to conceal more readily the work of being a scab, or of own-
ing property while professing to be a Marxist and demanding the latter’s 
truth be countenanced by every other rather than taking on more directly 
the complications of our desires and sensibilities as complications. It is 
just that such instances, in which what is shown and what is thought or 
done, cannot be moralized as responses to any structured opposition to 
appearance and belief, since that relation is just as easily described as one 
between appearance and thought, particularly when thought is regarded 
as a sifting from under. To put things more simply, it may just be that 
we are better served to call such willful instances of dissimulation lying, 
since the divide between appearance and reality here is intended and is 
not, in that way, the effect of a changing mind. A lie might give way to 
regret — and thus pass through hypocrisy along the way — but in lying the 
liar, at least initially, intends to carry on believing what he has only ever 
believed in the first place. What the liar wants is to meet the demand of 
acceptance at the level of appearance while thinking nothing acceptable. 
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But in a more flexible conception of hypocrisy, as distinguished from 
lying, we can say that if we are sifting from under while showing some-
thing else, it may simply be the case that we are not hiding or dissimu-
lating but are engaged in an ordinary experience of thoughtfulness. It is 
not simply that we are changing our mind but that mindfulness requires 
shifting, if not change. Curiously, in The Life of the Mind, Arendt speaks 
of the activity of thinking and the threat of hypocrisy in terms that just as 
easily include the work of fictional performance, but only insofar as the 
distinction between fiction and non- fiction becomes importantly difficult 
to sustain. Of the difference between self- display and self- presentation, 
for instance, Arendt writes,
Since appearances always present themselves in the guise of seem-
ing, pretense and willful deception on the part of the performer, error 
and illusion on the part of the spectator are, inevitably, among the 
inherent potentialities. Self- presentation is distinguished from self- 
display by the active and conscious choice of the image shown; self- 
display has no choice but to show whatever properties a living being 
possesses. Self- presentation would not be possible without a degree 
of self- awareness — a capability inherent in the reflexive character of 
mental activities and clearly transcending mere consciousness, which 
we probably share with higher animals. Only self- presentation is open 
to hypocrisy and pretense, properly speaking, and the only way to tell 
pretense and make- believe from reality and truth is the former’s fail-
ure to endure and remain consistent.35
What Arendt is suggesting here is that we are all, at various points, an im-
age for others.36 We become so, most unassumingly, by virtue of volition- 
less acts of self- display, or what shows of us, what remains a feature of our 
physicality, in an ongoing, unintentional way. Nothing prevents anyone 
from reading what one encounters in the confrontation with my self- 
display in this or that way, in ways that defy what I think I am showing; 
anyone is free to project onto me, even in my most guileless moment, 
ideas and associations drawn from sources other than the one that I also 
now am for some other. But what Arendt makes clear, here, is that we 
also regularly present ourselves in a particular way, such that pretense 
or hypocrisy might show at the very moment when what we have been 
presenting in one way, continuously, lapses. That is, I have been trying to 
present myself as x, so much so that it will be understood as an instance 
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of self- display — or what I cannot help but show as the me that never 
changes — when I suddenly lapse and show y instead.
However, just as soon as Arendt makes the distinction and suggests 
that the charge of pretense or hypocrisy may be what emerges in the 
distinction that one might begin to detect between self- presentation and 
self- display, she complicates the very notion of hypocrisy by indicating 
how difficult the distinction can be to make in the first place. “To uncover 
the ‘true’ identity of an animal behind its adaptive temporary color is not 
unlike the unmasking of the hypocrite. But what then appears under a de-
ceptive surface is not an inside self, an authentic appearance, changeless 
and reliable in its thereness. The uncovering destroys a deception; it does 
not discover anything authentically appearing. An ‘inside self,’ if it exists 
at all, never appears to either the inner or outward sense, since none of 
the inner data possess stable, relatively permanent features which, being 
recognizable and identifiable, characterize individual appearance.”37 If the 
“inside self” possesses no permanent features, it is because what counts 
as inside can only be derived by what we also describe as outside. If I 
am an object for others, every other is also a potential object for me. Put 
differently, when I contemplate what appears to me, especially if what ap-
pears is something I do not yet recognize, I draw on memories of things 
that are now summoned by what I see but do not yet understand. I begin 
to project onto an object the characteristics of other objects. And that 
implies, in part, that as I look at one thing, I may withdraw as I began 
to feature other things from other places for myself. It is, most likely, at 
this very moment that self- presentation and self- display cease to coincide, 
not because I am hiding or dissimulating but because I am thinking; I 
am attempting to form a visual grammar for what now appears before 
me. If what I find myself thinking of — at the very moment of withdrawal 
from appearance — is derived, at least in part, from the impression or 
trace of what I once encountered as the outside of and to myself, then 
my capacity to think is also what collapses a distinction between inside 
and outside, since what I think with is a phenomenal trace, or an object 
displaced. A condition of remaining responsive to the world, of reckoning 
with what we see but do not comprehend at once, is that self- display and 
self- presentation — what we actually show and what we intend to show 
continuously — become, for however long, distinct. To be charged with 
hypocrisy, in such moments, is merely to have been caught in an act of 
thinking. And if thought and appearance maintain some distance, we 
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will have more reason, still, to live with the awful similarity that pertains 
between emancipated conceptions of thinking as withdrawal and bureau-
cratic dissimulation. In the end, that relation shares something important 
with the difficulty of deciding whether an instance of hypocrisy is to be 
understood as an expression of thinking or an intended deception, the 
covering over of contradiction. We may simply need to make a judgment 
about which is a deception and which is an instance of thinking, of the 
mind changing by virtue of what we revisit in thought. In this way, we 
find the continuity of our being in the act of re- visitation, since what we 
feature for ourselves in such moments is the continuity of phenomena as 
constant displacement, the comparative dimension of which leads to an 
aspect shift as the work and world of thought. It is the distance thought 
keeps from what it thinks about. Or as Arendt puts it, “First, thinking is 
always out of order, interrupts all ordinary activities and is interrupted 
by them.”38
In making a judgment about hypocrisy, I can easily be wrong, espe-
cially since being wrong, as Davide Panagia rightly contends, is an onto-
logical problem, not an epistemological one.39 Put simply, what is wrong 
will change as we change; what changes stems from thinking not from 
knowledge or from first principles. This is what makes regret so impor-
tant. In the first chapter, I defined regret as a response that we have to the 
outward appearance of things and as the moment in which we recognize 
that what has passed before us was a contingent rather than a necessary 
phenomenon. The point of the distinction was twofold: first, to indicate 
that nonvoluntary relations are much rarer than we suppose, and second, 
that what our feeling of regret shows us is that the relation we maintained 
with what has now passed was, in fact, an involuntary one — a relation 
that has some bearing on the use or neglect of our will. Regret gives us 
not a second chance of seeing the same thing but a heightened awareness 
of the relative scarcity of nonvoluntary relations, which should prepare 
us for the contingency of whatever else arrives and should prevent us in 
turn from expecting that whatever does arrive will look exactly like what 
passed, or how we had imagined what it was that passed. However, if re-
gret is implicated in our relation to appearance, then it also, perhaps most 
obviously, has an inward aspect; that is to say, it is also an experience that 
can be described as withdrawal.
When we experience regret, we feature for ourselves an image of what 
has passed. The experience of regret is an occasion for the projection of a 
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mental image of something or some relation between people and things 
that we remember, but it is not only that. When picturing for ourselves 
what has passed we are also thinking of something else at once. We pic-
ture the same thing in different ways at the same time, even if the point 
of doing so is to arrive at a mental arrangement of the aspects that will 
take on more stability than the arrangement of aspects in the image that 
initially deceived me. If the mental image of what has passed and that 
comes of regret can be said to be more stable, it is also the case that it 
exists in a state of perpetual superimposition, at least insofar as we invoke 
that image in any experience of regret. And if the images that we keep 
suspended in mental superimposition are derived from the phenomenal 
world, then the “inward” dimension of regret cannot, in the end, be told 
apart from its supposedly “outward” dimension, insofar as what we reflect 
on and project for ourselves is as importantly “outside” as it is “inside.”
In the end, regret is not so easy to distinguish from the work of thinking. 
Regret allows us to redress a wrong, which is nothing more than a confu-
sion about appearance, or the hasty assumption that self- presentation and 
self- display come to the same point, or that the hypocrisy I noted is not, 
in fact, an instance of thinking but the appearance that is meant to be a 
covering over. But only if I am capable of thinking, and of regarding the 
bureaucrat as having the same capacity, do I have the chance not only 
to redress a wrong but also to see that how I think, as opposed to what 
I think, is what we have in common. Regret allows for agreement, or 
mutuality, where there once had only been discord. I can try again in a 
different field of experience with the same person or people. Most impor-
tantly, perhaps, agreement comes neither from conversion nor a belief 
that finds its constituency in time, that is, after the fact. Rather, regret is 
the altogether something else. It is the unheralded expanse of what can, at 
any time, go wrong, and thus go a different way. The experience of regret 
is what allows us to go wrong without redrawing a line between friend 
and enemy, to the extent that whoever departs — having been identified 
as an enemy — remains an enemy, and whatever I have now, I will have 
forever, once and again.
Afterthoughts
If regret and hypocrisy come to indicate the affective registration of think-
ing itself — as I have suggested that they ought to, at least insofar as one 
relates to the other — then what’s left for politics?
The question appears reasonable, since we so often assume that politics 
depends, at the very least, on the rhetorical force of conviction, in which 
case we know what we say or think and why we do what we do. Regret, 
conceived as it is here, might strike us as small change in the work of 
real politics, especially since we are accustomed to thinking of regret 
strictly in terms of failure, and then as a near synonym for nostalgia, 
at least when nostalgia is understood in its more colloquial expressions 
as a tenacious longing for something that has passed to the extent 
that we fail to properly appreciate what is before us.1 I hope that I have 
indicated no such thing myself. The answer to the question, if there is 
just one question, might simply be: I don’t know. But in saying so, I am not 
suggesting that we do nothing or expect nothing better. I simply suggest 
that we cease making appeals to the possible, which is nothing more than 
a false ground of knowledge, the proven path of what cannot, in any case, 
be given as proof. It may be that proof is only ever, in phenomenological 
terms, given, as the second chapter should indicate. In this sense, I am 
in sympathy with Jean- Luc Nancy’s response to Lenin’s question — what 
is to be done? — especially as it continues, in a nearly unabated fashion, 
to haunt political theorists, and precisely as an invocation of the possible. 
The question, in Nancy’s formulation, promises something that it can 
never deliver: a guarantee. Writing a year after a series of general strikes 
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in France in 1995, many of which immobilized the country in different 
ways and at different times, Nancy reminds us that “invention is always 
without a model and without a warranty. But indeed that means facing up 
to turmoil, anxiety, even disarray. When certainties come apart, there too 
gathers the strength that no certainty can match.”2 My theory of regret is 
nothing if not a way of understanding how turmoil, anxiety, and disarray 
are not only devastating — as such experiences very often are — but also 
productive of thought itself, which rarely happens, when it happens, with 
immediate clarity, ease, and indications of self- assurance. Only dogma 
can provide that quickly, and dogma is something other than thinking.
This is also why hypocrisy comes to matter as a way of understand-
ing both regret and the work of thinking itself, for a number of reasons. 
When we attempt to forestall regret, when we picture for ourselves what 
we might do, so as to go unnoticed in error — and ideally, never to err — we 
are trying to avoid the appearance of hypocrisy. That is to say, if we believe 
that we must be consistent in the presentation of ourselves in relation to a 
principle or series of principles — which is what binds religious conviction 
to political conviction in every case — then our doubts will always be put 
to bad use. And yet, from this perspective, the only way to remain free 
of hypocrisy is to refuse change, which means that we will also have to 
refuse thought: what we show others, we will take responsibility for as 
something identical to what we feature to and for ourselves. What we 
feature to and for ourselves, and also for others, is not only the same 
thing in such cases — knowing that by “same” we do not mean identical 
cases so much as instances of grammatical agreement — but is merely the 
sedimentation of a concept understood as the stable ground of all belief. 
Or as Linda Zerilli has argued, “The notion that political claims are either 
grounded (and therefore not contestable) or ungrounded (and therefore 
not persuasive) occludes a third possibility: rather than knowledge claims 
that must be redeemed as true or false by means of a logical or cogni-
tive (determinant) judgment, political claims are based on contingently 
formed public opinions that call for our (reflective) judgment without the 
mediation of a concept.”3 Hypocrisy gives name to both what remains as an 
expression of a supposedly grounded moral or political claim and, at the 
same time, the drift away from a claim that has worked for so long and 
now seems unworthy of the complications introduced. Hypocrisy names 
the presence of the original concept as it has both persisted and as it no 
longer applies, as well as whatever registers in the drift away, or the sift-
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ing from under — whatever is given to judgment without the mediation 
of a concept. It is “the strength,” to return to Nancy, “that no certainty 
can match.” It is also an experience that requires, or at least must always 
risk, regret.
This is why I have featured superimposition, in the final chapter, as 
an important trope for understanding the work of thought in a regretful 
state, and as the figuration of hypocrisy itself, insofar as it allows us, as 
a pictorial form that is isometric with thinking, to see the stated ground 
of conviction accompanied by its impossibility. I come to this claim just 
over one hundred years after Lois Weber, a pioneer of early cinema in 
the silent era. In 1915, Weber released her film Hypocrites, in which the 
figure of “Naked Truth,” performed by Margaret Edwards, appears as a 
naked woman seen only in the film in and as superimposition, as she 
leads a pastor through a series of places and institutions in order to reveal 
the hypocrisy of first principles that animates each experience in a given 
institution, whether in church, politics, marriage, or some other. As a 
superimpository figure, Naked Truth is never in just one place or another. 
She can be seen and also be seen through (figure conc.1). Technically 
speaking, in Weber’s figuration of Naked Truth are two images from two 
different places at two different times seen at once, one atop the other. The 
only time that Naked Truth appears in one image, and as one image — 
 that is, not in superimposition — is when she takes the pastor back in time 
to witness a scene in which a medieval monk erects a statue of Naked 
Truth only to provoke the violence of the people. Conventional wisdom re-
gards the attack on the statue as a moralistic attack on nudity, on the indis-
creet presentation of the female body. It strikes me instead as an important 
and familiar political act of iconoclasm that often follows and announces, 
ceremonially, the end of any dictatorship, or the reign of first principles.
Following this scene of iconoclasm, Naked Truth takes the pastor back 
to the present, to a series of scenes of hypocrisy. In the first, she takes 
him to a political rally in which we see a politician standing on a stage 
and before a sign that reads, “my platform is honesty.” The priest and 
Naked Truth join the politician on stage (and we continue to see Naked 
Truth, and also to see through Naked Truth), at which point she holds up a 
mirror to the politician (figure conc.2). When she does so, the entirety of 
the frame begins to blur, and no one has the same figural definition they 
had seconds before, save for Naked Truth, who remains in superimpo-
sition (figure conc.3). The screen goes black for a moment when Naked 
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Truth’s mirror appears in the center of the frame and shows us, in the oval 
that appears in an otherwise black frame, a scene of the politician in an 
entirely different place and time, collecting bribes from his constituents 
(figure conc.4). The frame goes dark and we return to the original blurred 
frame, in which Naked Truth continues to appear, amid the blurred fig-
ures, in the full clarity of superimposition. She can be seen through, but 
the layers themselves remain distinct, while the form of everyone else 
become significantly less distinct. As the scene of the political rally comes 
back into focus, the priest walks off the stage with his head down (figure 
conc.5). He has learned something. He looks regretful.4
It would, however, be too simple to read this scene as a clear instance 
of moral unveiling, of revelation. What is exposed, to return to Zerilli’s 
formulation, is the absence of ground in what is professed as ground, in 
what is expressed as first principle: “my platform is honesty.” The 
point is not simply that Naked Truth (and Lois Weber) shows the politi-
cian to be corrupt where instead he features his virtue. More important is 
that Naked Truth has taught something to the pastor — a man beholden 
to first principles (and unsuccessfully, since he is also shown to bore his 
parishioners) — namely, how to think, which means seeing something 
before you and also something else at once. That is, she is showing him 
how to think in two times at once — how, in Arendt’s terms, to be in two 
Conc.1
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places at once. Naked Truth is the visual figuration of what it means to 
sift from under. The principle remains on view, and so do alternative ways 
of thinking about or against that principle. We are all hypocrites, at some 
point. But what relieves us of the dogmatism in any instance of hypocrisy 
is our capacity for regret. If I insist on always saying one thing in the 
same way while doing something else in the same way, then I should be 
easily found out and decided against — in any venue — on the basis of my 
inability to think, which is also my unwillingness to try and make sense 
of why someone would look at the same thing in a different way than I do.
The fear of hypocrisy, unfortunately, tends to compel us to fortify our 
positions, to maintain what we show to others in the same way while do-






all that follows from it — gathers its political strength for being a way in 
which we can acknowledge our inflexibility and thereby create the con-
ditions under which we can begin a conversation with someone or some 
others who have — or so we have thought — values entirely opposed to 
ours. It could be that in time the conversation goes badly and should not 
continue. But in that case, I can merely regret my effort and try some-
thing else. This is why the bureaucrat has been an important figure here, 
as well as the mentor, whom we typically take to be altruistic to the core. 
I see them both — the bureaucrat and the mentor — as relatable but not 
identical figures. For one, we often think of bureaucrats as hypocrites, just 
like the politician in Weber’s film, who proclaims his categorical belief in 
honesty while taking bribes from his constituents. But if I assume this to 
be true of every bureaucrat, then I am left with two options. I can either 
leave the institution in which I find myself ensnarled — and every other 
institution thereafter — or else carry on raging in a state of hopeless mel-
ancholy against an enemy who perceives my limits just as clearly as I be-
lieve I perceive his. Both options suppose a belief in revolution as always 
the first step, in absolute breaks predicated on the absence of complete 
agreement, and on the assumption that there can never be agreement at 
any point further.
Sometimes, as we know, revolutions are necessary, but perhaps not as 
often as we imagine. Just as often, if not more so, the clean break is not 
so clean. How else to explain, for example, the institution of the first five- 
year plan with the beginning of the Soviet Union, a rapprochement with 
capitalism that seems in retrospect (and to many at the time) to have an-
nounced something less than a compromise: namely, that capitalism and 
socialism are not necessarily incompatible as modes of accumulation, 
if they differ, in principle, as modes of dissemination and distribution. 
I am always struck by the talk of five- year plans in the North American 
academy, for instance — by the language of a compromise that really never 
was one and that now rears its head in the West in the faculty meetings of 
liberal North American universities. We would do better to try and figure 
out what we have in common, not just what separates us, and separates 
us entirely. That is, if we are going to think about institutions compara-
tively, then we will have to consider something more than our differences, 
even when we are attempting to regard the differences as something to be 
honored, recognized as points of distinction. The differences will be what 
constitute the very act of comparison, since it could not happen if a rela-
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tion of identity is what we pursue. The point is not to identify what is the 
same and then eliminate one or even both terms of any relation, but to do 
the work of understanding what we hold in common. “Common” is what 
we can accept as related, not what is related in principle or else in essence.
For this reason my theory of regret supposes a belief in institutions, 
and an attendant belief that they can be renegotiated from within. The 
experience of autonomy matters a great deal, of course. It is just that 
autonomy itself — at least in the realm of politics — cannot exist as a first 
principle, nor can it be known or experienced in a categorically distinct 
way. No institution can be satisfying in every way, which is something that 
we should be able to see, first, in what we describe as our own sensibility.
In this respect, I have in mind a late passage in Roland Barthes by Ro­
land Barthes, entitled Terre promise, in which Barthes reflects, in the third 
person, on his own regrets: “He regretted not being able to embrace all 
avant- gardes at once, he regretted being limited, too conventional, etc.; 
and his regret could be illuminated by no sure analysis: just what was it 
he was resisting? What was he rejecting (or even more superficially: what 
was he sulking over) in one place or another? A style? An arrogance? A vi-
olence? An imbecility?”5 What Barthes acknowledges in himself, presum-
ably, is what he also has gotten over, since Barthes — much like the nar-
rator of The Postman Always Rings Twice — sees something else than what 
“he” once saw. If “he” regretted not being able to embrace every instance 
of avant- garde art, Barthes — the one who writes of an earlier “he” — 
seems to have recognized that it would be foolish to suppose that every in-
stance of avant- garde art is worth supporting, in principle, and that every 
instance could or should be known, moreover. If regret can be illumined 
by no sure analysis, it is because regret supposes no surety, on the one 
hand, and must reject analysis itself, on the other, at least when analysis 
proceeds on the basis of possibility. What comes forward in Barthes’s 
reflection on regret, here, is what regret should actually oppose and also 
mitigate against: a style (as if there were just one, or even just one in 
every one), an arrogance (why should I talk to him?), a violence (which 
is wrapped up with an analysis that works as much as one that fails — 
first when we accept advice, and second when we reject it), and an im-
becility (what I assume of the other who prefers something other than 
what I do). What Roland Barthes seems to do, here, is to regret the way 
that he had been thinking of regret — namely, as a worry about hypocrisy. 
Self- protection — or the careful maintenance of what I feature for others 
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and also to myself in the same way, while thinking about something else, 
also always in the same way — opposes thinking, which registers in this 
passage from Barthes as an instance of vulnerability rather than weak-
ness. The vulnerability that follows the acknowledgment of regret is an 
important political emotion precisely for the way in which it reopens us 
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 1 I am not concerned to develop this claim here, since my concern in this chapter 
is with a general theory of advice rather than an analysis of genre or style, but it 
would be worth considering the extent to which any instance of film noir tends 
to develop and display a structure of regret. How many of these films feature 
voice- over narrators that take us back through events that have already occurred 
expressly to show where the wrong decision was made on the basis of a fail-
ure of the will? In Fatalism in American Film Noir: Some Cinematic Philosophy 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), Robert Pippin considers a 
related question about the way in which films noir often stage misconceptions 
of reflective models of agency. Garnett’s Postman certainly meets all of the crite-
ria that Pippin convincingly identifies in his theory of fatalism. The difference 
that regret introduces, potentially, has to do with the way that we, as spectators, 
reflect on the flashback itself as a mode of regret that the characters nevertheless 
ignore, at least as a potential mode of emancipation. 
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understood as something that might be otherwise; what stands in reserve are 
aspects of phenomena that have been ordered in a particular way for a use that 
has already been destined, or instrumentalized, by the way in which the aspects 
of phenomena have been ordered. What lies in wait already has a function. Or 
as he puts it, “Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to that setting 
upon- upon, which sets upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in 
the mode of ordering, as standing- reserve. As the one who is challenged forth  
in this way, man stands within the essential realm of Enframing. He can never 
take up a relation to it only subsequently” (24).
   If man cannot take up a subsequent relation to what has been enframed, then 
at least two things are at stake. What man challenges forth — say, natural gas from 
shale — cannot be returned, nor lived with in a relation different than the one 
imagined and then made. It is not that what comes to presence does so in a state 
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what is real and thus in what stands in reserve: what waits as real, which now 
only means something to be used. In this way, man is co- responsible for what 
comes to presence as standing- reserve, insofar as man starts “something on its 
way to arrival.” Enframing, Heidegger insisted, was nothing technological; how-
ever, technology finalizes a relation between matter, aspect, and use in ways that 
appear necessary because irreversible. Thus, in terms of our discussion here, the 
inevitability of what stands in reserve, I would argue, leaves the human in a non-
voluntary relation that was established nevertheless voluntarily. In this way, regret 
could never follow from enframing, from an act of challenging forth in a way that 
cannot be reversed, at least not in the way that I imagine it. Martin Heidegger, The 
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2013), in which a senatorial candidate from Hammond, South Carolina, is 
featured in a long shot, sitting screen left across from his wife, who is featured 
screen right. The scene involves a conversation between the couple, in which 
they will try to reckon with what will become of them and also his campaign 
now that the wife has been exposed in the media as having had an affair with her 
husband’s political rival. At the end of the scene, the camera stays in place but 
refocuses such that we can see, in the rear plane of the image — and in between 
the couple trying to decide whether the husband must carry on with his cam-
148 · notes to chapter two
paign, the husband’s political advisor — the one who decided what it is possible 
to say, and to do, and who was always there in the frame, even if not always seen. 
 15 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 
1973), 57. 
 16 What I am saying here brushes up against Ernesto Laclau’s conception of hege-
mony and the contingent articulation of the social through the establishment 
of an equivalential relation, whereby our differences are de- emphasized for the 
sake of what we might share as a lack that needs to be rectified in the social as 
it currently exists. The primary difference that I want to introduce here between 
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